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This thesis contributes to contemporary research on neoliberalism by analysing the ‘social 
investment market’ (SIM) as part of the reproduction and remaking of hegemony since 
the financial crisis of 2008. It describes the modernisation attempts under the idea of 
‘ethical capitalism’ to deal with multiple problems of market governance, by linking it 
with new notions of public responsibility, in order to bring about a sustainable recovery 
by harmonising relations between government, market, and society. My original 
contribution to knowledge is the fusion of a cultural political economy perspective, 
developed by Sum and Jessop (2013), with a historical materialist policy analysis, which 
allows me to explain ‘moral capitalism’ – defined by Clarke (2010a, p. 388) as a “muted 
echo of popular scepticism and outrage about the crisis of the present” – in strategic-
relational terms. This is understood as an encounter, negotiation, and provisional and 
unstable compromise between competing projects of restructuring, namely between an 
effort to ‘restore’ neoliberal hegemony on the one side, and efforts to advance 
‘progressive post-neoliberal alternatives’ (Peck, Theodore, & Brenner, 2010, p. 112), on 
the other. I demonstrate this perspective by reconstructing two cases of Social Impact 
Bonds – projects seeking to employ markets for the achievement of public goals, 
identifying both the possibilities for substantive change as well as limitations, in the 
ongoing context of political economic crisis. 
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“Nothing less than a revolution is needed to improve the lives of millions who are being 
left behind.” – G8 Social Impact Investment Taskforce (2014, p. 39) 
 
 
“[M]oral capitalism’ is a muted echo of popular scepticism and outrage about the crisis 
of the present” – John Clarke (2010a, p. 388) 
 
 
“‘[P]rogress’ occurs as the reaction of the dominant classes to the sporadic and 
incoherent rebelliousness of the popular masses—a reaction consisting of ‘restorations’ 
that agree to some part of the popular demands and are therefore ‘progressive 
restorations’, or ‘revolutions-restorations’, or even ‘passive revolutions’. – Antonio 




“The problem is to see whether in the dialectic of ‘revolution/restoration’ it is 
revolution or restoration which predominates; for it is certain that in the movement of 
history there is never any turning back, and that restorations in toto do not exist.” – 
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1. Chapter 1 – Introduction: Hegemony crisis and ‘ethical capitalism’ 
This thesis contributes to contemporary research on neoliberalism by analysing efforts to 
reshape hegemony through the idea of ‘ethical capitalism’ in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis. I am concerned with attempts to modernise market governance by linking 
it to new notions of public responsibility (Sprague, 2010) . The object of this investigation 
is the ‘social investment market’ (SIM) (Dowling & Harvie, 2014) as a means of 
harmonising the relations between government, economy, and society, and to achieve a 
sustainable and equitable recovery from the crisis. 
I contribute to understandings of ‘moral capitalism’ by analysing the “muted echo of 
popular scepticism and outrage about the crisis” (Clarke, 2010a, p. 388) as a provisional 
compromise between competing projects of restructuring. This is to say, I investigate 
these projects as an encounter, negotiation, and asymmetrical settlement between 
competing restructuring projects, namely, between efforts to restore neoliberal hegemony 
on the one side and the desire to constrain or transcend market governance on the other 
side. This investigation fuses a cultural political economy perspective, developed by Sum 
and Jessop (2013), with a historical materialist policy analysis (Brand, 2014; Buckel, 
Georgi, Kannankulam, & Wissel, 2014; Kannankulam & Georgi, 2014). 
The research project is based on case studies of two ‘Social Impact Bonds’, seeking to 
‘mobilise private capital for public good’ (Warner, 2013), in New York City and the U.K. 
city of Peterborough. In these cases, I describe efforts to use markets to transform public 
services, reduce incarceration, and to lower public liabilities in service experimentation. 
The cases describe new approaches to fiscal problems through efforts to ‘mobilise’ 
private capital for public good. And they represent efforts to respond to slow and uneven 
economic growth with the idea of ‘producing shared value’ which yield both ‘financial 
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and social rewards’. My analysis reveals the contours of these dynamic new projects and 
the engagement and contestation between competing actors and visions, identifying both 
their possibilities and constraints for substantive transformation in the context of the on-
going and evolving political economic crisis. 
1.1. The disruption of hegemony and the ‘strange non-death of neoliberalism’ 
The economic crisis of 2008, the related disruption of hegemony, and resulting changes 
to contemporary capitalism are of major concern for contemporary scholarship. Not only 
did the financial meltdown disrupt the structures of capitalism in a way not seen since the 
crash of 1929, inherited belief systems of market rationality were equally shaken. 
Confidence in the superiority of liberal market democracy and triumphant assurances of 
the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama 1989), pronounced just a quarter century before, were 
suddenly challenged. Scholars and commentators alike reminded us of the historical 
contingency, rather than natural destiny, of market governance, deepening awareness of 
our specific political conjuncture and the possibility of a ‘postneoliberal’ future.  
Both scholars and political leaders defined 2008 as a moment of change in the trajectory 
of historical development. Wallerstein (2008) wrote of the coming “demise of neoliberal 
globalization”, while U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown said that “the old era of 
unbridled free market dogma was finally ushered out” (The Guardian, 2009a). Post-
neoliberal perspectives re-emerged – both on the left and right (Clarke, 2010b; Jessop, 
2012; Solty, 2013) – with calls for a ‘Green New Deal’, ‘public responsibility’, welfare 
expansion, and the ‘re-embedding’ of the economy (Dale, 2012). Neo-Keynesian 
stimulus packages were short-lived (Blyth, 2013, p. 54) and a Polanyian double 
movement did not occur. 
   
9 
 
Instead of a ‘post-neoliberal’ turn, market governance returned, as “the global crisis set 
the stage for another neoliberal counteroffensive”, writes Peck et al. (2012). Rather than 
restraining markets, there was a return to ‘business as usual’ seen in the “massive public 
subsidy paid to failing financial institutions to ensure that the ‘system’ is saved”, Clarke 
argues (2015, pp. 49–50). This sharp rise in government debt was to be solved through 
sharp reductions in public expenditures in the turn to fiscal austerity and welfare 
retrenchment (Blyth, 2013, p. 5). 
This ‘strange non-death of neoliberalism’ (Crouch, 2011) proceeds by eroding or 
avoiding channels of public input about economic decisions in what Crouch (2016) calls 
‘post-democracy’ (Habermas, 2011).  In this situation, “markets set the agenda and 
(fiscal) constraints of public policies, but there is little that public policies in their turn 
can do in terms of constraining the realm and dynamics of the ever-expanding market” 
(Offe, 2013). In the ‘crisis of democratic capitalism’ (Streeck, 2011), market rule is re-
imposed in the form of an ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ (Bruff, 2014). In two leading 
liberal market economies, for example, harsh austerity measures are implemented with 
the U.K. central government ‘devolving’ responsibility onto local authorities, and U.S. 
municipalities have had their budgetary authority suspended in order to enact ‘emergency 
[economic] management’ (Peck, 2012a, p. 635, 2014a, p. 40). Nor do all repressive 
actions have clearly utilitarian purposes, as Davies (2016, p. 131) argues, but instead 
express a ‘punitive neoliberalism’ which acts out a “desire to extract some form of 
vengeance”. This forceful re-imposition of control also means the exclusion, repression, 
and fragmentation of alternatives. 
But the forceful re-imposition of neoliberalism creates legitimacy problems. According 
to Offe (2013), market rule is increasingly “absen[t] of any supporting normative theory” 
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and “stripped of any shred of justification.” Market rule lacks innovation and cannot be 
‘reinvigorated’ (Dale, 2012, p. 3). We’re confronted with a situation of ‘zombie 
neoliberalism’ (Peck, 2010) that is ‘dead but dominant’ (Smith, 2008). If the manifold 
crisis of neoliberalism includes economic, fiscal, social, and environmental dimensions, 
this is now compounded by legitimacy problems, or what Gramsci (1971) called a ‘crisis 
of intellectual and moral leadership’ (see Gill, 2012). In this situation, political 
alternatives are blocked, and with it, the possibility of political-economic renewal. 
1.2. ‘Ethical capitalism’ as hegemonic renewal? 
While much research on contemporary neoliberalism focuses on its post-democratic 
restoration, scholars have also observed efforts since 2008 to ‘re-moralise’ capitalism 
(Clarke, 2010a, p. 388; Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 430; Wallerstein, 2011). Clarke (2010a, 
p. 388) points to new “regulatory desires” wherein “[t]he ‘casino capitalism’ of the past 
[would] be tamed, restrained and made more people-friendly by injections of morality, 
ethical standards and a sense of social responsibility”. Jayasuriya (Sprague, 2010, pp. 129–
130) describes the emergence of “new notions of ‘public responsibility’ within forms of 
market governance” , and asks whether these outcomes of the 2008 crisis reflect a “move 
away from pre-crisis forms of regulatory governance” and towards “socialis[ing] 
neoliberalism”. 
For example, the OECD (2010) seeks an alternative to ‘business as usual’ involving an 
“ethical capitalism” which achieves a “stronger, cleaner and fairer society”, and achieves 
a sustainable recovery of inclusive growth. In this visions, “[b]usinesses have a role to 
play”, but they should “plac[e] people at the centre of economic undertakings” and 
“realise collective well-being” (ibid). Such initiatives should go beyond existing 
corporate social responsibility schemes, which rely on firms’ voluntary assumption of 
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responsibility (Crouch, 2006, p. 1534), and instead, require governments to “set the 
institutions right” by creating the adequate “legal framework[s] and fiscal policies” 
(OECD, 2010). The idea of ‘ethical capitalism’ is a renewal of a ‘neo-corporatist’ vision 
(Jessop, 2002a, p. 462) based on cross-sector collaboration between governments, market 
actors, and civil society, with the aim of reversing the polarisations of neoliberalism and 
achieving mutually beneficial goals. 
Yet, whereas scholars have noted the development of ‘ethical capitalism’ projects since 
the crisis of 2008, they have not been subjected to a sustained critical analysis, as to their 
intentions and effect upon the political economic trajectory and contemporary hegemony. 
This thesis fills this research gap by uncovering the content of this strategy, analysing its 
aims and objectives to reform contemporary neoliberalism through the partial 
incorporation of progressive ideas. In doing so, I aim to contribute to scholarship about 
the ‘strange non-death of neoliberalism’ (Crouch, 2011), by showing how its coercive 
restoration is complemented by strategies to create a new, inclusive consensus that 
“maintain[s] the system with a minimum of force and a maximum of persuasion” 
(Wallerstein, 2011, p. 86). In doing so, I investigates the ‘iterative process’ of political 
economic development since 2008 and efforts to restore and reshape hegemony against 
the background of political economic disruptions, and the competing strategies of social 
restructuring. 
1.3. The ‘social investment market’ as research object 
Efforts to foster an ‘ethical capitalism’ since 2008 have come from some of the highest 
international organisations, from national states, and from local and regional 
governments, often in collaboration with market actors and civil society organisations. 
According to the G8 (2014), an ‘ethical capitalism’ is being concretely advanced in the 
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form of the ‘social investment market’. According to McHugh et al. (2013, p. 247) write, 
“[t]he term ‘social investment’ in this context refers to a monetary investment in a social 
policy initiative, providing the investor with a financial return while delivering public 
welfare services.” But the SIM is framed in even broader terms as a new investment 
paradigm to solve the social problems of twenty-first century capitalism, as we see below. 
The 2013, the G8’s new Social Impact Investment Taskforce (2014, p. 1) proclaimed that 
“[t]he financial crisis of 2008 highlighted the need for a renewed effort to ensure that 
finance helps build a healthy society”. The shaken belief in the self-regulating market 
gave way to the need for the ‘social investment market’ that would “bring the invisible 
heart of markets to guide their invisible hand” (ibid). This would bring about “a revolution 
in the way we solve society’s toughest problems” (ibid). Advancing a neo-corporatist 
perspective, they proclaimed a “new unifying force [to] harness entrepreneurship, 
innovation and capital” and “tackle social and environmental issues in the 21st century” 
(ibid). One “high-level recommendation” is the ‘social impact bond’ (see below) (2014, 
p. 6). 
The ‘social investment market’ was elevated by the European Union (European 
Commission, 2013, 2017; European Investment Fund, 2013) and the World Economic 
Forum, among other organisations, to move ‘impact investing’ “from the margins to the 
mainstream” (World Economic Forum, 2013). In 2017, the Global Impact Investing 
Network (2017) estimated the market’s value at more than £800 billion.  
The ‘social investment market’ is investigated in this thesis by analysing a leading policy 
approach, namely the ‘social impact bond’ (SIB) (Dowling, 2016; McHugh et al., 2013; 
Warner, 2013; Whitfield, 2015). Since the introduction of the world’s first SIB in 2010, 
more than 100 such projects exist today, totalling over £280 million (Pioneers Post, 2018). 
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Most of the SIBs are concentrated in the OECD countries, and especially in the two 
leading ‘liberal market economies’ (P. A. Hall & Soskice, 2001), the U.K. and U.S., 
known for their strong financial sectors and limited welfare protections. SIBs have also 
appeared in the global South in the form of ‘development impact bonds’ (Center for 
Global Development & Social Finance, 2013). 
Social Impact Bonds  
Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) are a central policy of the SIM. They articulate the idea of 
‘ethical capitalism’ through the neo-corporatist idea of ‘unifying’ government, market, 
and society in a mutually-beneficial arrangement by ‘mobilising private capital for public 
good’ (Warner, 2013). In simple form, the SIB aims to attract non-governmental 
resources to public services, and which rewards private investors based on the 
performance of such preventative interventions. 
A government commissioner sets a policy goal that seeks to reduce reliance on welfare. 
They seek to lower the number of children in care homes, persons in homeless shelters, 
as well as the number of people collecting unemployment aid (Social Finance, 2016; The 
Brookings Institution, 2015; Whitfield, 2015). They are also used in the area of criminal 
justice, and my investigation focuses on efforts to reduce incarceration levels (see chapter 
3). Instead of directly financing the services, a government commissioner secures up-
front resources from external actors, in the form of a private investment (Warner, 2013, 
p. 303). Services are contracted to community, charitable, or non-profit organisations to 
administer preventative programmes. But the aim is not the mere provision of service, but 
to achieve concrete and measurable ‘outcomes’, for example, reducing the number of 
children in care homes or persons in prison. Yet, not only are service objectives different, 
‘social impact’ also aims to achieve corresponding reductions in public welfare 
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expenditures, or in my cases, for remedial institutions. Such anticipated savings are 
crucial, because a portion of such savings are paid by the commissioner to the investors 
as profitable return. SIBs claim to only “pay out financial returns [if] specified social 
outcomes have been met” (McHugh et al., 2013, p. 248). But SIB are a risk product which 
do “not guarantee a fixed rate of return”  (Warner, 2013, p. 1). Only if ‘social impact’ is 
achieved do investors receive a profitable return; otherwise, they risk losing their 
principal. In this way, the SIB aims to transform conflictual relations between 
government, the private sector, and society into a mutually-beneficial relationship around 
‘aligned interests’ and thereby advance the project of an ‘ethical capitalism’. 
As described in chapter 3, my investigation analyses two case studies of social impact 
bonds, including efforts to reduce high levels of re-incarceration in the world’s first SIB 
in the U.K. city of Peterborough from 2010 to 2015 (Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2013), and 
a similar project in New York City from 2012 to 2015 (Lake, 2015; Schram, 2015). The 
following section presents an initial overview of the theoretical and methodological 
approach guiding this investigation, which is further described in the following two 
chapters. 
1.4. Theory and methods – Cultural political economy and historical 
materialist policy analysis 
This investigation of the renewal of capitalism is guided by theories of hegemony, 
specifically those informed by the cultural political economy (CPE) approach developed 
by Jessop and Sum (Jessop, 2004, 2010; Sum, 2012; Sum & Jessop, 2013) and historical 
materialist policy analysis (HMPA) (Brand, 2014; Buckel et al., 2014; Kannankulam & 
Georgi, 2014). As described in the following chapter, CPE and HMPA both integrate 
Marx’s critique of political economy with Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and Foucault’s 
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concept of knowledge and power, to create a robust framework for analysing dynamic 
societal processes, their contradictions, and their transformations. 
Here, the CPE and HMPA allow ‘ethical capitalism’ to be analysed as part of the iterative 
process of political economic reconstitution and production of hegemony. Accordingly, 
it is considered as a contingent set of compromises or provisional settlements in the 
specific historical conjuncture, resulting from the combination of crises, and the 
differential capacity of strategic actors to operationalise their goals. 
From such a starting point (elaborated in chapter 2), I begin from the view that the 
attempted links between market governance and public responsibility reflect not a single 
but rather a multiplicity of somewhat diverging values, ideas, actors, and practices, and 
their re-articulation and assemblage into a set of practices. In the absence of a grand 
double movement to roll back or transcend market rule, the SIM is understood here as 
part of the ‘iterative reconstitution’ (Brenner et al., 2010, 16) of competing strategies of 
social restructuring. From this view, the ‘hybrid’ character of SIBs can be investigated as 
an encounter between multiple and divergent crisis management strategies, each seeking 
to impress its own trajectory upon state and societal developments (Hay, 1999). This 
allows policies to be conceived as the formation of “unstable compromises among social 
forces” within the state (Brand, 2014, p. 436), an instability resulting from underlying 
crisis-dynamics and social conflicts. Policy analysis can then reconstruct such processes 
by identifying divergent positions, locate the fault-lines between opposing strategies, 
describe the negotiation and consensus achieved both symbolically and materially, 
observe the power asymmetries in these processes, and locate uneven outcomes and 
problem displacement (Sum & Jessop, 2013, 24). 
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Hence, I am interested in reconstructing how spatio-temporally concrete compromises 
shape “the contours, forms, norms, procedures and practices that characterize an emergent 
state regime” (Hay, 1999, p. 331), or cross-sector collaboration between government, 
private, and civil society actors. This investigation of SIBs looks equally into both the 
discursive contestations and consensus achieved in narrating the causes and proposed 
solutions of certain problems (discussed below), as well as the efforts to materially 
reshape social practices, and collective and institutional action.  More specifically, the 
attempt with SIBs to link market governance to ‘public responsibility’, is analysed as an 
asymmetrical and unstable compromise between efforts on the one side to ‘restore’ and 
extend market rule, and those forms of “resistance” seeking to contain or even transcend 
neoliberalism on the other side (N. Brenner et al., 2010b).  
This allows me to reconstruct the development of concrete policies by focusing on the 
way concepts and social, fiscal, and economic crises evolve and interpenetrate, how new 
ideas are presented as solutions, and which social practices are developed across the state, 
economy, and society to address them. 
I reconstruct two case studies of Social Impact Bonds (see chapter 3). These are the 
world’s first SIB in the U.K. city of Peterborough and a second in New York City, both 
located in the area of criminal justice, and which seek to ‘mobilise private capital’ to fund 
services to reduce rates of reconviction among people held in local jails. The case studies 
describe the problem narrations and their discursive framing of solutions which build 
consensus to extend or modify existing modes of collective and institutional action in the 
city. This means investigating how they compete in urban settings to narrate and shape 
“objects of governance” (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 220), creating consensus around 
specific policy approaches and crisis management strategies (2013, p. 405). 
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Policy plays an important role in the operationalization of crisis management strategies. 
According to HMPA, it is understood as a “politico-strategic terrain” for the pursuit of 
broader goals (Kannankulam & Georgi, 2014, pp. 64–65), struggles actors enter into 
according to their own strategic calculations. Concrete policies, conceived as 
compromises, denote however, that multiple agents determine the urban policy process, 
requiring an investigation that accounts for the presence of multiple local state and non-
state actors, as well as regional and state-level agents. My research therefore weighs the 
influence of each project within the investigated conflict, identifying how each is present 
within it and what influence they have upon material and symbolic outcomes. 
The SIBs are analysed in terms of the specific ways they address these three, interrelated 
crises, namely social, fiscal, and economic crises (see chapter 3). I assess how policy 
actors succeed or fail to frame these problems, with regard to causes and solutions, and 
the social practices they advance, as well as the outcomes that result. In doing so, I 
contribute to research about neoliberalism’s renewal by identifying contestations over, 
and contradictions within market rule and the effort to ‘progressively’ remake it. 
1.5. Research questions 
My investigation is guided by the following three groups of research questions: 
 How does ‘ethical capitalism’ respond to the crisis of neoliberal hegemony? How 
does it link market modes of governance with new notions of public responsibility, 
as Jayasuriya (Sprague, 2010, p. 129) argues? How does it narrate the crisis? 
Which causes does it identify and which solutions does it propose? Which 
practical measures does it take to ‘align the interests’ of government, market, and 
society as a response to the crisis? 
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 How does ‘ethical capitalism’ fuse market ideas with progressive perspectives? In 
what sense does it express, as Clarke (2010a, p. 388) writes, the “popular 
scepticism and outrage about the crisis”, and how does it simultaneously “mute” 
such critiques? Do such projects articulate a ‘third way’, between orthodox 
neoliberalism and its alternatives, in what Fraser (2017a, 2017b, 2017c) calls a 
‘progressive neoliberal alliance’? If so, how are advocates of market expansion 
linked with proponents of ‘progressive post-neoliberal alternatives’ (Peck et al., 
2010, p. 112)? Which advantages and limitations does each group achieve in these 
contingent alliances? 
 What status does ‘ethical capitalism’ have in the struggle over broader political 
economic developments and hegemony? Does it act merely to restore legitimacy 
in neoliberal hegemony by compensating for its post-democratic deficiencies? 
Does it instead open up a post-neoliberal trajectory? Or does it reflect simply a 
passing moment in the ongoing struggle over hegemony? 
1.6. Structure of the thesis 
The following chapter presents the theoretical perspective fusing CPE and HMPA, 
explaining how Marx, Gramsci, and Foucault may be brought together to interrogate the 
dynamic process of hegemony production. I describe the analytical tools deployed for 
investigating ‘ethical capitalism’ in the context of capitalist crisis and efforts at restoration 
and change. Chapter 3 describes the research strategy and methodologies used to develop, 
analyse, and evaluate my cases of two Social Impact Bonds in the U.K and U.S. 
Afterwards, I provide, in Chapter 4, a historical contextualization of my research object, 
including its pre-history during ‘second wave neoliberalism’ during the 1990s, and the 
rapid emergence and diffusion of the SIM and SIBs since the crisis of 2008. 
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The first case study is presented in Chapter 5, analysing the world’s first Social Impact 
Bond, in the U.K. city of Peterborough. This reconstructs the contestation, renegotiation, 
and tensions of managing social, fiscal, and economic crisis through efforts to ‘mobilise 
private capital’ to fund preventative services to reduce re-offending among short-term 
offenders. In Chapter 6 I present the New York City SIB, involving an investment from 
Goldman Sachs to reduce offending among adolescents detained at Rikers Island jail.  
Chapter 7 provides my consolidated research findings through a case comparison, and 
discusses SIBs as a contradictory and unstable compromise under the concept of 
‘progressive neoliberalism’. Chapter 8 concludes this thesis by discussing ‘ethical 
capitalism’ in the broader context of contestations over hegemony, and presents ideas for 
future research investigations. 
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2. Chapter 2 – Theorising hegemony: Cultural political economy and 
historical materialist policy analysis 
This chapter presents my theoretical approach to the topic of ‘ethical capitalism’, based 
on cultural political economy and historical materialist policy analysis. Whereas chapter 
one introduced my research topic, the current one conceptualises it as part of the iterative 
development of the political economy and dynamic process of hegemony production and 
change. CPE and HMPA are located in the field of critical political economy research, 
and are concerned with the discursive-material production of social reality which seek to 
foster a constructive dialogue between Marx’s critique of political economy, Gramsci’s 
theory of hegemony, and Foucault’s concepts of knowledge and power (Best & Paterson, 
2009).  
In particular, my analysis draws from two complementary theories, the ‘cultural political 
economy’ (CPE) of Jessop and Sum (Jessop, 2004, 2010; Sum, 2012; Sum & Jessop, 
2013), and the ‘historical materialist policy analysis’ (HMPA) (Brand, 2014; Buckel et 
al., 2014; Kannankulam & Georgi, 2014). These theories have developed in reciprocal 
engagement, and as Caterina (2017) argues, may be productively linked. The major part 
of this chapter presents the main aspects of CPE. It focuses on the dynamic process of 
social change and stability, the (re)production of hegemony, the process of ‘passive 
revolution’, the role of meaning making and structuration, contextual biases, strategic 
action, and the idea of provisional compromises. This allows for the conceptualisation of 
SIBs as part of the dynamic and iterative process of political economic change, both in 
response to structural problems encountered by neoliberalism, and as efforts to achieve 
stability by incorporating alternatives. 
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Yet, CPE is enhanced with HMPA in the second part of this chapter to enhance the 
investigation of hegemony by connecting it to critical policy analysis. HMPA makes two 
important contributions. First, it builds upon CPE’s understanding of hegemony as an 
encounter between multiple perspectives and actors through its concept of ‘hegemony 
projects’. This allows me to investigate the link between market governance and public 
responsibility as a relationship between competing strategies of social restructuring and 
the actor groups supporting them. But HMPA offers a second contribution to my 
theoretical framework. This regards the link it offers for analysing the relationship 
between a broad hegemony project and a more circumscribed policy. Conceiving policy 
as the ‘politico-strategic terrain’ for advancing a hegemony project (Buckel et al., 2014; 
Kannankulam & Georgi, 2014), I may connect analytical levels between ‘ethical 
capitalism’, the ‘social investment market’, and social impact bonds. 
2.1. Cultural political economy 
Cultural political economy (CPE) advances a theory of development bringing together 
Marx’s critique of political economy with Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and Foucault’s 
conception of knowledge and power (Sum & Jessop, 2013, pp. 205–214). It seeks to 
integrate these theorists by drawing out the ontological assumptions of Marx by 
evaluating the interdependence between the mode of economic production with the 
institutions and norms of political and civil society, which assumes the inherent 
meaningfulness of societal structures for coordinating human action (Sum & Jessop, 
2013, p. 1). This ontological assumption is expressed in Eagleton’s description of theory 
in which he writes that “just as all social life is theoretical, so all theory is a real social 
practice” (1990, p. 24). In the following sections, I explain CPE’s conception of 
hegemony, beginning with its ideas on societal change and stability. 
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2.2. Stability and change 
In presenting CPE’s conception of stability and change, this section focuses on Marx’s 
critique of the capitalist mode of production, Gramsci’s conception of hegemony, and 
Foucault’s ideas about knowledge and power.  
The capitalist mode of production can be understood as a generalized system of 
commodity production, geared not primarily towards the generation of qualitative ‘use 
values’ but instead, towards the accumulation of quantitative and tradeable ‘exchange 
values’ (Marx, 1990, p. 138). The expansive accumulation of capital plays a central 
organising role in modern societies (Marx, 1990), not only within the narrowly conceived 
‘economic’ sphere, but in society more broadly. It relies upon “supplementary modes of 
reproduction, regulation and governance”, Jessop (2002b, p. 11) writes, including social, 
political, cultural or other institutions, norms, practices, and systems of meaning to ensure 
its reproduction as a social order. 
The relation of the mode of production to other instances of contemporary capitalist 
societies is viewed here in a dynamic and omnidirectional way. Because the economy 
lacks the “self-closure necessary to determine the extra-economic”, the former is 
“reciprocally determined by the [extra-economic] in turn” (Jessop, 2002b, p. 23). The 
mode of production’s dependence upon ‘external’ instances to secure its reproduction, 
means that there is also an increase in the space for agency to steer it in different directions 
(2002b, p. 18). Nonetheless, economic forces play a key role in shaping societal 
trajectories because “wealth must be produced before it can be distributed” (Jessop, 
2002b, p. 24). Because the basis of material life must first be secured before social 
relations can be changed, the economic holds an ‘ecological dominance’ (Jessop, 2002b, 
pp. 24–25) within society. This idea differs from a conception of economic dominance 
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based on the idea of absolute control (a determinist base-superstructure relationship) on 
the one hand, but also challenges a loose conception of multiple powers in structural inter-
dependence. It emphasizes dynamic interdependence but also differences in power. 
Jessop writes that the ‘the economic’ has a “far greater capacity (…) to imprint its 
developmental logic on other system’s operations (…) than these systems are able to 
impose their respective logics on that system” (2002b, p. 25). 
This extended view of societal reproduction beyond the immediate economic core is 
enhanced by the work of Gramsci (1971), for whom capitalism’s interdependence with 
other organizing systems and practices was central to his theory of hegemony. Here, 
Gramsci (1971, p. 263) is interested in the state in its ‘integral’ sense, including both 
political and civil society, as sites where coercion and consent are used to achieve 
compromise and order in a context of contradiction and social conflict. Such an order 
represents a ‘historic bloc’ linking an economic mode of production with a 
complementary organisation of political power, mode of social life, familial and gender 
relations, and cultural norms. These settlements involve material concessions to the 
‘subaltern’, ensuring its reproduction and participation in an uneven and asymmetrical 
configuration.  
Inspired by Poulantzas (2014), Jessop and Sum (2013, p. 94) define a provisional 
settlement as an “unstable equilibria of compromises”, which is a “partial, improvised, 
temporary, and premature ‘harmony’”. Gramsci is concerned with the co-production of 
relations, and how competing actors pursue strategies – ‘war of position’ and ‘war of 
manoeuvre’ – to pursuit goals. His conception of ‘war of position’ is of particular 
importance for this research project as it refers to struggles over hegemony which traverse 
the ‘integral state’ of political and civil society (Gramsci, 1971, p. 238), and construct a 
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‘collective will’ (1971, p. 125) behind specific societal projects. This involves struggles 
over meaning, identity, concepts of justice and legitimacy, but also over institutional 
contours in the “stepwise transformation of the structural selectivities that may obstruct 
and/or facilitate the realization of the project” (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 204). 
Gramsci’s conception of hegemony, located in state and society, can be further extended 
by drawing on Foucault, argue both Sum and Jessop (2013, p. 207) and advocates of a 
HMPA (Brand, 2014, p. 427). Here, the former’s concept of ‘moral and intellectual 
leadership’ can be investigated with the latter’s contribution to modern power, 
particularly, with Foucault’s emphasis on discursive constructions and the production of 
societally accepted kinds of ‘knowledge’. For Foucault (1984, pp. 54, 72–73), “truth 
regimes” are contextually-situated forms of discursive organization with power effects 
that produce, “govern”, and constrain what may be said, and that produce subjects and 
identities. This “sedimentation of systems of rules and norms” consolidates what Gramsci 
called “conceptions of the world” and Foucault called “truth regimes” which stabilize 
unstable and diversely complex social orders, Sum and Jessop write (2013, p. 211), 
narrowing the scope of action “for developing alternatives and mobilizing opposition to 
the dominant order.” Critically important is the fact that these processes do not eliminate 
tensions or contradictions. Instead, Gramsci described ‘common sense’ as ‘contradictory’ 
(Rehmann, 2014, pp. 127–128). Yet he is not simply concerned with the variety of 
interpretations, but rather, with the way norms are produced, not through the elimination 
of difference, but through the elevation or marginalisation of different ideas within a 
contradictory common sense. Such variation and friction represent also potential sources 
of ‘resistance’ (Foucault) and proceed to become counter-movements. 
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But, while Foucault enriches a description of how questions, CPE re-connects them to 
why questions. The aim is to “link [Foucault’s] work on governmentality with [Marx and 
Gramsci’s interest in] the forms, institutional fixes and regulation-cum-governance of the 
capital relation” (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 213), its disruption, and the modification and 
reconstruction of market society in its aftermath.  
These three sources of theory provide the basis of an investigation into the dialectically 
linked structural and agential causes and mechanisms in the production of hegemony and 
in competing crisis governance strategies to shape the “contours, forms, norms, 
procedures and practices” of collective and institutional action, and “impose[s] a 
developmental trajectory” upon the state and civil society (Hay, 1999, p. 331) about 
which kinds of action are, and are not, possible. 
The aim of CPE is to develop a ‘third way’ between what Sum and Jessop describe as 
‘hard political economy’ and ‘radical social constructivism’, through their particular 
understanding of the dialectically intertwined moments of discursive-material reality. 
This proceeds by historicizing categories of political economy so to challenge the 
reification of capitalism as a natural system (e.g. either the concept of homo oeconomicus, 
or the idea of the ‘self-regulating market’), while also identifying the real causal effects 
upon society that these ‘social constructions’ have when they are generally accepted in 
society and instituted in social structures (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 126). CPE takes a 
‘cultural turn’ within political economy, by emphasizing the set of ‘extra-economic’ 
practices and systems, which provide the market with both its necessary support, yet also, 
sources of potential conflict. CPE focuses on the production of contingent social and 
institutional settlements. It aims to avoid the dilemmas of voluntarism, which, while 
correctly pointing to the socially constructed character of social formations, risk 
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downplaying causal economic mechanisms “including their distinctive logics, 
contradictions, dilemmas and crisis tendencies” which shape fields of action (Sum & 
Jessop, 2013, p. 177). It also challenges functionalist approaches which, instead of 
elevating agents above society, “reduces [them] to passive bearers of self-reproducing, 
self-transforming social structures” (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 180).  
This introduction leads to a focus on the key concept of hegemony, discussed below, and 
the relation between structure and agency, conceived by CPE in the strategic-relational 
approach, discussed in the section afterwards. 
This perspective has direct relevance for my construction of the research object, the Social 
Impact Bond. Bringing together Marx, Gramsci, and Foucault in the particular way 
described above, the analysis seeks a multi-causal explanation of SIBs in the current 
societal conjuncture. It is concerned with the economic structures, interests, and forces 
bringing this form of ‘ethical capitalism’ into being. That is, the ‘social investment 
market’ is analysed through the lens of capital accumulation. In this way, SIBs are 
analysed as a new opportunity for investors in a context of economic slump, and as a 
mode of capital accumulation in a ‘world awash with liquidity’ (IMF). Yet, the centrality 
of economic explanations should not overshadow the economy’s lack of closure, and 
thereby the necessity for political and cultural explanations. This effort to link market 
modes of governance with new notions of public responsibility and structures of 
accountability, means analysing “extra-economic” supports in two ways: on the one hand, 
as an effort to expand markets into areas previously shielded from it, and on the other 
hand, as an effort to ‘embed’ the market in other values or practices. Hence, the 
Gramscian contribution is the investigation of the influence of these different factors (i.e., 
their market-expanding and market-embedding factors), towards a new consensus on the 
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relation between economy and society, or the provisional ‘compromises’ or ‘settlements’ 
achieved between them. But Foucault’s insights are equally important, as his work 
develops further the ‘constructed’ nature of reality, assumptions under-developed in Marx 
and Gramsci’s work, and develops understandings of the micro-politics of power. Here, 
I interrogate the social investment market’s micro-politics of power in shaping 
conceptions of societal problems and their solutions, and how these also affect practices 
of economic investment, fiscal practices of governments, and social practices of public 
provisioning. 
2.3. Producing hegemony 
A key concept for CPE is hegemony, developed by Gramsci in his effort to explain the 
relative durability of advanced capitalist societies despite their internally contradictory 
tendencies and social conflicts. CPE brings Marx, Gramsci, and Foucault together in 
enhancing a concept that focuses on both agential and structural issues, describing the 
ongoing process of achieving a contingent yet contradictory unity, or an “unstable 
equilibria of compromises” in a given spatiotemporal context. Yet hegemony implies both 
a kind of leadership and the specific forms of such settlements produced by that leadership, 
shaped through newly sedimented meaning (i.e. accepted ideas), and social structures that 
organize and form the contours and “corridors” (Brand, 2014, p. 433) of collective action, 
in the ‘integral state’ of political and civil society. 
Expanding upon traditional understandings of power (and the state), which emphasize 
their negative and repressive dimensions, social forces lead, Gramsci argues, through the 
active construction of relatively durable social compromises between different actors and 
social forces through a combination of consent and coercion. Hegemony is coalition or 
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alliance-based power, albeit through asymmetrical relations, and uneven allotment of 
rewards. According to Thomas (2010), Gramsci conceives leadership as the selective and 
partial inclusion by leading groups of allies or opponents as junior partners through their 
active or tacit consent, and the coercive domination over and/or exclusion of opponents.1  
Such compromises are established through dialectically intertwined symbolic-material 
action creating a structured terrain within which involved actors may operate, “creat[ing] 
‘corridors’ of viable and reasonable action, frameworks and thinking, as well as policy-
making” (Brand, 2014, p. 433), ways of conceiving, selecting, construing, and shaping 
objects of steering. Poulantzas is helpful here, as he emphasizes the sedimentation and 
structuration of power relations, defining the state as the “material condensation of a 
social relation of forces” (2014, p. 128).2 Consensus sets agreements among the parties 
to a compromise limiting what content be or may not be included, and how the positions 
are related to one another. As Demirovic writes, hegemony “determines the conditions of 
possible polarizations” and “monopolizes power to define what might emerge as 
opposition and as a hostile force against the balance achieved by compromise” (quoted in 
Brand 2014, 433).3 
This productive conception of power involves the integration of diverse subjects, leading 
Jessop and Sum (2013, p. 201) to write that its effectiveness “depends on the capacity of 
dominant groups to suture the identities, interests, emotions and values of key sectors of 
                                                          
1 Thomas (2010, p. 163) writes that for Gramsci, “hegemony is the form of political power exercised over 
those classes in close proximity to the leading group, while domination is exerted over those opposing 
it. Consent is one of the means of forging the ‘composite body’ of a class alliance, while coercion is 
deployed against the excluded other. A class’s ability to lead, to secure the consent of allies, however, 
also relies upon its ability to coordinate domination over the opponents of this alliance, just as its ability 
to exert such coercive force depends upon its prior securing of the consent of such an alliance.” 
2 Poulantzas was an important influence in the early development of CPE (see Jessop 2007). 
3 Demirovic is referred to by Jessop and Sum as an important contributor to CPE (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 
91). 
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subordinate classes and other subaltern groups into a hegemonic vision and embed this in 
institutions and policies – leading in turn to their translation into common sense”. This 
task is assisted by ‘organic intellectuals’ (Gramsci) who function as “crucial bridges 
between economic, political and ideological domination, and as active agents in linking 
culture (especially knowledge) and subjectivity” (ibid). Such actors frame issues, 
formulate ‘solutions’, create ‘truth regimes’, which are to be linked to, and supported by 
corresponding social practices (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 202). A key element of power is 
the way leaders engage in “constructing, producing and circulating bodies of (moral, 
intellectual) knowledge that normalize (or resist) particular object fields, subject positions 
and relations of rule inscribed terrains” (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 203). 
But hegemony is not produced through consensus around common conceptions of the 
world, but has a ‘material substratum’ (Poulantzas, 2014, p. 31). Just as dominant 
discourses may partially incorporate alternative ideas, so do social compromises often 
provide limited ‘material concessions’ (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 201). These are of 
“positive significance for the popular masses” (Poulantzas, 2014, p. 31). Through 
compromises, “subaltern groups develop a real interest [and] expect real advantages that 
cannot in any way be reduced to a form of self-deceit”, Candeias writes (2013, p. 4).4  
Compromises, however, do not ensure the direct fulfilment of such interests and goals, 
but instead their reworking and partial integration into a larger set of agreements, often 
involving costs and even inversions. Fraser (2009, p. 108) illustrates this point with her 
description of the partial integration of second wave feminism’s critique of ‘state-
organised capitalism’ and the transition to neoliberalism. In this case, the women 
                                                          
4 Sum and Jessop also identify Candeias as a source of their understanding of hegemony (Sum & Jessop, 
2013, pp. 92–93). 
   
30 
 
movement’s critique of androcentric gender relations under Fordism were effective, but 
they did not lead to social equality. Instead, women could escape relations of family 
authority, but only through workforce entry, which, helped to unravel the ‘social wage’, 
while it increased overall labour time because of the ‘second shift’ of domestic household 
work. Here, feminist goals were partially fulfilled but also set back in the “shift in 
progressive thinking from equality to meritocracy” (N. Fraser, 2017c).5  
Conceiving hegemony as a provisional settlement then, seeks to bring into focus the 
presence of a plurality of actors, who are in a dynamic relation with one another, and who, 
with different degrees of power, ‘negotiate’ problems in response to ‘urgences’. But this 
coalition conception, and the provisional settlement character of hegemony, means also 
drawing attention to disruptions which accumulate across sites and scales and interrupt 
compromises, even causing their breakdown, resulting in new efforts to restore, modify, 
or transform them through new compromises that reconfigure power relations and set new 
developmental trajectories. 
Passive revolution 
A supporting concept to describe the production of hegemony as a dynamic process of 
establishing compromises in the face of challenges and disruptions is Gramsci’s “passive 
revolution” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 106). It denotes a process of “revolution/restoration” 
(Gramsci, 1971, p. 109), where ruling groups, organisations, and ideas respond to 
structural problems and/or challengers by both selectively incorporating alternatives, yet 
                                                          
5 This is the same kind of dialectical thinking applied by Marx, e.g., in his description of religion as both 
the ‘opiate of the masses’ and as the ‘heart in a heartless world’ (1983, p. 115), or his description of free 
labour as both emancipation from feudal domination but simultaneously dispossession from the means 
of production. 
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achieving a “restoration” through a forward motion that “revolutionizes” some aspects of 
society. 
Thomas (2010, p. 151) describes passive revolution in two “forms”, first, “cautious, 
defensive measure[s]” taken by a weakened hegemon, which “molecularly absorb[s] 
leading figures of the subaltern classes and oppositional social movements into a 
consolidating state apparatus and its ‘representative’ organs in civil society”. This form, 
Thomas suggests, involves a degree of progressive movement, of “social and cultural 
elevation” (ibid). The second “form” involves the stronger “absorptive capabilities” of 
the state and of its ability for the “bureaucratic incorporation” of opponents and 
alternatives, what Gramsci calls ‘transformismo’. Both forms, he continues, seek to upend 
the possibility that alternative forces become hegemonic and initiate significant changes 
in the course of historical development (Thomas, 2010, pp. 151–152).  
The concept of “passive revolution” – like that of hegemony – is disputed among scholars 
(Thomas, 2010), between those circumscribing it temporally and spatially, and others 
applying it more broadly to modes of political domination (see Callinicos 2010; Morton 
2010). The usage by CPE – and that employed in this thesis – is the broad usage, referring 
to passive revolutionary qualities involved in the processes of producing and securing 
hegemony. For Sum and Jessop, the term is used “to examine the ways in which a social 
class maintains its hegemony through gradual, molecular changes – a “‘revolution’ 
without ‘revolution’” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 59) – that operate through passive consent, the 
decapitation of resistance movements, and absorption of opposition through compromise 
and concession” (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 351).  
The concept of “passive revolution” has been used in the field of cultural political 
economy, to understand the pre-history of SIBs, namely, through Sum’s study of 
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Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (Sum & Jessop, 2013, pp. 324–351).  In it, she 
describes the interplay of disciplinary neoliberalism and its “new constitutionalism”, 
which erodes the moral basis of politics, produces a societal push-back from labour and 
environmental groups, which results in a ‘new ethicalism’ renegotiating compromises 
between international firms and local producers. In her analysis, Sum demonstrates how 
the concept of ‘passive revolution’ helps explain CSR, as conflicts between corporations 
(in her case Walmart) with workers and environmental groups are resolved through a 
‘new ethicalism’ which integrates opposition through the provision of partial concessions, 
but does so in such a way that is weighted towards the more powerful coalition partners 
(Sum & Jessop, 2013, pp. 346–348).6 While alternative concepts, such as ‘recuperation’ 
help identify the absorption and fragmentation of alternatives, the concept of ‘passive 
revolution’ focuses on a double movement, both the ‘recuperative’ and the modernizing 
elements, analysing both potential advances achieved, and persistent or new limitations 
imposed upon the subaltern. This may shift the “unstable equilibrium of forces” onto new 
terrain while maintaining its imbalance. Such processes are analysed, Gramsci (1971, pp. 
219–220) writes, to determine “whether in the dialectic of ‘revolution/restoration’ it is 
revolution or restoration which predominates; for it is certain that in the movement of 
history there is never any turning back, and that restorations in toto do not exist”. 
The concept of ‘passive revolution’ strengthens the investigation of SIBs because it helps 
me contextualise the research object as part of an iterative process similar to the 
development of the ‘new ethicalism’ described above. Just as CSR is the outcome of a 
process of contestation over globalisation, SIBs might similarly be explained as a 
contestation over neoliberal capitalism. Just as Sum expanded our understanding of CSR, 
                                                          
6  This case is discussed in the subsequent chapter historicizing SIBs. 
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by situating it within broad societal conflicts of the 1990s, the concept of ‘passive 
revolution’ can be equally productive in the analysis of SIBs by considering the 
incorporation of critics of neoliberalism since the crisis of 2008. It investigates how the 
crisis of neoliberalism and the blocked post-neoliberal transformation produces a 
‘compromise’ to deal with both structural contradictions and social conflicts. If “moral 
capitalism” is an “echo of popular scepticism and outrage about the crisis of the present”, 
as Clarke (2010a, p. 388) writes, this process of incorporation might be described as a 
passive revolution. The concrete investigation of SIBs aims to understand the encounter 
between competing strategies, and how these are combined and reworked in the process. 
2.4. Making meaning and building structure 
In investigating the stability, change, or transformation of social relations and hegemonic 
formations, CPE begins from the fundamental ontological assumption of the endless 
complexity of the social and natural world, and investigates the processes by which it is 
reduced, and with it, social orders are reproduced. It assumes that the social and natural 
world can neither “be grasped in all its complexity” nor allow for “all permutations of 
social relations [to] be realizable in the same time-space” (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 3). 
This impossibility necessitates processes of “complexity reduction”, processes of 
“enforced selection”, which “select” or privilege some meanings and social practices over 
others. CPE research investigates complexity reduction through semiosis (i.e. sense- and 
meaning-making) and structuration (or ‘structure building’). 
This means that the endless variety of possible perspectives is reduced through the 
selection of some aspects of the social and natural world as meaningful over others. Here, 
making sense of the world means making it “describable”, and “calculable”, and enabling 
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actors thereby to navigate and participate in it. But these interpretive acts are also 
productive, i.e. they generate meaning, co-constructing in an “intersubjective” process, 
the terrain determining what may be imagined as possible and ‘reasonable’ social action. 
“[C]onstruals”, Sum and Jessop (2013, p. 4) write, “may shape the natural and social 
world in so far as they guide a critical mass of self-confirming actions based on more or 
less correct diagnoses of unrealized potentials”. Drawing on Marx, they write that 
“construals become a ‘material force’, that is, have durable transformative effects in the 
natural and social world” (2013, p. 4). This emphasizes the way particular discourses, 
narratives, and identities come to be elevated and institutionalized over others in specific 
spatio-temporal contexts. 
The second mode of complexity reduction is structuration or “structure building” (Sum 
& Jessop, 2013, pp. 4, 149), involving “the emergent pattern of social interactions” 
(Jessop, 2010, p. 338). This narrows existing and potential social practices from the 
endless variety through the establishment of social organization. This is regarded as an 
ontological necessity. “If [social interactions] are not to be random, unpredictable, and 
chaotic, it is essential that possible connections and sequences of action are limited” 
(Jessop, 2010, p. 338). In other words: “not everything that is possible is compossible” 
(2013, p. 24). “[I]n contrast to the immense variety of individual elements of a social 
formation that are possible when considered in isolation at a given point in space-time,” 
they write, “there is a smaller set of elements that can be combined as articulated moments 
of a relatively coherent and reproducible structure” (2013, p. 24)7. Structuration then, 
                                                          
7  “This limits the chaotic variation of social relations in a given spatio-temporal matrix but cannot eliminate 
all interstitial, residual, marginal, irrelevant, recalcitrant and plain contradictory elements. Indeed these 
may provide redundancy and flexibility in the face of crises. In addition, a key part of securing order 
within a given spatio-temporal framework depends on the capacity to displace and defer problems 
elsewhere and into the future” (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 24). 
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means the narrowing of “the chaotic variation of social relations in a given spatio-
temporal matrix” (ibid), and hence stabilizing the social order. It means that certain social 
and institutionalized practices reduce – yet without eliminating – the variety of possible 
kinds of social action and interaction by setting the forms, principles, parameters, and 
logics of social organization and institutions. 
2.5. Three moments of development 
In investigating the production, disruption, modification, or potential transformation of 
given social configurations, CPE offers a three stage schema involving the evolutionary 
mechanisms of variation, selection, and retention. Demonstrating the usefulness of this 
approach, Sum and Jessop refer to moments of crisis, which can set off this evolutionary 
development. First, by disrupting established and accepted norms and social practices, 
they can trigger the variation of competing interpretations of the crisis and generate 
multiple crisis governance strategies [including, among others, that of “responsible” or 
“ethical capitalism”] (Jessop, 2012), a struggle over the selection of some strategies over 
others, and finally their retention (or implementation) in specific socio-temporal contexts, 
including specific policies. 
Variation 
The first stage initiating societal change and evolution is the disruption of an inherited 
mode of societal reproduction, or mechanisms within it. This denotes the moment(s) 
“when a set of social relations (including their connection to the natural world) cannot be 
reproduced (cannot ‘go on’) in the old way” (2013, p. 396), or, “when established patterns 
of dealing with structural contradictions, their crisis tendencies, and strategic dilemmas 
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no longer work as expected and, indeed, their continued reliance thereon may aggravate 
matters” (Jessop, 2010, p. 346). 
Such breakdowns may trigger dissonance among persons as inherited theories fail to 
adequately make sense or explain such events, “disrupt accepted views of the world and 
how to ‘go in’ within it and also call established theoretical and policy paradigms into 
question” (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 395), whether these are consciously or unconsciously 
accepted. This involves the de-naturalisation and “(re)politicization of sedimented 
discourses and practices” (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 404), which can affect “prevailing 
meta-narratives, theoretical frameworks, policy paradigms and/or everyday life” (2013, 
p. 414).  
Such cognitive disorientation can also “open the space for [the] proliferation (variation) 
in crisis interpretations” (2013, pp. 402–403), where alternative narratives are articulated 
which identify, construe, and explain the causes of breakdown, and which advance 
corresponding ideas for new or modified courses of action. Or as Eagleton (1990, p. 26) 
writes, for “much of the time, our intellectual and other activities bowl along fairly 
serenely”. But these “taken-for-granted activities” can “falter, log-jam, come unstuck, 
[or] run into trouble”, as they encounter ‘internal’ or ‘external’ pressures – or their 
combination. At such junctures “theory proves necessary” (ibid). It is “just a practice 
forced into a new form of self-reflectiveness on account of certain grievous problems it 
has encountered”, he writes (ibid). 
What happens in such moments is semiotic change, Jessop and Sum (2013, p. 166) write, 
involving the selection of other aspects of reality as meaningful, and their 
“transform[ation] into objects of observation, calculation and governance”. Such 
discourses range in breadth and depth, from those seeking to restore, modify, or 
   
37 
 
potentially transform them, and hence initiate a change in society’s developmental 
trajectory. The possibility for semiotic variation, for new meanings to advance, and for 
new societal paths to develop, depends however, upon social action (Sum & Jessop, 2013, 
p. 49). Different “economic, political, and intellectual actors” compete to “remake extant 
objects of governance and/or introduce new objects” (Sum, 2012, p. 6), hence to “remake 
the objects of governance discursively and materially” (Sum, 2012, p. 10). This is 
achieved by building a “new discursive chain” that “reinforces these objects of 
governance in part through interdiscursivity” (Sum, 2012, p. 6), and the 
“recontextualis[ation] [at] different sites and scales” (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 220). 
In this stage, “[s]ocial forces try to make one or another imaginary the hegemonic or 
dominant ‘frame’ in particular contexts” (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 171). They seek to 
achieve “consensus on interpretations about a crisis (or crises) and its (or their) most 
salient features”, and do so relationally, interacting with competing actors and initiatives. 
Such initiatives determine “private and public strategic and policy initiatives to manage 
the crisis and/or move beyond it” (Sum & Jessop, 2013, pp. 404–405). By framing an 
issue, they seek to “make one or another imaginary the hegemonic or dominant ‘frame’ 
in particular contexts and/or to promote complementary or opposed imaginaries” (Sum & 
Jessop, 2013, p. 171).  
Selection 
The second stage in this process is “selection”. Whereas semiotic variation produces new 
narratives in a moment of cognitive disorientation and social disruption, selection reduces 
complexity by narrowing semiotic variation, building a new consensus that is also 
institutionalised. 
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In this stage, some discourses are “privileged” over others in “representing social 
phenomena” and “for interpreting events” and “legitimizing actions” (Sum & Jessop, 
2013, p. 185). Selection involves the progression from discursive construal to social 
structuration, where, in reference to crises, some “imaginary paths to recovery” are 
“translat[ed] into specific social responses” (2013, p. 403), which begin to dominate 
common sense, and (re)shape collective action and institutional logics in the state and 
civil society.  
Selection involves then also the narrowing of semiotic variation by “limiting possible 
combinations of semiosis and semiotic practices” (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 185), showing 
struggles between actors and actor groups, or social forces, between competing strategies, 
in the struggle for hegemony. 
A critical component of CPE is understanding these evolutionary mechanisms as part of 
historical processes, analysing changes in social formations by analysing strategic action 
while accounting for contextual biases (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 150). In fact, Sum and 
Jessop write that “[r]evealing these biases and the variable scope for strategic action in 
different periods and conjunctures is the key to Herrschaftskritik” or the critique of 
domination or power (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 150). Accordingly, the selection of one 
imaginary over another “is not reducible to narrative resonance, argumentative force or 
scientific merit alone (although each may have a role)” (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 405), but 
must be analysed as the outcome of strategic action in a selective context, which: 
“creates a complex assemblage of asymmetrical opportunities for social action, 
privileging some actors over others, some identities over others, some ideal and 
material interests over others, some spatio-temporal horizons of action over 
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others, some coalition possibilities over others, some strategies over others and so 
on” (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 150).  
In such contexts, selection is not determined from the outset but rather is the outcome of 
struggles between individual and collective actors who reflexively “take account of this 
differential privileging through ‘strategic-context’ analysis when choosing a course of 
action” (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 49). 
The movement from variation to selection reduces unstructured complexity – where 
multiple imaginaries rest aside one another – to a structured one, where some imaginaries 
prevail as dominant discourse and common sense, and contribute to structuration by 
shaping social action as they are operationalized in social organisations and determine 
institutional practices. “The greater the range of sites (horizontally and vertically) in 
which resonant discourses are retained, the greater is the potential for effective 
institutionalization and integration into patterns of structured coherence and durable 
compromise”, which means also that “the constraining influences of complex, reciprocal 
interdependencies will also recursively affect the scope for retaining resonant discourses” 
(Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 185). 
In explaining the resonance of Social Impact Bonds, the task is then to provide an 
explanatory account as accurate as possible, for this second stage, of: 
“why and how some construals are selected, get embodied/embrained in 
individual agents or routinized in organizational operations, are facilitated or 
hindered by specific social technologies and affordances, and become embedded 
in specific social structures ranging from routine interactions via institutional 
orders to large-scale social formations” (Jessop, 2010, p. 339). 
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The hegemony focus of CPE emphasizes too that the selection of an imaginary is a 
relational process, where this is not adopted as an hermetically sealed object wholly 
different from its alternatives, but rather involves the re-contextualisation in a given 
context in relation to other discourses and social and institutional practices, with the 
renegotiation of existing compromises towards a new, and often asymmetrical settlement, 
involving the “allocat[ion] of costs”(Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 405), and the “absorption of 
opposition through compromise and [material] concessions” (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 
351). 
The ultimate selection of one imaginary in organisations and institutions affects the 
“contours, forms, norms, procedures and practices” of collective action, and “impose[s] 
a developmental trajectory” upon the state and civil society (Hay, 1999, p. 331) about 
which kinds of action are, and are not, possible. 
Retention 
The selection of a certain imaginary to make sense and meaning of some aspects of reality, 
and to provide [theoretical, logical, or value-based] guidance for collective action requires 
approval within existing institutions and social practices, and its translation into 
coordinated action. The third phase involves the sedimentation of some narratives over 
others as common sense and as organizing principles of social conduct, and their 
structuration through the “theoretical, interpretative and policy elaboration” in 
organisational and institutional practice. The third stage, of retention, shows how ideas 
are embedded and how they contribute to structuration. In this moment, “particular 
interests, norms, and ideas, as well as forms of compromise, organization of power, etc., 
become state – and hence public – policy” (Brand, 2014, p. 433). This structuration 
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defines the contours for what is regarded as “reasonable and viable action, frameworks 
and thinking” (2014, p. 433). Such achievements materialise “relatively durable patterns 
of social compromise” (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 405), social contracts defined not only 
by consensus between involved parties, but also define an outside set of ideas and 
practices that are excluded. Compromises secure not only interests of involved parties, 
but also “determines the conditions of possible polarizations” and “define[s] what might 
emerge as opposition and as a hostile force against the balance achieved by compromise” 
(Demirović quoted in Brand 2014, 433). 
Disruption 
These three evolutionary mechanisms provide an overall general approach towards 
investigating change and stability in social relations. But CPE’s critical realist ontology 
treats the achievement of such settlements not as final nor automatic, not as a reified 
object, but as dynamic social relations requiring work to constantly reproduce the social 
order. The “fit between imaginaries and real, or potentially realizable, sets of material 
interdependencies in the economy and its embedding in wider sets of social relations,” 
Sum and Jessop (2013, p. 405) write, is “always limited and provisional”. Tensions in 
achieved settlements, in newly sedimented meanings and forms of structuration, can 
always trigger a new cycle of negotiation, when social practices fail to continue to 
produce expected and routine outcomes, when they become internally conflictual with 
other sets of social practices, or when divergences between them and discourses, 
identities, values, etc. accrue. Such divergences can promulgate cognitive disorientation 
and compose new ‘urgences’ towards which new ‘problematizations’ (Foucault) are 
generated, hence potentially initiating the evolutionary mechanisms of variation-
selection-retention anew. 
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CPE understands the retention of certain imaginaries as spatio-temporal settlements or 
“fixes”, or as “unstable equilibria of compromise”, which are never complete, and require 
constant reproduction, and are always liable to encounter tension. There is the possibility 
of disruption, which leads to the beginning of the process again, based however not on 
unstructured terrain but rather one shaped by struggles of the past. Because hegemony is 
a concept for capturing a dynamic set of social relations, rather than static and fixed 
object, it is understood as a never-completed project, but rather always requiring its 
reproduction. Hence, the end of this process is the starting point for the next one, in an 
infinite cycle of renewal and disruption. Achieved settlements are the grounds and terrain 
upon which new challenges, contestations, restorations, modifications, and potential 
transformations, occur. 
2.6. Historical materialist policy analysis 
The main part of this chapter has focused on the cultural political economy perspective 
(Jessop, 2004, 2010; Sum, 2012; Sum & Jessop, 2013), and its dynamic understanding of 
hegemony and how it is produced, maintained, and modified. This involves strategic 
action in a context of structural selectivities. The rest of this chapter enhances this account 
by drawing on historical materialist policy analysis. There are two main issues discussed 
here. In the first part, I focuses on HMPA’s concept of ‘hegemony projects’. This helps 
us to identify specific actor groups within the processes of hegemony struggles, and to 
analyse the competing between groups based on their proposals for social restructuring 
that lead in contradictory directions. The second part focuses on HMPA’s concept of 
policy as a ‘politico-strategic terrain’. This is important because it allows us to connect 
broad ‘hegemony projects’ to the analysis of circumscribed political initiatives. For 
HMPA, policy is a field of struggle for the advancement of middle or long-term 
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objectives. But CPE’s understanding of hegemony in relational terms and as a 
compromise formation, allows us furthermore, to analyse policy not in terms of a single 
‘hegemony project’, but rather as part of the contested terrain, by which multiple actors 
compete to operationalise their goals, visions, and interests. 
2.7. Social forces and ‘hegemony projects’ 
As described above, CPE conceives the production of hegemony as a dynamic process of 
relationality between multiple social forces. It is understood as a struggle between 
competing forces each seeking to determine which ‘objects of governance’ are ‘selected’, 
how they are ‘construed’, and how they are discursively and materially reshaped. 
Different actors “try to make one or another imaginary the hegemonic or dominant 
‘frame’ in particular contexts” (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 171), and do so by creating a 
consensus around such a perspective, and lend legitimacy to certain forms of collective 
action and institutional practices. As Fairclough writes, this ‘select[ion] [of] parts of the 
world’ involves their ‘representation from a particular perspective’ (Fairclough, 2003, p. 
129). For this reason Jessop and Sum speak of different social imaginaries or ‘crisis 
construals’, related to competing ‘crisis management strategies’. 
This perspective is helpful to critically examine SIBs. This approach allows us to 
challenge the dominant portrayal of this policy as a singular, stable, and unitary narrative 
– commonly represented in the think tank literature – by investigating the tension between 
a multiplicity of meanings within the policy, the negotiation and provisional compromise 
achieved between them, and its remaining instabilities. Hence, the analysis focuses on the 
multiple and even diverging projects of restructuring, the varieties of crisis construals and 
perspectives, and the range of forms of action present in SIBs. ‘Ethical capitalism’ is 
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understood as a contingent assemblage based on asymmetrical power relations in the 
current societal conjuncture and specific political contexts. 
Hence, SIBs are initially reconstructed as a site of convergence between varying 
interpretations and ‘crisis management strategies’. But it does not stop here, but instead, 
reconstructs also the second moment in the process of ‘complexity reduction’ whereby 
the variety of perspectives is reduced, both through the exclusion of alternatives, and also 
their partial incorporation. It investigates the building of provisional settlements between 
these diverse positions, and the implementation of such ideas in collective action, 
considering finally, potential disruptions, especially following the completion of the 
projects. 
Reconstructing the struggle over hegemony in the post-2008 context then involves an 
actor analysis considering the competition between ‘crisis management strategies’ with 
their related ‘crisis construals’. As Hay writes, “[f]orms of restructuring are the subject 
of ideological and political contestation as competing parties, and projects, vie for state 
power by offering alternative visions and projections of the future trajectory of the state” 
(Hay, 1999, pp. 330–331). Out of this contest arises “a dominant crisis narrative” which 
is “linked to a distinctive state project and a new political-economic paradigm” (Hay, 
1999, p. 331). (Hay’s limited focus on political parties in this selection can be broadened 
and applied to struggles situated throughout society, and cultural political economy 
focuses especially on the sites of civil society.) 
Such strategies link crisis narratives with efforts to restructure collective and 
institutionalized social action. The “discursive reconstitution” of the state, economy, or 
broader societal category is treated “as an object in need of decisive intervention and as 
the object of strategic restructuring” (Hay, 1999, p. 331), and this effects “the contours, 
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forms, norms, procedures and practices that characterize an emergent state regime” (Hay, 
1999, p. 331), and its relations to the economy or social life more broadly. 
In a similar way, Sum argues that, in seeking hegemony, “economic, political and 
intellectual actors compete across different scales to remake the objects of governance 
discursively and materially” (Sum, 2012, p. 10), and turn them into “objects of 
observation, calculation, regulation, governance and transformation” (Sum & Jessop, 
2013, p. 173). Social forces then seek to generalize their own positions, and determine 
what becomes accepted as “the basis for private and public strategic and policy initiatives 
to manage the crisis and/or move beyond it” (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 405). 
Yet, as Caterina (2017) argues, such an actor analysis can be greatly enhanced by 
historical materialist policy analysis’ idea of ‘hegemony projects’ (Brand, 2014; 
Forschungsgruppe ‘Staatsprojekt Europa’, 2014; Kannankulam & Georgi, 2012, 2014). 
This is because it can provide more precision to CPE’s conception of hegemony as an 
iterative process of development. Whereas CPE emphasises variation and ‘complexity 
reduction’, HMPA seeks to identify the political character of these differences and their 
fusion. To investigate SIBs from a strategic-relational approach means investigating the 
substantive differences between actors who encounter one another in policy processes 
and hegemonic contests, and who seek to make their ideas dominant, but also to achieve 
beneficial settlements according to their political goals. The identification of such 
political differences can be achieved through ‘heuristic theorising’ (Beauregard, 2012, p. 
481) to identify “specific aspects of reality or ways of thinking” over other ones, which 
the researcher regards as key to “the phenomenon under review” (ibid).  
Such heuristic theorising is sought through HMPA’s idea of mapping the constellation of 
forces in a given conjuncture and political context, relative to the research object. 
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Whereas scholars developed abstract sketches and hypothetical formulations of possible 
post-2008 political-economic scenarios in the immediate aftermath of the crisis (Brie, 
2009; Wallerstein, 2011), HMPA translates these into a modus of identifying existing 
forces situated in the specific political conjuncture, which can be investigated for their 
impact upon its trajectory. Similar to CPE’s conception of ‘crisis management strategy’ 
(Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 406), Kannankulam and Georgi (2014, pp. 63–64) propose 
developing a heuristic of ‘hegemony projects’ to “conceptually group together strategies 
and their protagonists” into “aggregations of similar but not necessarily consciously 
motivated tactics and strategies of actors”, which have a “common direction”. These 
projects are the combined strategies of discursive and material intervention to select, 
construe, and remake the ‘objects of governance’ described by Sum and Jessop above, 
involving narratives, demands, aims, and specific political projects (Kannankulam & 
Georgi, 2014, p. 64). For clarification, the term ‘hegemony project’ refers not only to 
already hegemonic projects, but also to those striving to become hegemonic. 
The actor map helps to organize the data of concrete investigations by conceptually 
linking the multiplicity of discourses, values, demands, practices, and actors to specific 
projects with certain intended directionalities. Yet while HMPA proposes an inductive 
method to investigate the impact of different actors upon the object of investigation, I 
deploy a deductive method to identify the lines of conflict between competing hegemony 
projects through the case analysis. Perceived as a more open approach, the aim is to avoid 
confirmation bias in representing the projects, and instead to discover what kinds of 
conflicts and resolutions are contained in the effort to link markets with notions of ‘public 
responsibility’, and to identify competing visions, and the actors advancing diverging 
strategies. This approach is regarded as particularly helpful because of the diffuse 
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presence of competing ideas within the project, which do not clearly originate from 
divisible policy actors or their organisations. Instead, the dynamism of the policy 
practices can be reconstructed by identifying these conflicts, their provisional resolutions, 
and their remaining tensions. 
2.8. Policy as ‘strategic terrain’ and ‘unstable compromise’ 
This section describes how CPE is enhanced by HMPA in a second way, namely through 
its focus on policy as a ‘politico-strategic terrain’ for the intended operationalisation of 
‘hegemony projects’. Relatedly, I discuss how we can enhance the analysis of multiple 
competing projects with the idea of provisional, asymmetrical, and ‘unstable 
compromise’ between the competing projects. Following Caterina (2017, p. 5), HMPA 
supports the investigation of hegemony by making them more concrete. One of its ‘key 
conceptual innovation[s]’ is the way it relates broad-based ‘hegemony projects’ to more 
circumscribed ‘political projects’ or policy (ibid). As Kannankulam and Georgi (2014, 
pp. 64–65) write: “[I]n order to achieve hegemony, a hegemony project must place in 
position a series of concrete and limited ‘political projects’ (Bieling & Steinhilber 2000: 
106) in such a way that these projects form the politico-strategic ‘terrain’ on which a 
hegemonic project then condenses.” Such ‘political projects’ can be understood as 
specific policies. A “systematic focus on the relationship between overarching hegemony 
projects and the series of concrete limited political projects on which hegemony projects 
draw” Caterina (2017, p. 6) argues “can be fundamental to improve CPE empirical 
analyses of hegemony struggles, as it helps to make the nature of hegemony more 
concrete.” 
Conceiving policies as a ‘politico-strategic terrain’ coheres with CPE’s conception of 
strategic action discussed above, as reflective and calculative action on a strategically 
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selective terrain. But CPE’s conception of an iterative process of social formation and 
hegemony construction should not be lost. The ‘politico-strategic terrain’ can be inhabited 
by multiple competing projects. And as Brand writes, “[s]pecific policies can be 
understood as unstable compromises among social forces which are formulated through 
specific state apparatuses or even groups or alliances in particular apparatuses” (Brand, 
2014, p. 436). Hence it becomes possible to represent this multiplicity through the 
reconstruction of SIBs, as an object of research at the intersection of competing hegemony 
projects, and as a provisional and uneven settlement between them in a specific spatio-
temporal context. 
But it is important to distinguish these concepts of ‘compromise’ or ‘settlement’ from the 
idea of a democratic process, which these terms might otherwise imply. While CPE and 
HMPA share with the democratic idea the view of a plurality of forces in their 
relationality to one another, rather than the expression of a single force, or the expression 
of a structure, they do not mean ‘negotiation’ in the form of a round table. Instead, both 
theories draw from Poulantzas (2014), who described the (integral) state as the ‘material 
condensation of a relationship of class forces’ (Brand, 2014, p. 432). In this way, policy 
may be understood as the outcome of these struggles situated on “strategic terrain” of the 
state with its existing set of power relations. Reconstructing such ‘compromises’, Brand 
writes, “is an empirical question” (2014, p. 432). 
2.7. Conclusion 
This chapter presented my theoretical framework to transform my research topic into an 
object of investigation. I described the production and potential modification of neoliberal 
hegemony, as a way of analysing ‘ethical capitalism’ and social impact bonds. This equips 
me with the analytical tools to answer my research questions. To reiterate, these are: How 
   
49 
 
can we conceptualise ‘ethical capitalism’ as part of the struggle over hegemony? What 
does it seek to modify in the existing hegemonic formation, and what does it seek to 
maintain? How do these efforts to link market governance with notions of ‘public 
responsibility’ and structures of accountability differ or cohere to dominant concepts and 
practices of contemporary neoliberalism? How might these projects be understand as the 
encounter, struggle, and provisional negotiation between advocates of market rule and 
those seeking alternatives to it? Might such approaches be understood as ‘progressive 
neoliberal’ compromises? Do these projects reflect the continuation of market rule, 
achieve instead the economy’s re-embedding, or a new combination of each of these 
efforts? What role does ‘ethical capitalism’ play in the broader struggle over hegemony? 
Are they a continuation of market governance, part of a transition to a post-neoliberal 
future, or a passing moment? 
The following chapter presents the research strategy and methodology for the concrete 
investigation of these questions as an analysis of Social Impact Bonds as part of the 
struggle over hegemony since the crisis of 2008.  
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3. Chapter 3 – Research Strategy and Methodology 
This chapter explains how I go about analysing my object of investigation and answer my 
research questions. I present the research strategy, design, and methodology for these 
tasks, describing the concepts and tools deployed to interrogate Social Impact Bonds as 
part of the iterative process of post-2008 political economic developments, and the 
reproduction and remaking of hegemony. 
3.1. Research sample 
In order to concretely investigate ‘ethical capitalism’ as part of the struggle over 
hegemony, I’ve selected the following research sample. ‘Ethical capitalism’ is a general 
term for a wide set of ideas and practices about ways of making market governance more 
responsible or accountable to society. It has included examples from corporate social 
responsibility, ‘inclusive growth’, cooperative enterprises, the ‘social economy’, and the 
like. Within this broad field, I am concerned with the more limited example of the ‘social 
investment market’, a set of initiatives that have rapidly expanded since the crisis of 2008, 
which seek to link financial products with some measurement of positive social ‘impact’ 
(see chapter 4). A central example of the SIM is the Social Impact Bond (SIB), which 
represent the specific object of investigation for this research project. The criteria for 
selecting this research sample is twofold. First, SIBs have a central symbolic value for 
efforts to advance an ‘ethical capitalism’, as articulated, for example, by the OECD 
(2010) which describes SIBs as an institutional development towards the achievement of 
‘sustainable social progress’ (see also chapter 4). SIBs’ symbolic value for the ‘social 
investment market’ is also of major significance, promoted by the G8 (2014, p. 6) as well 
as its national advisory boards in the U.K. (UK National Advisory Board to the Social 
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Impact Investment Taskforce, 2014) and U.S. (US National Advisory Board on Impact 
Investing, 2014). 
The second selection criteria is a theoretical one. This has to do with the way SIBs are 
framed as a crisis management strategy aimed at addressing three problems of 
contemporary capitalism, namely the crisis of social reproduction, the fiscal crisis of the 
state, and crisis of capital accumulation (Dowling & Harvie, 2014). (This is discussed in 
detail below). 
3.2. Research strategy: case studies 
 
Social scientists emphasise that a case study approach can be a valuable research method 
in explaining dynamic societal processes (Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen, & Karlsson, 
2002; Easton, 2010; A. Sayer, 2000; R. A. Sayer, 1992). This investigation deploys a case 
study approach (de Vaus, 2001) to study the operationalization of Social Impact Bonds. 
My aim is to provide a descriptive and explanatory account of SIBs and the SIM as a 
crisis management strategy, in terms of both their discursive or ideological intervention, 
and their impact upon processes of material structuration, and to also infer the causes for 
their growing resonance in specific spatial-temporal contexts. 
A case study strategy is especially well suited to these research objectives, because as a 
methodological approach, it allows for qualitative research into the object that respects 
its social embeddedness and seeks to illuminate the multi-casual factors behind its 
development. Hence, this approach will enable me to present the research object as a 
whole and within its societal context (de Vaus 2001: 220). Case study research allows for 
an investigation of the holistic character of the cases as well as the embedded units of 
analysis within them (de Vaus 2001: 220-221). This will allow me to consider the policy 
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in relation to critical features of the social context, as well as to consider the sublevel or 
constituent elements (ibid). It allows for thick descriptions of the projects under 
investigation, without isolating them from broader social, political, or economic trends 
(de Vaus, 2001, p. 234). In doing so, it allows one to reflect on their research object’s 
contingent and provisional character. They are assemblages of practices and ideas, which 
are not necessarily coherent, but are made to correspond in a working relationship. 
Case study research also allows for the use of multiple data sources (de Vaus 2001: 230-
231), which can be compared with one another in a process of triangulation, and also to 
identify relevant conflicts. And case studies can also be used to achieve generalisation, 
by focusing on the links between cases, and between theoretical propositions (de Vaus, 
2001, p. 237). The cases allow for an investigation of a concrete process from which 
informed conjectures can be made about similar projects in other contexts, and related to 
existing theories about restructuring attempts. This process of generalisation involves 
abstract theorisation that argues, based on observed case studies, that these are examples 
of broader social and political developments. I must provide a convincing argument that 
links my presentation of the character and causes of the observed SIB examples with the 
broader movement of SIBs as a crisis management strategy or hegemony project, and to 
the SIM and ‘ethical capitalism’. In case study research, such generalisation is of a 
theoretical rather than statistical kind. This is possible when the examined sample shares 
important features with the general population, and SIB discourses resemble those of the 
broader social investment market. 
The ultimate aim is to re-present the policy as a hegemony project, or more specifically, 
as an encounter between multiple hegemony projects and their (asymmetrical) 
compromise. This allows me to show the presence of alternatives within ‘ethical 
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capitalism’ – that is, its relational character – but also the constraints upon such 
alternatives. Second, I can present ‘ethical capitalism’ as a project running parallel to the 
dominant modes of hegemonic restoration based on ‘post-democracy’ and coercion. 
Bringing these together, I argue that the incorporation of alternatives into a market 
governance project result also from the blocked post-neoliberal transition in the current 
conjuncture. 
3.3. Case selection 
As described below, my case studies investigate the world’s first Social Impact Bond in 
the U.K. city of Peterborough and the first U.S. example in New York City, both focusing 
on the social policy area of criminal justice, and seeking to reduce levels of incarceration. 
Three criteria were used in this case selection. First, I selected cases from the broader 
population of SIBs based on their national context. The U.K. and U.S. were chosen 
because of their leadership role in the development of SIBs, and are therefore not outliers, 
but rather cases which are inspiring similar projects elsewhere. This also allowed for a 
cross national comparison providing an idea of where these developments might lead. 
The second criteria was a practical decision based on the amount of data on the cases. As 
two of the first projects, I was able to collect data during the policy implementation in 
both cases and following both of their completion. Whereas much of the literature, at the 
beginning of my research project, was based on the theory of SIBs, I was able to 
investigate the practice and the outcomes of these experiments. The third criteria relates 
to the policy area of criminal justice. Both the Peterborough and New York City cases 
focused on the issue of incarceration, and sought to reduce the high levels of re-
incarceration in both locations. Whereas other SIBs focus on areas of health, housing, 
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employment, the common social policy provided an additional commonality for 
comparative analysis. 
Case 1: The Peterborough Social Impact Bond 
The first case study is the Peterborough SIB, which operated between 2010 and 2015. 
The social objective was located in the field of criminal justice, and sought to reduce re-
incarceration among 3,000 men released from short-term sentences at HMP Peterborough 
(Rand Europe, 2011; Social Finance, 2011). Multiple investors contributed a total of £5 
million towards the project, which funded local organisations to administer preventative 
services to reduce recidivism. If these achieved the agreed upon target of a 7.5% reduction 
in recidivism, the Ministry of Justice agreed to pay a moderate return to the private 
investors. These returns were to be paid from the anticipated savings in criminal justice, 
due to reductions in police, courts, and remedial institution budgets. However, if the 
targets were not reached, this ‘pay for success’ model would not reward the investors, 
and they risked losing their capital. 
Case 2: The New York City Social Impact Bond 
My second sample is the New York City Social Impact Bond which was instituted from 
2012 to 2015. As in the first case, the NYC project was in the area of criminal justice, 
with the social objective of reducing recidivism among adolescent detainees released 
from the city’s notorious ‘Riker’s Island’ prison (MDRC, 2013a). The city secured a £6.9 
million [$9.6 million] investment from Goldman Sachs for the up-front financing of two 
community organisations administering preventative programs to youth in detention. If 
the programmes achieved the pre-set 10% reduction in reincarceration, the investor could 
expect a profitable return from the city, based on anticipated savings made through 
reduced criminal justice expenditures. If the project failed to hit this target, the 
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government was not responsible for repaying Goldman Sachs for its lost capital. (In this 
case, a significant loan guarantee by Bloomberg Philanthropies would sharply reduce the 
firm’s loss.) Especially important for this case is that, in contrast to the Peterborough 
project, the New York Case achieves one of SIBs main objectives, namely, to involve 
“mainstream” investors, not only foundations and charities. This case will provide the 
opportunity to evaluate the theory that SIBs enlist private resources for public goods 
through a mechanism that “blends” financial and social benefits. 
3.4. Three objects of intervention 
In the previous chapter, I described how policy may be conceived as a ‘politico-strategic 
terrain’ of struggle for competing hegemony projects, each advancing different discourses 
and pursuing different visions of social change (or restoration). This approach focuses on 
the strategic action of diverse actors and understands policy as a provisional settlement 
between diverging projects. Furthermore, I explained that both CPE and HMPA argue 
that the struggle between different projects occurs through the selection, construal, and 
discursive-material reshaping of different policy ‘objects’ (Brand, 2014, p. 426; Sum, 
2009b, p. 186). My case analysis focuses on the encounter, negotiation, and resolutions 
between these actors in terms of their reshaping of such ‘objects’. 
There are three central ‘objects of steering’ which my case analysis focuses. These are 
social, fiscal, and economic objects, and refer to the crisis of social reproduction, the fiscal 
crisis of the state, and the crisis of capital over-accumulation and uneven growth 
(described below). These categories were arrived at through an iterative process of 
discovery that combined deductive with inductive reasoning. This drew first on the 
expansive literature review by Fraser et al. (2016), predominantly of the ‘grey’ literature 
produced mostly by what Rosenman (2017) calls the ‘social finance industry’. As Fraser 
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et al. explain (2016, p. 4), the majority of these texts were produced by think tanks, 
consultancy firms, investors, government agencies, and charities. Using a method of 
‘interpretive synthesis’, these authors identify three central ‘narratives’ and ‘lines of 
argument’ present in the SIB literature. My own data analysis, of some of these same 
sources as well as others (described in the following chapter) confirmed and yet adjusted 
these, also with the help of theoretical texts on the subject. These include especially 
Clifton and Warner (2013) and Dowling and Harvie (2014). The former emphasise the 
fiscal dimension of SIBs, elements implicit in Fraser et al.’s work, but not fully 
developed. Dowling and Harvie (ibid) provide a more abstract formulation of SIBs, 
identifying most clearly their social, fiscal, and economic objects of governance, and, in 
line with CPE, describing this policy as a ‘crisis management strategy.’ (See also 
Harvie/Ogman 2017). 
The three ‘objects of intervention’ are described here as the social crisis, fiscal crisis, and 
economic crisis. 
1. The first object of intervention is the crisis of social reproduction (Dowling & Harvie, 
2014, p. 8) (or, the ‘social crisis’), defined as the breakdown in the ways people 
“reproduce themselves, their cultures and their social relationships” (Bakker & Gill, 
2003; N. Fraser, 2016). Against the background of deepening social crises since 
2007/08, SIBs have targeted mental health issues and depression, homelessness, 
childcare needs, unemployment, and incarceration (Dowling & Harvie, 2014, p. 9; 
Whitfield, 2015, p. 30). In their substantial review of the SIB grey literature, Fraser 
et al. (2016, p. 7) confirm the central role played by ‘social crises’ in official SIB 
discourses, emphasizing “frequent articulat[ions]” of SIBs as a way to “prevent or 
ameliorate complex social problems”. Similar representations are present in the 
   
57 
 
popular literature, where SIBs are said to hold the potential to “solve society’s most 
intractable problems” (The Guardian, 2010a), to “save society” (The Independent, 
2011), or even to “save the world” (Bank, 2012). 
2. The second object of intervention is the fiscal crisis of the state, referring to the 
perception of over-burdening government debt (Dowling & Harvie, 2014, p. 7). In the 
context of fiscal crisis (see Blyth, 2013; Peck, 2012, 2014), policies of ‘fiscal 
consolidation’ or austerity have reduced the resources and budgeting options 
especially for city governments (Peck, 2012a). In this context, SIBs present the idea 
of ‘leveraging’, ‘mobilizing’, or ‘incentivizing private capital for public good’ (US 
National Advisory Board on Impact Investing, 2014), as a way of dealing with the 
contradiction between shrinking public resources and growing social need. 
Fraser et al. (2016, p. 7) argue that one dominant narrative in the grey literature centres 
around “public funding cuts” and “resource allocation” problems, and presents SIBs 
as a “strategic opportunit[y]” in the context of fiscal constraint. Warner and Clifton 
(2013, p. 55) argue that SIBs enable “constrained city leaders to try to provide basic 
services in a time of austerity” by “raising private revenue”. The scheme is 
advantageous for its ‘risk shifting’ ability, “transfer[ing] risk from the public sector 
to the private sector” (2016, p. 7), or in other words, “privatiz[ing] the risks and 
shar[ing] the gains”. According to a central proponent of such arrangements, 
“investors bear 100 percent of the financial risk in an SIB” (Social Finance, 2012, p. 
22). This fiscal strategy is framed for popular audiences as a “way to fund promising 
new programs at no cost to taxpayers” (The City of New York Office of the Mayor, 
2012), as we see in the official press release for the New York City Social Impact 
Bond. 
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3. The third object of intervention is an economic one, namely the crisis of capital 
accumulation or profitability (Dowling & Harvie, 2014, p. 5). This refers to the 
economic slump since 2007/08, triggered by the collapse in values related to the U.S. 
housing market, and resulting vulnerability in financial markets for profitable 
investment (Harvey, 2010). Central here is also the extremely uneven development or 
economic polarization (Piketty, 2014), whereby capital and labour surpluses appear 
side by side and yet unable to be placed into productive relation. SIBs are presented 
as a response to this problem, articulating what Fraser et al. (2016, p. 7) call a “private 
financial sector reform narrative”. The SIB is supposed to satisfy needs of private 
market actors in their search for yield (through the production of ‘social value’). This 
is not only framed as a profitable solution for surplus capital (and investors), but as a 
course correction, to ‘offset’ “the anti-social, dangerous aspects of financial 
capitalism” (A. Fraser et al., 2016, p. 8). SIBs are expected to support the financial 
sector in “deliver[ing] inclusive economic growth that benefits everyone” (G8 Social 
Impact Investment Taskforce, 2014, p. 6). 
3.5. Three modes of steering 
The above section explains how SIBs contribute to processes of meaning making and 
structuration by intervening in three policy objects, namely, the social, fiscal, and 
economic crisis. This section explains the three modes of steering that reshape these 
objects. Chapter two discussed two modes of structuration, namely the production of 
meaning through discourses and the building of structures through collective action. The 
third mode of structuration mediates between discursive and material structuration and 
refers to ‘knowledging and governing technologies’, and draws from Foucault’s ideas 
about power and knowledge.  
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Discourse — The first mode of steering refers to systems of meaning making or discourse. 
In this research project, I rely on Fairclough’s concept of discourse, which, in 
collaboration with Jessop, has been integrated into CPE (Fairclough, Jessop, & Sayer, 
2001). As discussed in the previous chapter, discourse refers to the semiotic aspect of 
social reality, or its systems of meaning, and particular discourses ‘select’ and ‘represent’ 
‘parts of the world’ from a particular perspective (Fairclough, 2003, p. 124). In doing so, 
discourses intervene in social reality by changing or reinforcing existing conceptions of 
the world, and shifting normative ideas for justificatory and preferable forms of action or 
social structure. They are not solely descriptive but also prescriptive or ‘projective’, 
“representing possible worlds which are different from the actual world” and hence they 
are “tied in to projects to change the world in particular directions” (ibid). In changing 
meanings, they shape the possibilities and limitation of different forms of social action. 
In the case analysis, discourse is analysed as a way to select and represent the three policy 
objects discussed above, and to advance certain projects of desirable forms of collective 
action. 
Furthermore, discourses operate at multiple ‘scales’. They have “different levels of 
abstraction” and may “generate a range of representations” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 124). In 
the case study analysis, I am concerned with how discourses steer both narrow and broad 
policy objects. Not only do SIBs represent re-incarceration, public debt, and recession in 
specific ways in New York City and Peterborough, they also draw on and generate broad 
narratives about the social, fiscal, and economic dimensions of crisis of neoliberalism, 
and advance preferred courses of actions. 
The theory of hegemony described in the previous chapter also coheres with this 
conception of discourse because of the latter’s emphasis on differentiation and 
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relationality. A single case study, policy, or text holds multiple discourses or meanings. 
In fact, new discourses rarely emerge by clearly replacing an existing one in toto, but 
instead, “the new is made out of a novel articulation of the old” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 
127). Hence, the case analysis investigates the encounter between multiple discourses, 
and how they are “articulated together by using vocabulary which works key categories 
within two [or more] discourses into semantic relations” (128), as well as the way certain 
elements are incorporated into the new formation, and how other elements of a discourse 
are backgrounded or excluded altogether. In particular I investigate the ‘social impact’ 
narrative, the fiscal narrative of ‘leveraging private capital for public good’, and the 
economic narrative of ‘producing shared value’, all as a response to specific issues in 
local contexts, and as more general responses to problems in contemporary neoliberalism 
in each national context. 
The case studies analyse how discourses shape public perceptions and policy knowledge 
about social, fiscal, and economic problems or crises, regarding both their sources or 
causes, as well as their ‘imaginary solutions’. Accepted narratives also become resources 
which privilege certain judgments over others in the determination of the ‘correct’ 
methods for addressing problems. 
‘Knowledging and governing technologies’ — Technologies refer to the cognitive tools 
which advance particular interpretations of social events, allowing for their 
categorisation, calculations, and organisations of social events into data. These 
instruments produce, stabilise, and regulate certain ways of interpreting the world, and 
thereby also shape the ways people act upon it. Jessop and Sum (2013, p. 477) drew this 
term from Foucault, and I use their concept in this investigation. They write that 
‘technologies’ “govern [the] conduct” of “selecting and retaining specific imaginaries” 
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(ibid). Such “mechanisms”, contain discursive and practical aspects. They “provide 
reference points not only for meaning-making but also for coordinating actions within 
and across specific personal interactions, organisations and networks, and institutional 
orders.” (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 477). 
My research investigates then, how such technologies translate ‘social impact’ discourses 
into mechanisms for interpreting complex social processes, how they establish analytical 
lenses and categories, and how they create regularity, predictability, and governability of 
social processes. I analyse also the fiscal interpretive instruments that assess possibilities 
that ‘social impact’ might have upon public savings and determining the shares 
distributed to investors as return, and the expected net savings for government. The cases 
are also analysed in the way interpretive technologies are deployed to translate economic 
narratives into knowledge practices, focused on the conceptualising and devising modes 
of circulating money through state, private, and civil society organisations, and devising 
links between risk, reward, and ‘impact’. 
Collective action — The third mode of steering refers to collective action or social 
practices which intervene in and shape the three policy objects. I investigate which forms 
of collective action are used in order to achieve the goal of ‘social impact’? Which 
methods are deployed to reduce reincarceration? In relation to the fiscal policy object, I 
analyse the practice by which governments seek to ‘leverage private capital for public 
good’? How do they gain access to surplus capital and which practices enable it to 
circulate through public, private, and societal organisations? How do these practices 
distribute risks and rewards? Thirdly, I analyse how the economic policy objects are 
steered by social practices aimed at creating ‘shared value’ between government, 
investors, and society. Which forms of collective action are deployed in pursuit of the 
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goal of a mutually beneficial or ‘inclusive’ economy? And finally, which practical 
outcomes result from these strategies? 
3.6. Data collection and sources 
The cases are analysed with qualitative methods relying on three data sources, which were 
collected, using the following methods, and created the document archive. These data 
sources included grey literature from primary actors directly involved in each case study, 
as well as some secondary actors playing supportive roles, but not directly involved in 
the cases. These included local, regional, central, or departmental government 
commissioners; private, charitable, and institutional investors; non-or quasi-
governmental organisations acting as project managers or ‘intermediaries’, service 
organisations, project evaluators, philanthropic organisations providing subsidies, and 
thinks tanks and international organisations (e.g. the G8) who contributed to the 
intellectual frameworks for these projects or their broader appeal, as well as those 
working directly on policy development and design. Documents included official 
publications, statistical documents, reports, press releases, newsletters and 
advertisements.  
Documents from primary and secondary actors were located through direct browsing of 
these organisation’s websites. They includes, for the Peterborough case: Cabinet Office, 
Ministry of Justice, Big Lottery Fund, Big Society Capital, Social Finance organization, 
Rand Europe, Rockefeller Foundation, Centre for Social Impact Bonds at the Cabinet 
Office, St. Giles Trust, Ormiston Families, SOVA, Bridges Ventures, Barrow Cadbury 
Trust, among others. For the New York City case, I identified documents on the websites 
of the Mayor’s Office of New York City, Bloomberg Philanthropies, Goldman Sachs, 
MDRC, The Osbourne Association, Friends of Island Academy, and Vera Institute of 
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Justice. Further resources were collected through google searches with the search terms 
“Peterborough Social Impact Bond” and “New York City Social Impact Bond”. 
Additionally, primary sources were identified in reference lists from the secondary 
literature and from direct references from interviewees. For the two cases, the primary 
literature totalled 60 documents. 
But I was not only interested in the representation, technologies, and practices presented 
by the primary actors, but also the broader significance of the cases for ongoing struggles 
over hegemony and meaning in the crisis conjuncture. For this reason, my data archive 
complemented primary literature with a second data type, namely, media documents in 
the form of electronic news items published on the websites of local and national press 
organisations (Bryman 2001: 377). These data sources provide a window into the public 
meaning of SIBs. They reveal dominant and competing perspectives, alternative 
evaluations and interpretations, and terms of debate. Such sources provide data about how 
SIBs are presented to the wider public, and material to be analysed for understanding how 
they resonate. For the Peterborough case, sources include the BBC, The Economist, 
Financial Times, the Guardian, The Telegraph, The Independent, Harvard Business 
Review, and Charity Finance News among others. Data from new sources included the 
organisations of The New York, The Financial Times, PBS, Reuters, Huffington Post, the 
Wall Street Journal, Bond Buyers, and Bloomberg News. Search terms included the 
keywords “Peterborough Social Impact Bond” and “New York City Social Impact Bond”. 
In order to focus on the re-contextualisation of these projects in the broader struggle over 
hegemony and meaning, I also included documents found under the key words “social 
impact bond”, “impact investing”, “shared value”, “pay for success”, without specific 
reference to the New York City or Peterborough cases. 
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Of the 90 total documents included in this archive, and organized in the Zotero electronic 
bibliography management system, a representative sample of 50 documents was selected 
for analysis. The strategy of document analysis is described later in this chapter. 
I used a third type of data, namely semi-structured interviews. Interviews are an important 
data source for my research project and raise ethical issues and researcher self-awareness. 
Interviewees are regarded with respect and measures were taken to protect their rights 
and upheld ethical standards in my relationship with these important participants. 
Interviewees were informed through digital communication and verbally about research 
goals and publishing intentions, and they consented to the use of their comments in my 
research project in anonymised form. Their contribution was highly respected and I 
protected their confidentiality. An additional aspect of research ethics is the 
trustworthiness, credibility, and dependability of my analysis. It was important to me to 
represent my interview partners with accuracy and care. One technique I used was to 
summarise interview partners’ statements in my own words and to ask them whether it 
reflects their opinion accurately. This not only helped confirm statements, but provided 
the opportunity to achieve a more nuanced understanding of the issues. I also immersed 
myself in the field, seeking multiple sources of information to triangulate research 
hypothesis and corroborate conclusions. Furthermore, I addressed issues of credibility in 
my research investigation by engaging with other experts in the field, including those 
whose work differs from my own, and providing ‘thick descriptions’ that allow readers 
to understand the cases themselves at a deep level, and to make their own judgments, and 
even potentially transfer my findings to other settings and test their applicability. 
Interviews with key stakeholders are used to access important data not available in 
documentary sources. I conducted 30 semi-structured interviews with policy actors 
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involved in the two cases. There are significant advantages in using interviews. As 
Denscombe (2010, p. 173) explains, they help in the collection of qualitative data, 
especially when “people’s opinions, feelings, emotions and experiences” are at stake. 
This format allows for the capturing of rich descriptions of the meanings given by 
important actors in the case. The interview provides a way for issues “to be explored in 
depth and in detail rather than simply reported in a word or two” (Denscombe 2010: 174). 
An additional advantage of interviews is that they allow for access to “privileged 
information” (Denscombe 2010: 174). “The depth of information provided by interviews 
can produce best ‘value for money’ if the informants are willing and able to give 
information that others could not – when what they offer is an insight they have as people 
in a special position ‘to know’.” (Denscombe 2010: 174). In these cases, it is then the 
ethical responsibility of the researcher to offer and respect requests from interview 
partners that information be anonymous. 
Semi-structured interviews provide the best degree of organisation and flexibility “to let 
the interviewee develop ideas and speak more widely on the issues raised by the 
researcher. The answers are open-ended, and there is more emphasis on the interviewee 
elaborating points of interest” (Denscombe 2010: 175). It allows for the respondents to 
reveal the meanings they attribute to words, concepts, and ideas, in ways that may differ 
from common or specialised usage, allowing for a deeper and more complex 
understanding of the meaning given by actors towards the policy under investigation. 
Interviews were conducted with all ‘stakeholder’ groups, including government, private, 
and civil society organisations. For the Peterborough case, these interview partners 
included the following government organisations: The Cabinet Office, the Ministry of 
Justice, the Peterborough Council, and the Centre for Social Impact Bonds at the Cabinet 
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Office. Non- or quasi-governmental organisations included the Social Finance 
organization, which acted as project manager of the Peterborough case, Big Society 
Capital, and the Big Lottery Fund, which provided financial and intellectual support for 
the project. Private actors include the investors Bridges Ventures, the Barrow Cadbury 
Trust and Friends Provident Foundation. Civil society actors include the St. Giles Trust, 
Ormiston Children and Families, SOVA, the One Service, and Rand Europe.  
Interviewees in the New York City case included the government organisations of the 
Mayor’s Office of New York City, private organization providing financial support, 
Bloomberg Philanthropies, as well as the non-governmental organization acting as 
‘project manager’, MDRC, and the service organisations The Osbourne Association and 
Friends of Island Academy. Additionally, I spoke with the evaluator, the Vera Institute of 
Justice, and the policy development organisations, the Nonprofit Finance Fund, CLASP, 
and the Social Impact Bond Technical Assistance Lab at the Harvard Kennedy School. 
Interview respondents were identified through direct contact with stakeholder 
organisations, and additional contacts were made through the snowball effect. They were 
conducted in person in New York City, Peterborough, and London, or by telephone, 
between September 2014 and February 2018. The interviews lasted 40 to 60 minutes in 
duration, and were anonymised to protect the identity of interview partners. Interviewees 
were asked to represent the cases from their own perspective, to explain the relationship 
between the SIB and their organisation’s own missions, as well as to discuss their short, 
middle, and long-term hopes and expectations for the project. They were asked both in 
relation to the three objects of steering, but also with open ended questions to allow for 
them to identify unforeseen or overlooked aspects. They were asked to reflect on the 
project’s innovations, or continuities the SIB had with existing policy approaches. They 
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were asked about the project’s accomplishments and challenges, as well as their 
expectations and hopes for future policy developments, e.g. whether SIBs were viewed 
as a new paradigm, or as part of a transition to another approach. All interviews were 
recorded with an audio device and stored in the data archive.  
The interviews were transcribed and entered into the document archive in Zotero, and 
analysed in the NVivo computer programme. The data provided multiple kinds of 
information, both about the social practices and knowledge technologies which the 
projects implemented, but also about the discursive framings of the projects as attempted 
forms of restructuring as perceived solutions to aspects of the crisis. For this reason, the 
data served both as a way of understanding the dynamic social processes and the related 
meanings they produced. 
The primary data sources, media outputs, and interviews were read in their entirety, 
imported into Nvivo and coded in reference to the three central objects of intervention, 
i.e. their social, fiscal, and economic attributes. Key words for the social object of 
intervention included: “social problem”, “social ill”, “social crisis”, and the more specific 
terms of “crime”, “incarceration”, “offending”, “rehabilitation”, “prison” and “jail”, and 
“social impact” and “outcome”. The fiscal objects were coded with the following key 
words: “fiscal”, “constraint”, “resources”, “finances”, “budget”, “expenditure”, 
“funding”, “leverage”, “mobilise”, “incentive”, “investment” and “savings”. The 
economic object was analysed by identifying text passages using the search terms “bond”, 
“investment”, “return”, “principal”, “value”, “benefit”, “product”, “contribution”, 
“resource”, and “payment”. To avoid bias confirmation and to support an iterative process 
of discovery, these documents were also searched in terms of word frequency, and read 
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in their entirety, which revealed other important ideas, which expanded and enhanced the 
analysis and key words listed above.  
3.7. Data and case analysis 
This section describes the data analysis and case analysis and its contribution to 
contemporary research on neoliberalism and efforts to establish an ‘ethical capitalism’, 
advance a ‘social investment market’, and implement social impact bonds. It begins by 
discussing the data analysis, and moving stepwise to the broader theoretical objectives of 
this research project. 
Similar to Fraser et al. (2016), I analyse the three data sources by ‘synthesizing’ the 
arguments and narratives identified in them, and reconstruct general ‘lines of argument’ 
in relation to the three policy objects discussed above (social, fiscal, and economic crisis). 
However, whereas Fraser et al. (ibid) present a rather singular, harmonious, and coherent 
integration of narratives in relation to the three policy objects, I investigate the variation 
of meanings within them which are linked to diverging visions of social restructuring. 
The case analysis reveals ambiguities in the data, and the presence of multiple positions 
pushed by different policy actors, in relation to the policy objects. Whereas Fraser et al.’s 
presentation of dominant narratives is based on review of the primary literature, published 
by think tanks, foundations, market actors and government agencies of the ‘social finance 
industry’ (Rosenman, 2017), my investigation of media outputs and especially through 
interviews with diverse policy practitioners helped identify these tensions at a deeper 
level. Prodding questions allowed me to inquire into diverging perspectives which were 
often present but marginalised in the primary literature. This allowed me to identify 
elements of competing ‘hegemony projects’. 
The cases could be represented as an encounter between different hegemony projects, by 
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describing the diverging discourses about the common objects of steering. I identify 
multiple and often competing narratives about the social, fiscal, and economic crises and 
how they should be addressed in these projects, and how these relate to larger visions of 
political restructuring.  
But SIBs are more than a variety of perspectives. They are rather a provisional unity in a 
particular way. The case studies describe the process of ‘complexity reduction’ and the 
negotiation between ‘hegemony projects’, how select elements of each incorporated, 
elevated, included, foregrounded, backgrounded, or excluded. I show how discursive 
variation is reduced by the advancement of a dominant narrative that is stabilised, 
elaborated, and made into practical interpretive tools for analysing social events through 
particular ‘knowledging technologies’, and finally, how specific goals are identified, and 
forms of social action implemented in the pursuit of these goals. But I also identify the 
‘material substratum’ (see previous chapter) of these provisional settlements – even if 
these are highly asymmetrical – and highlight the material concessions junior coalition 
partners receive in these projects. In doing so, I also identify the policy’s uneven 
outcomes. Hence, I present the contradictory policy process and provisional 
compromises, identifying the kinds of ‘solutions’ not only as discourses but also as 
practices, their achievements and limitations, their uneven outcomes, and the 
displacement of the problems they were unable to solve. 
These chapters centres on the following three specific bundles of questions: 
1. How do SIBs address the social crisis? How are social crises represented by them? 
Which causes are identified by the policy actors, and which solutions do they 
advocate? Do these narratives articulate a narrow focus on individual behaviour 
as the source of social crises, and advance repressive methods of control as their 
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solutions, associated with neoliberalism (J. S. Davies, 2014), as argued for 
example by Silver and Clarke (2014), Rosenman (2017), and others? Or does the 
idea of ‘social impact’ instead advance an expanded discourse focused on social 
conditions, and pursue instead the amelioration of inequality through structural 
reforms, pointing in a progressive post-neoliberal direction? How are discourses 
transformed through ‘knowledging technologies’ into interpretive frameworks for 
analysing social events, e.g. through the concept of ‘social impact’? Which forms 
of collective action are perceived as sufficient in achieving the project’s stated 
goals, and operationalised? 
2. How is the fiscal crisis addressed? Which discourses are articulated to identify its 
origins, and which narratives are advanced to imagine its resolution? Which 
‘knowledging technologies’ are developed? How do the ideas of ‘mobilising 
private capital for public good’ shape perceptions of fiscal problems, and 
construct specific responses to them? Furthermore, which practices are assembled 
to achieve these goals? Do SIBs link the fiscal crisis to excessive public spending, 
as seen in the austerity narrative? Does this policy advance public expenditure 
cuts as a solution, and thereby cohere with the politics of neoliberal austerity? Or 
do they locate the cause of fiscal problems in the concentration of capital in the 
private sector, and express a turn away from the dominant position? Do they then 
seek to address public fiscal deficits by drawing on private capital surplus? 
3. Thirdly, I investigate the cases as a response to the economic crisis. I ask how 
economic issues are narrated in terms of crisis origins and proposed solutions. I 
assess whether these reflect a continuation of market reason, or instead a re-
centering of societal needs within economic practices. I interrogate how the 
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‘knowledging technology’ of ‘shared value’ advances certain interpretive 
frameworks over others. I investigate whether it marks a change of course to 
reduce uneven economic development by lifting living standards of marginalized 
populations through equitable economic practices, or if it instead articulates a 
post-neoliberal economy only in rhetoric which is constrained by the steadfast and 
one-sided assertion of capital interests at the expense of a general good. 
More specifically, and in line with a hegemony approach focused on the achievement of 
social compromise, I ask how are these different, competing strategies (or hegemony 
projects) simultaneously present within the SIB projects, and what effect do they each 
have upon the common objects of steering? What ways do they, through these 
interventions, shape (or fail to shape) the discursive and material contours of the 
investigated policy experiments? Do these examples reveal the domination of 
marketization over social processes, or instead, the ‘re-embedding’ of the economy 
(Polanyi)? Do these cases represent a turn away from a ‘negative compromise’ of a zero-
sum game, and the achievement of a ‘positive compromise’ of mutual benefit (Wright, 
2012)? Or what kind of settlement do they achieve? And do these reveal a new terrain of 
hegemonic struggle? 
Following the case study chapters, I compare the projects, and shows how SIBs may be 
understood not only as a specific intervention in a circumscribed local context, but rather 
how these represent ‘politico-strategic terrain’ of more broadly conceived hegemony 
projects (see chapter 7). I am interested in the provisional and unstable compromise 
between different ‘hegemony projects’ which each seek to advance its crisis construal and 
crisis management strategy, and ‘impose’ its own ‘developmental trajectory’ upon 
society, the state, and the economy (Hay, 1999, p. 338). But I also describe the contingent 
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assemblage that emerge out of these actors’ encounter in the policy process, and in 
describing to the best of my ability, the provisional compromises reached, their problem 
narratives as well as practical ‘solutions’ (and displacements), and the remaining 
instabilities. 
3.8. Theory building: Reconstructing SIBs as hegemony struggles 
As described in the introductory chapter, the aim of this research project is to contribute 
to contemporary research on neoliberalism since the financial crisis of 2008. I show how 
the ‘post-democratic’ restoration of hegemony since the crisis of 2008 is paralleled by 
modernisation efforts seeking an ‘ethical capitalism’, and shine the light on the ways 
coercion is complemented by efforts to create a new popular consensus, and address 
neglected problems in innovative ways. This task is achieved through concrete analysis 
of the ‘social investment market’ in two case studies of SIBs. This section describes the 
steps taken in building this theory from the concrete analysis. 
First, I analyse ‘ethical capitalism’ policies not as single units, but instead illuminate its 
relational character between competing ‘hegemony projects’ and their ‘unstable 
compromise’. Whereas Clarke (2010a, p. 388) defines ‘moral capitalism’ as the “muted 
echo of popular scepticism and outrage about the crisis of the present”, I investigate the 
presence of alternatives within these market-based initiatives, but also the way such 
alternatives are ‘muted’. In other words, I analyse the link between market governance 
and ‘public responsibility’ as a dynamic tension between competing restructuring efforts, 
advanced by policy actors belonging to different ‘hegemony projects’. This is achieved 
by a critical investigation of the data. 
The incorporation of alternatives into such projects represents what Gramsci calls 
‘passive revolution’, as capitalism seeks to modify itself through the selective 
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recuperation of its opposition. But I also show how such incorporation, while fragmenting 
into elements a potential post-neoliberal alternative, also achieves certain advantages in 
the present context for counter-hegemonic forces. 
The investigation reconstructs ‘ethical capitalism’ as a contingent assemblage and 
compromise formation between unequal partners on a terrain of ongoing crisis of 
neoliberal hegemony and unequal power relations. In doing this, I contribute to research 
on neoliberalism’s ‘strange non-death’ (Crouch, 2011) since the crisis of 2008 by 
complementing the dominant narrative of ‘post-democracy’ with one about 
neoliberalism’s modernisation attempts, and revealing its persistent troubles and 
limitations. In the conclusion, I describe the dissembling of these contingent arrangements 
in the context of the mutating crisis conjuncture. 
3.9. Limitation of the study 
In concluding this chapter, I finish by defining some of the boundaries of this study, which 
have further focused my investigation. There are two literatures which my research does 
not particularly build upon, but deserve mention here, in order to clarify further the focus 
of my investigation. The first is a political economy investigation into regulatory ‘fixes’ 
(Harvey 2010), and the second is an often (but not entirely) social constructivist focus on 
changing conceptions of ‘the social’. These are explained in turn below. 
First, while I examine the social investment market as a strategy of crisis management, I 
do not test its ‘success’ as spatio-temporal ‘fix’. That is, I do not assess whether the social, 
fiscal, or economic crises have been ‘solved’ by the social investment market. I 
investigate instead the causal factors giving rise to the SIB in the time and place of its 
emergence, its ‘imagined solutions’, and the contradictory effects it has upon social, 
fiscal, and economic developments. I am concerned with illuminating, through qualitative 
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research, a thick description of these complex practices, through a small data set of two 
case studies. Assessments of the SIM as a regulatory fix would require a broader data set 
and a longer time-frame. Not only did I favour a qualitative study to richly describe the 
complex dynamics of these experiments, my project’s time limits restricted the possibility 
of the type of quantitative study that would be necessary to answer the question of a 
regulatory fix. This latter question however remains of much interest – and the current 
investigation might be a building block for such studies in the future. I hope that the 
results of the present investigation may be used to test theoretical generalisations at a 
higher scale. 
In addition to the political economy literature on the regulatory ‘fix’, this research project 
also does not engage at length with the literature on the rationalisation, economisation, or 
financialisation of ‘the social’ – often, but not exclusively, in the tradition of social 
constructivism. There are a few specific works to be mentioned here. First, Rose’s (1996) 
analysis of the ‘death of the social’ investigates the shift within ‘knowledge’ from national 
‘societies’ to sub-national ‘communities’ which accompanied the socio-economic 
transition to ‘globalisation’. It focuses on the micro-politics of risk management and 
governance at lower scales, and the rise of individual responsibility against the notion of 
collective solidarity. A similar contribution to these changes was offered by Espeland and 
Stevens (1998), whose analysis of societal fragmentation moves from the discursive and 
narrative level towards that of social practice through quantification, standardization, and 
the conception and assessment of ‘commensuration’. Additionally, Fine and Lapavistas’ 
(2004) study of the development of ‘social capital’ is discussed in this chapter, yet I do 
not rely heavily on their work. Similarly, Hall (2014) discusses the ‘social return on 
investment’ approach which quantifies ‘values’ that transcend or do not directly translate 
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into monetary forms, focusing on philanthropic investment in the ‘third sector’. And 
Beckert’s (2016) Imagined Futures is concerned with the expectations within market 
economies, focusing on the topics of risk and its calculation, as well as opportunities of 
profitable investment. The author focuses on how faith in future development supports 
current actions, thereby helping to secure the anticipated future – which for capital 
holding actors means profits. Most recently, Chiapello (2015) analysed the ‘spreading of 
financial analysis and calculation’ beyond the formal boundaries of the financial sector 
and into society.  
Yet, while all of these texts contribute in some way or another to the investigation of 
capitalist development at the centre of my research, they also share a common limitation 
which has limited their use value for my project. This is due to my concern with the 
ambiguous and contested character of such developments towards the social investment 
market and ‘ethical capitalism’. As described in chapter two, my theoretical framework 
seeks to ascertain the conflux and intersection of causal factors upon social development 
and policy formation, for which I require a method to interrogate the negotiated praxis 
driving societal development, wherein competing logics and actors produce compromises 
in social formations. This fundamentally contrasts with other research perspectives – both 
in the field of political economy as well as among many ‘social constructivist’ approaches 
– concerned, as valuable as they are, with a more narrowly focused investigation of 
rationalisation, marketization, or financialisation. For these reasons, such of these 
contributions do play a role in my investigation, but this remains limited, as my 
investigation seeks to identify and accurately represent the changing forms of 
compromise between competing forces, logics, visions, and desired trajectories of social 
development. I hope to develop this argument in a future contribution, and thereby 
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4. Chapter 4 – Historical context: Social impact bonds and 
neoliberalism 
Following the theoretical and methodological presentations of the previous two chapters, 
this one historicises the research object in the context of neoliberalism. It does so by 
identifying SIB’s roots in two stages of neoliberalism. First, I identify the policy’s origins 
during the period of ‘second wave neoliberalism’, when an initial round of marketization, 
privatisation, and commodification during the 1970s and 80s, took on a more socially 
expansive form (Gill 1995; Harvey 2005), accompanied by notions of ‘social 
responsibility’ which grew during the late 1980s and expanded throughout the 1990s 
(Sum 2009a). I describe not only this historical background of SIBs but also its specific 
intellectual origins, by explaining the concept of the ‘Social Policy Bond’, proposed in 
1988 (Schram 2014). The second part of this chapter moves away from this pre-history 
of SIBs towards its practical life, during the current, third phase of neoliberalism, which 
emerged in the aftermath of the financial meltdown of 2008 – sometimes called 
‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ (see Demirović 2018). This section first describes social, 
fiscal, and economic developments during this time which represent significant 
contextual changes accounting for the ‘selection’ and implementation of SIBs during the 
past decade. Afterwards, I outline the SIBs’ practical emergence and expansion by 
describing policy developments in the U.S. and U.K. 
This approach to historicisation is based on Gramsci’s conception of development, in 
which history is not understood as an ‘evolutionary flow’, as Stuart Hall (2015, p. 55) 
writes, but rather as the ‘mov[ement] from one conjuncture to another’. This presentation 
focuses on the interrelated set of social, political, economic, and cultural institutions 
which structure the historical periods, and provide the framework from which policies 
emerge. 
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4.1. The Pre-History of SIBs 
This section contains two parts. First, I describe the context of ‘second wave 
neoliberalism’ – focusing on select social, political, and economic changes – which was 
significant to the first stage of SIBs’ emergence. In the second part of this section, I 
explain the intellectual origins of SIBs, conceived originally as ‘Social Policy Bonds’, 
and the problems this policy was conceived to resolve. 
4.1.1. The context of ‘second wave neoliberalism’ 
Whereas much of the critical literature on SIBs emphasise the policy’s convergence with, 
and even extension of, existing market modes of governance – as the “mutation of 
privatisation” (Whitfield 2015), “the next neoliberal thing” (Schram 2015), or the 
“financialisation of urban policy” (Lake 2015) – these analyses often overlook how SIBs 
express, simultaneously, a modernisation agenda within neoliberalism. Both the time 
frame and substance of SIBs relate to a specific historical development, I argue, belonging 
to ‘second-wave’ neoliberalism (Steger and Roy 2010). SIBs belong to this phase – which 
began in the late 1980s and early 1990s – as both a further extension of markets from 
economy into ‘society’ (Gill 1995), but this involved too a ‘moral’ turn. ‘Roll out 
neoliberalism’ (Peck/Tickell 2002) was accompanied by a ‘new ethicalism’ which sought 
to “reconnect economic policies with (new) moral norms” (Sum 2009: 18). The 
emergence of SIBs is therefore not a story of neoliberalism as such, but rather of a 
particular modernisation attempt within market governance, involving both its rescaling 
and refashioning as a form of ‘responsible’ capitalism. Only by considering this particular 
historical development can we explain the contradictory development and emergence of 
SIBs in the present conjuncture. 
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The period of ‘second wave neoliberalism’ has been given many names: the ‘third way’, 
‘post-Washington Consensus’, and ‘roll-out neoliberalism’, and is associated with the 
ideas and practices of ‘social capital’, corporate social responsibility, the ‘social 
economy’, and ‘inclusive growth’ among others.  
The ‘third way’ was a central banner of dominant centre-left parties in the U.K. and U.S. 
in the 1990s led by Blair and Clinton following the radical market deregulation under 
Thatcher and Reagan.  As a normative project, Giddens framed the idea of a ‘third way’ 
(1998) as an alternative to laissez faire economics on the one side, and as ‘renewal’ of 
social democracy on the other side, meant to face the challenges of the new era of 
globalisation. Hence, where the governments of Thatcher and Reagan radically rolled 
back social protections and challenged the very idea of society, Blair’s ‘New Labour’ and 
Clinton’s ‘New Democrats’ each sought to deal with growing material polarisation not 
through social protections but through social capital (Fine & Lapavitsas, 2004): they faced 
off economic security by engineering an active state to re-make workers to fit the 
economy’s changing needs. According to this idea, instead of restoring workers’ rights to 
welfare protections are cutback, they are neither entirely left on their own, but instead, 
they are to be re-skilled (see Burrows & Loader, 1994; Jayasuriya, 2006; Peck, 2001).  
Jenson describes the shift on the international stage by emphasising the ‘post-Washington 
Consensus’. Where trickle-down theory failed to distribute the rewards of economic 
growth to the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy, ideas of ‘inclusive growth’ were 
intended to steer the market to supporting the ‘bottom of the pyramid’. Among the 
institutions of UNICEF, the OECD, and the EU, a new focus on ‘social exclusion’ 
emerged, focused on ‘social investment’ and ‘preventative policy’ (Jenson, 2010). The 
emphasis on entrepreneurialism which accompanied the first phase of neoliberalism 
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turned into an ‘empowerment’ agenda, involving ‘micro-credit’ schemes, and neo-
corporate ‘governance’ arrangements to coordinate state, market, and civil society 
organisations towards ‘common goals.’ 
Transnational corporations responded to criticism of the negative social and 
environmental ‘externalities’ of their business practices at this time through ‘corporate 
social responsibility’ initiatives (Crouch 2006). Rather than to exclude and repress 
critiques and grievances, they modified the normative basis of their businesses and 
established local ties that would expand their business practices and change the content 
of legitimacy (Sum 2009).  
Afterwards, this largely voluntary practice of firm’s self-assessment and promotion led 
to more complex standards and assessments which external institutions sought to establish 
as means for re-embedding market actors in forms of public accountability. The ‘social 
return on investment’ was developed to quantify and assess the worth of social processes 
which often easily eluded monetary valuation (Hall 2014). In these processes, 
governments, which had redrawn from economy during the first phase of neoliberalism, 
were being brought back into economic policy in a new way, acting as one among many 
actors in a collaborative, network-style ‘governance’ framework (Bevir 2012). These 
developments were not the outcome of a self-evolving system, but also the response to 
internal contradictions and external social forces, which placed pressures on existing 
norms and called forth new ones, as described by Graefe (2001, 2006) on the emergence 
of the ‘social economy’ (see also Amin et al. 2002; and Sum 2009). One result was of this 
increasing influence of business and the simultaneous normative shift towards public 
accountability was the development of ‘New Public Management’ (NPM), which fused 
within government administration an emphasis on efficiency with notions of public 
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accountability. NPM was an important element of ‘second wave neoliberalism’ which 
sought to introduce the normative idea of ‘fairness’ into governance arrangements 
(Davies 2016, pp. 127–128). This paved the way for the idea of government 
commissioners only ‘paying-for-success’ in public services, an important basis, upon 
which Social Impact Bonds were built, with their external financial sources, as Warner 
(2013), as well as Nicholls and Tomkinson (2013), make clear. 
Yet while ‘second wave neoliberalism’ advanced the idea of ‘social inclusion’, often 
through labour market participation, it did not do so equally across the population. While 
some sections of the population were targeted for market inclusion, other were excluded 
from the new arrangements. Significant repressive structures remained intact and even 
expanded in this period. The “roll-out” phase involved, what “new forms of institution-
building and governmental intervention”, that are “no longer concerned narrowly with 
the mobilization and extension of markets (and market logics)” (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 
389). Instead, they have the “political foregrounding of new modes of ‘social’ and penal 
policy-making, concerned specifically with the aggressive reregulation, disciplining, and 
containment of those marginalized or dispossessed by the neoliberalization of the 1980s” 
(388-389). As Wacquant (2009, 2010) argues, the focus on penal policy making meant 
the turn towards ‘prisonfare’, a way of dealing with increasing social insecurity through 
the ‘punitive punishment of the poor’. 
The increasing turn to social policy “does not mean”, Peck and Tickell (2002: 389) 
continue, “that economic policy concerns have somehow slipped off the agenda, but 
rather that—as modes of neoliberal economic management have been effectively 
normalized—the frontier of active policymaking has shifted and the process of state-
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building has been reanimated”. The new strategies do not resolve crises, but are “modes 
of crisis displacement” (374). 
Prisonfare 
A critical aspect of the conjuncture of ‘second wave neoliberalism’, not yet discussed, but 
critical for the analysis of the Social Impact Bond case studies analysed in this thesis, is 
the repressive mode of social control, namely carceral institutions, punitive punishment, 
and ‘prisonfare’ (Wacquant, 1999, 2009, 2010, 2011). In this conjuncture, social 
dislocations were not only responded to by the rediscovery of ‘society’, but also by a 
growing obsession with hardening its divide through methods of social control. 
‘Roll out’ neoliberalism involved not only ‘social’ but also penal institutions, as 
repressive forms of managing social polarisation. This issue is of particular importance 
for this research project because both case studies intervene in criminal justice issues, 
address mass incarceration and high rates of reincarceration, seek to reduce recidivism, 
achieve prison downsizing, and articulate a ‘decarceration’ agenda. In fact, “crime 
prevention” is the very first goal in a list of potential policy goals, in the very first 
document conceptualizing the idea of ‘social policy bonds’ (SPBs) (see below), followed 
by employment, health, housing, education, and pollution (Horesh, 1988, p. 272). As we 
will see in the case studies, both the New York City and Peterborough cases problematize 
penal institutions – at least in a limited way – expressing desires for a turn away from the 
politics of ‘prisonfare’. For this reason, it is imperative to discuss the particular criminal 
justice-related background context, against which the Peterborough and New York City 
SIBs must be understood. 
If the social institutions introduced in the late 1980s and 1990s represent the ‘positive’ 
response to increasing precarisation, polarization, and dislocation caused by ‘first wave 
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neoliberalism’ and the ‘roll back’ of the Fordist settlement, these were paralleled by the 
‘roll out’ of ‘negative’ institutions as well, namely penal institutions as repressive modes 
of managing these problems. As Peck and Tickell (2002, p. 389) write: 
“No longer concerned narrowly with the mobilization and extension of markets 
(and market logics), neoliberalism is increasingly associated with the political 
foregrounding of new modes of “social” and penal policy making, concerned 
specifically with the aggressive reregulation, disciplining, and containment of 
those marginalized or dispossessed by the neoliberalization of the 1980s.” 
As Wacquant (1999, p. 323) explains, market deregulation was combined with repressive 
social reregulation “to mask and contain the deleterious social consequences (…) of the 
deregulation of wage labour and the deterioration of social protection.” He shows that the 
growth of penal institutions is not a reaction to “criminal insecurity” but “a response to 
rising social insecurity” (2010, p. 197). The U.S. showed a “decline or stagnat[ion] for 20 
years after the mid-1970s before falling precipitously in the 1990s”, according to official 
statistics (Wacquant, 2010, p. 208). This means that the United States “became four to 
five times more punitive in a quarter-century holding crime constant” (2010, p. 199).  
In international comparison, the U.S. prison population has grown much faster than the 
OECD average. The average incarceration rate of 100 persons per 100,000, recorded since 
1925 began in the early 1970s to rapidly grow, reaching a near seven-fold increase at the 
beginning of the new century with a nearly 6% growth rate throughout the 1990s (Prison 
Policy Initiative, n.d.). The incarcerated population was predominantly male, 
disproportionately black and latino, and higher in the southern states (Prison Policy 
Initiative, 2016). The incarcerated population peaked around 2008 with nearly 2.7 million 
people in local, state, and federal prisons (ibid). The U.K. also saw a rise in the 
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incarceration rate in this period, though not comparable to the U.S. which is an OECD 
outlier. In 1993, the U.K. prison population began a steady annual rise from to 2.5% to 
3.4%. The increase is due to ‘tough on crime’ policies, with the Ministry of Justice writing 
that “almost all of this increase can be accounted for by the rise in the number of prisoners 
sentenced to immediate custody”, including people detained for committing civil, or non-
criminal offenses, and immigration violations (Ministry of Justice, 2016). As in the U.S., 
the overwhelming majority of persons in detention are male. 
There are variety of methods used, by police, courts, and prisons, to expand carceral 
institutions, including ‘zero tolerance policing,’ ‘mandatory minimum sentencing’, youth 
curfews and juvenile ‘boot camps’, speedy stricter sentences for misdemeanours and 
street crimes, “accelerated criminal processing for low-level delinquents”, etc. 
(Wacquant, 2010, p. 211). 
The institutional developments described here involved clear discursive shifts, and the 
construction of a ‘new penal common sense’. The “criminaliz[ation] of poverty” 
(Wacquant, 1999, p. 321), achieved by the repressive penal institutions, in response to 
increasing social insecurities arising from socio-economic changes and the roll back of 
Fordist social protections, rested also on the “cultural trope of personal responsibility” 
(Wacquant, 2010, p. 213). This involves the breaking apart, or bracketing out, of social 
interdependencies, when considering social positions of marginality and exclusion. This 
“philosophy of moral behaviourism” (Wacquant, 2010, p. 198) involves a practice of 
“deterrence, surveillance, stigma, and graduated sanctions to modify conduct” 
(Wacquant, 2010, p. 199). And finally, ‘prisonfare’ has, as already implied, a class but 
also a racial element. In the U.S., it has mostly targeted blacks and latinos, while in the 
U.K., it targets immigrants and lower-class persons (Wacquant, 2010, p. 206).  
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This ‘penal common sense’ first developed in New York City and was later exported to 
London and other European capitals, with incarceration growth in the U.S. mirrored in 
the U.K. and other European countries, with the exception of those countries which did 
not follow the same path of radical market deregulation and welfare retrenchment, and 
thereby produced less social insecurity that those states which more strongly broke up the 
post-war Fordist settlements (Wacquant, 1999). 
4.1.2. The concept of ‘Social Policy Bonds’ 
It was during this period of ‘second wave neoliberalism’ that, in July 1988, the New 
Zealand economist Ronnie Horesh formulated his concept of a ‘Social Policy Bond’ 
(SPB), as a way to ‘harness self-interest to make the achievement of social objectives 
more efficient’. His original formulation shares strong family resemblances with the 
‘third way’ politics of the time, seeking to chart a course between neoclassical and laissez 
faire economics on the one side, and social democracy on the other, by linking market 
governance with notions of ‘public responsibility’. The section describes the SPB on two 
levels: First, I describe the “mechanism” or “policy instrument” (Horesh, 1988, p. 268), 
and second, briefly reconstruct the SPB discourse as a ‘third way’ project to change the 
relations between the state, economy, and society. 
Narrowly focused, SPBs were developed as a “policy instrument” to link profitable 
private investment with social policy objectives, utilizing self-interest for both fiscal and 
social returns. In Horesh’s conception, the state would issue a SPB, for example, aimed 
at the reduction of crime or unemployment, which would be redeemable only if and when 
such objectives are met. “Assume”, therefore “that a fixed number of bonds is issued, 
redeemable for $10 only when unemployment is down to, say, 20,000” (1988, p. 269). 
These bonds would be purchased by investors, based on their appraisal of its risks and 
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rewards, that is, the likelihood that unemployment would be reduced to a specified level 
and within a specific time frame. 
Yet, the term ‘bond’ is a misnomer. Unlike traditional bonds, which are “redeemable for 
a fixed sum, at a fixed date and yield a fixed rate of interest” (Horesh 1988, p. 269), the 
‘SPBs’ would only be redeemable if and when these targets are met. They “are 
redeemable only when the government objective in question has been achieved” (ibid),8 
making the ‘bonds’ performance-based. The aim is to incentivize specified social 
outcomes, linking rewards to ‘impact’. Bondholders would only see a return on their 
investment if specified targets are met, whether these be reductions in crime, 
unemployment, or homelessness, or improvements in housing, healthcare, or education 
(Horesh 1988, p. 266). (Even industrial and environmental policy could be addressed, or 
that of international conflict resolution, argues Horesh.9).  
If the intervention successfully satisfies the specified objective, investors would receive 
a profitable return on their principal, paid by the government. Such pay-out is not intended 
to increase expenditure, but rather reduce it. This is because ‘outcome payments’ are 
supposed to be paid from anticipated government savings accrued through expenditure 
reductions resulting from lower levels of unemployment, crime, or other welfare issues. 
The setting of goals and impact assessments are not given but rather to be negotiated 
between private actors and public authorities holding different and sometimes competing 
perspectives. “[T]here would be difficulties in the specification of the objective to be 
                                                          
8 The question of risk becomes a major topic in the current discussions of Social Impact Bonds. Warner 
writes, “private investors in SIBs (to date) have required substantial loan guarantees or subordinated 
debt” (2013, p. 308). These have been advanced by philanthropies – by Bloomberg Philanthropies in 
the New York City case – and by the government itself – by the Big Lottery Fund in the Peterborough 
Prison Project in the U.K. 
9 The ‘bonds’ could raise industrial production, “export earnings”, reduce “atmospheric pollution”, end 
“war, famine and disease” (Horesh 1988, pp. 275-277). 
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attained”, Horesh (1988, p. 272) writes. And there would be “varying interpretations”, 
and possibly “deliberate attempts to falsify the information required to monitor 
achievement of the objective in question” (ibid). This is especially the case because 
different forces and interests are at stake. Such challenges could be dealt with the 
following ways. 
First, the parties would have to agree on a “definition” of the objective at stake (Horesh, 
p. 272). Regarding unemployment, “[i]t would be unsatisfactory to redeem the bonds 
when unemployment was down to a certain level for a short time only. The objective is a 
sustained level of low unemployment and this is how it would have to be defined when 
the bond is issued” (Horesh, p. 273. emphasis in original). Secondly, the objective must 
be quantifiable (ibid) so that performance may be judged, government savings can be 
assessed, and profit may be shared. And thirdly, monitoring must be made possible, and 
done so in a way that balances the interests of the parties involved (ibid). As seen in the 
current SIB experiments, these processes require elaborate institutional development, not 
discussed in Horesh’s early formulation. 
This simple description begins to show that these ‘bonds’ are not simply a new 
commodity among others, but introduce new market dynamics into government, require 
institutional changes, and call for the reshaping of relations between state, private 
interests, and civil society. The bonds’ performance-based value does not place them in 
the same category as bets, such as is the case with products in futures markets. Rather, 
there is here a clear intention of influencing outcomes, and empowering self-interested, 
market actors within the field of provisioning with this goal. But in order to operate, they 
require new institutional arrangements. 
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With SPBs, not only do bondholders have a material interest in the performance of a 
specific social policy outcome, they are given the opportunity to affect this outcome by 
intervening in the provisioning. Horesh seeks to leverage market motivations for the 
transformation of provisioning. Bondholders should seek to maximize their financial 
returns by optimizing the performance of their Bond’s specific policy intervention. As 
Horesh (1988, p. 269) states, “the holders of the bonds now have a strong interest in seeing 
the value of their bonds increase as quickly as possible”. This argument is in the SIB 
literature two decades later referred to as ‘aligned interests’. 
This would spur a market of competing service providers, and bondholders would want 
to introduce unemployment reducing measures of their own, beyond the scope of 
government programmes. In Horesh’s words, “active investors would then finance 
initiatives that would help achieve the objective” (1988, p. 270). In the given example, 
these might include a variety of “labour recruitment drives” such as efforts to “match 
vacancies with those currently unemployed” (ibid). 
As Horesh (1988, p. 280) makes clear, this initiative involves the “surrendering of policy 
instruments to the private sphere”, the “contract[ing] out [of provisioning] to the private 
sector” (269), and the roll-back of the public sector (2000: 42). But this privatisation of 
service provisioning is not supposed to undermine the state's role in setting the goals of 
social policy (Horesh 1988, p. 269). In other words, the public sphere is supposed to set 
the ends, while the private sphere is to conduct the means. Horesh (ibid) writes: “In 
essence the achievement - but not the setting - of social objectives is contracted out to the 
private sector via a free market in a new sort of financial instrument: government-issued 
social policy bonds (SPBs)”. 
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This approach was differentiated from other forms of outsourcing, which Horesh admits, 
often enriched the private provisioning firms without improving service provision. 
“Neither is privatisation the answer: private agencies have private objectives and there is 
no intrinsic reason why these should coincide with social objectives. Privatisation, and 
the need to give shareholders a decent return on capital, all too often lead to the provision 
of services only to those most able to afford them” (Horesh 1988, p. 268, emphasis 
added). The result has been the concentration of wealth into fewer hands. Horesh writes: 
“Deregulation and the freer operation of self-interest in parts of the private sector have 
made a lot of people very wealthy indeed. But the less well-off have gained little and 
market forces are often cited to justify measures that hurt the poor” (ibid). 
The SPB does not (necessarily) involve the sale of a public company to a private 
enterprise. Or at least, SPBs are designed to link private, profit-maximization to the 
satisfaction of publicly-set goals. SPBs therefore would involve a specific role for the 
state. What the “bonds” require is a form of targeted, coordinated, and monitored 
intervention. Horesh believes that the monetary incentives of this performance-based pay-
off scheme, introduces a new dynamic by which bondholders will take particular interest 
in the operation of public provisioning, which according to him currently lacks “tangible 
inducement to perform better”.10 Investors “will be highly motivated to become active 
rather than see their returns from bondholding suffer as the targeted objective becomes 
an ever more remote possibility” (Horesh 1988, pp. 270-271). 
When ‘bondholders’ have a share in the performance, and receive returns on efficient and 
effective outcomes, they are materially interested and “invested” in it. They are therefore 
                                                          
10 This is presented as improving public services which lack performance incentives (Horesh 1988, p. 
268).  
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especially inclined to favour certain kinds of provisioning. They are no longer external to 
it, but rather, they have a self-interest in its performance because it determines the growth 
or reduction of their capitals. Horesh therefore takes issue with a “hands off”, laissez-
faire, or “indirect” approach. He wants to insert market discipline into the provisioning 
of public goods, unleashing a new dynamic to reshape the relationship between the state, 
private forces, and civil society. This is why in Horesh’s later writings on the subject, he 
refers to the SPB ‘regime’ (Horesh 2000, pp. 40-41). It is much more than a new financial 
product, or performance-based equity. 
According to Horesh’s vision, the new ‘bonds’ should consciously construct ways for 
investors to improve their “products”, i.e., they should be able to enhance the performance 
of a distinct social provisioning project. This is what the strategic use of market discipline 
within the sphere of public services means.  
Yet, an important difference between this early conception from today's Social Impact 
Bonds and Pay for Success projects, is the role Horesh attributes to the bondholders and 
the market. According to his idea, bondholders would themselves directly seek out the 
service providers, and finance their services directly. This contrasts strongly to the actual 
SIB and PfS projects today, which are formed as cross-sector coordination, rely heavily 
on “intermediaries” for the selection of service providers from established civil society 
organisations, and the elaboration of monitoring organisations. Horesh expects 
bondholders to take it upon themselves to select and also “finance initiatives that would 
help achieve the objective” (Horesh 1988, p. 270). 
Thus, while this early conception did anticipate (and encourage) the underlying dynamic 
of this new “regime”, it had not anticipated the institutional arrangements that would 
become necessary for its implementation. This had not yet elaborated the new terms, 
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practices, and relationships between private ’bondholders’, service providers, and 
government agencies that have become a key component of SIBs and PfS programs today. 
Yet although the role of civil society organisations had not been anticipated in the moment 
of Horesh’s conception of SPBs, it is also the case that ‘civil society’ had not at that time, 
attained the normative status it holds today. That is, in some sense, the dynamics Horesh 
anticipated could not be unleashed until the institutional components had emerged. The 
civil society organisations so crucial to the cross-sector coordination in today's projects, 
had, in the late 1980s, that is, at the time of conception, not yet become institutionalised. 
Hence, it was not simply a subjective blindspot on his part, but a matter of historical 
development of social relations that had not yet developed. The development of an 
institutionalized ‘third sector’ in the 1990s and 2000s may have provided the right 
conditions for SPBs to be selected and institutionalized in practices. 
Hence, the ‘bonds’ were conceived as something more than a new commodity, in fact, 
they were supposed to bring about a new ‘regime’ (Horesh, 2000). By unleashing a new 
market dynamic, they seek to encode new relationships, and with their institutionalisation 
in today's experiments, they actively (re)shape the operations of public provisioning, and 
the relations between politics, economy, and society. They also affect established 
meanings, for example, regarding the content of rights, entitlements, and citizenship. 
The broader political trajectory of SPBs also requires attention. These were made explicit 
by Horesh. It was a third way political project, diverging in limited ways from specific 
aspects of neoliberal programs. Horesh objected to trickle-down economics on the 
grounds that, while it may produce enormous material wealth, it does so in a vastly uneven 
manner. The result is “poverty amidst plenty” (Horesh 1988, p. 267). 
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Yet the objection to trickle-down theory did not lead Horesh to support the welfare state. 
He criticised the ‘ineffectiveness’ of ‘indirect’ mechanisms, which only ‘retroactively’ 
(re)distribute capital surpluses. According to him, “[g]overnment encourages economic 
growth in the hope that benefits will outweigh the costs and then tries, via the tax and 
welfare system, to effect some redistribution” (Horesh 1988, p. 266). But, this strategy 
has however not helped reduce unemployment, nor improve “housing, education, health 
services” (ibid). This is because there is no institutional design to allow monetary 
incentives to drive improvements in social provisioning. 
Horesh's proposal is explicitly inspired by Adam Smith's theory that self-interest is the 
“most effective catalyst for the generation of wealth” (Horesh 1988, p. 267). However, 
the uneven distribution of this wealth led Horesh to propose a mechanism to “channel 
self-interest into solving social problems, not just individual ones” (ibid). Therefore, in 
the conjuncture of a collapsing Cold War era, where the stand-off between western “free-
market” capitalism and “actually existing socialism” was unravelling, Horesh's proposal 
objected to both trickle-down theory or “self-regulating market” on the one hand, and to 
socialist or social democratic forms of social welfare states and redistributive policies to 
address class polarization on the other. 
Although Horesh’s programme coheres with the “social economy” trajectory of the 
1990s, it was not selected by policy makers at the time. It was not until the economic 
crisis of 2007/08 that the social conditions ripened and the social forces necessary for its 
emergence had come into leadership roles in government. As I describe in the next 
section, it was the crisis of second wave neoliberalism in 2008 which triggered SIBs as 
an increasingly popular policy approach, and the introduction of austerity in 2010 which 
accelerated its diffusion. 
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4.2. The Practical History of SIBs 
4.2.1. The context of neoliberal crisis  
Although SIBs have their intellectual roots in the late 1980s, it was not until the financial 
meltdown of 2008 that they were selected as policy approach and practically 
implemented. This section describes first important changes to the context, focusing on 
the social, fiscal, and economic aspects of the post-2007/08 crisis conjuncture, and then 
describes SIBs concrete development and implementation in the U.K. and US. This 
presentation completes the three stage evolutionary process conceived by CPE (see 
chapter 2): Having described the stage of semiotic variation in the first section of this 
chapter, that is, of a particular policy idea, I now focus on the two final stages, namely its 
selection as policy approach and its retention in policy practice through practical 
implementation. 
Conceived as a manifold crisis (Brie, 2009; Calhoun, 2011; Demirović, Dück, Becker, & 
Bader, 2011; Gill, 2012a; Wallerstein, 2011), this section gives special attention three 
main aspects of the crisis of neoliberal hegemony that are central to today’s historical 
emergence of SIBs in the two leading ‘liberal market economies’ (P. A. Hall & Soskice, 
2001) of the U.K. and U.S. I focus first on the intensifying crisis of social reproduction, 
which although present before 2008, was intensified by the financial meltdown, the 
resulting economic slump, and the retrenchment of welfare. This contextual change was 
an important reason for the resonance of the idea of ‘social impact’ since 2007/08, and 
SIBs, conceived as a way of ‘solving deep-seated social problems’. Their third way 
character stepped away from laissez faire and repressive attitudes of social control, yet 
advanced also an alternative to ‘big government’, through the idea of ‘big 
society’(Dowling & Harvie, 2014; Lee, McNulty, & Shaffer, 2012; Wiggan, 2018). The 
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second contextual change was the fiscal crisis, caused by the public’s recapitalisation of 
the financial sector (and selected automobile manufacturers) after the industry’s 
implosion, and the falloff in tax revenue resulting from the economic slump (Blyth, 2013). 
A climate of fiscal constraint and welfare cuts collided with growing social needs. The 
idea of ‘mobilising private capital for public good’, a central slogan of SIBs, presented a 
third way to both welfare retrenchment and anti-austerity pushback (M. E. Warner & 
Clifton, 2013). It proposed ‘impact investment’ as a way to address these pressures, filling 
funding gaps, without increasing taxation. The third contextual feature critical to this 
investigation is the economic crisis, that is, slow and uneven growth following the 
financial implosion of 2007/08. In this context, SIBs are promoted as a ‘third way’ by 
‘producing shared value’. This is imagined as an alternative to trickle-down theory on the 
one hand, because it is said to focus on producing direct benefits, or ‘inclusive prosperity’. 
But it is also an alternative to redistribution approaches. It proposes supporting economic 
expansion while addressing internally, its uneven distribution, through a new investment 
product. These three contextual issues are discussed in detail below. 
Social context: Deepening crises of social reproduction 
In both the U.S. and U.K., the financial implosion of 2007/08 meant a deepening social 
crisis, with the loss of homes, employment, health coverage, the depletion of personal 
savings and pensions. In discussing the ‘social crisis’, I refer to Bakker and Gill’s (2003, 
pp. 17–18) definition of ‘social reproduction’ as the “biological reproduction of the 
species” but the reproduction of its supports and web of social relations that make such 
reproduction possible. For the vast majority of the population, this includes the ability to 
reproduce oneself as labour power (ibid). Crises of social reproduction have increased for 
individuals in both the U.S. and U.K. since the financial meltdown of 2008. 
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As McBride shows, unemployment rates rose significantly in both countries since the 
financial crisis, from 4.6 to 8.1% in the U.S. and from 5.3 to 7.9% in the U.K. between 
2007 and 2012, with youth and especially long-term unemployment rising much faster 
(2015, p. 71). Nor do these statistics convey the kind of employment or income levels, 
where job loss was higher in the middle-income group, and job growth higher in the 
bottom group, leaving many employed persons with less disposable income and 
increasing levels of debt (J. Brenner, 2010, p. 74; McBride, 2015, p. 74). Between 2007 
and 2008 alone, more than 2.5 million people fell below the official poverty level in the 
U.S. (Béland & Waddan, 2011, p. 233). Unemployment effected living space as well with 
increasing numbers of young and old employed sharing residence in multi-generational 
households (J. Brenner, 2010, p. 75), while many millions of people lost their homes to 
foreclosure. In fact, in 2008 a quarter of homeowners owed more on their properties than 
these were worth (ibid). 
Not only was the crisis experienced differently depending upon one’s position in the 
socio-economic class hierarchy, growing inequality was felt differently between ethnic 
groups. In 2010, latino unemployment rates were 50% higher than those for whites, while 
black unemployment were twice as high (2011, p. 234). Gender was also an important 
factor in the experience of social crisis. Between 2007 and 2009, unemployment for 
single-mother households rose more than 50%, from 8 to 13.6 percent (J. Brenner, 2010, 
p. 74).  
Despite official unemployment status, less than half of U.S. workers collected even 
limited unemployment aid in 2009, with many people on growing contingent contracts 
disqualified from benefits (Béland & Waddan, 2011, p. 235). Food stamps recipients 
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climbed to a near record high at the end of 2008, with nearly 30 million people collecting 
benefits, and jumping to 37 million the year afterward (2011, p. 236). 
Job loss also deepened a public health problem with increasing levels of physical and 
psychological health, drug abuse, and suicides. Especially in the U.S., where job loss 
meant that 6 million people lost their employment-based health insurance (Stuckler & 
Basu, 2013, p. 99), premature and avoidable deaths were on the rise, at least until 
healthcare reform was introduced in 2010 (ibid). 
With the intensification of the social crisis after 2008, a significant number of people 
struggling to reproduce themselves ended up incarcerated, with U.S. and U.K. prison 
populations remaining high. The U.S. incarceration rate remains the world’s highest, and 
is five times the OECD average, holding 690 persons per 100,000 in prison. Though the 
U.K. does not compare with the U.S. outlier, it too remains above the OECD average 
(Walmsley, 2016).  
Against this background, both the U.K and U.S. governments advanced the idea of the 
‘social investment market’ as a response to deepening social crises.  Partially because of 
the depth of its austerity measures, the U.K. played a leading role in these initiatives with 
its idea of ‘public sector reform’ and the ‘big society’ (Peter Alcock, 2014; Dowling & 
Harvie, 2014; Wiggan, 2018). But in both countries we see not only the (further) shift of 
services from government providers to the voluntary, non-profit, and ‘third’ sector, but 
also the continued transformation of their goals. Rather than providing social protection 
from the insecurities of the market, ‘interventions’ would be increasingly focused on the 
production of ‘human capital’ to achieve labour market absorption. 
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This could also be seen in the increasingly agent-centred focus on personal ‘resilience’ 
that downplayed social conditions of personal crisis (Dagdeviren, Donoghue, & 
Promberger, 2016), and the attempt to make personal coping strategies ore effective as a 
way to “reduce the need for council services” (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2013, p. 20). 
People would be ‘re-abled’ to cope with the social crisis, and made ‘independent’ of 
welfare support, through the expansion of ‘preventative’ measures, with the aim of 
keeping them out of remedial institutions (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2013, p. 20), as 
we see in our two case studies. 
The decarceration focus in the case studies reflects changing criminal justice policy 
narratives, as Roberts and Silvestri (2010) explain, with the language of a “rehabilitation 
revolution” (Ministry of Justice, 2010b, p. 1) linked to interventions “to encourage 
employment” (Ministry of Justice, 2010b, p. 2). As I argue below then, the Peterborough 
SIB’s decarceration goal, and its effort, in a limited way, to roll-back punitive ‘prisonfare’ 
policies proceeds through the roll-out or extension of disciplinary ‘workfare’ policies 
(Peck, 2001; Peck & Theodore, 2010; Wacquant, 2010), which “involves the imposition 
of a range of compulsory programs and mandatory requirements for welfare recipients 
with a view to enforcing work and residualizing welfare” (Peck, 2001, p. 10).11 
The shift in policy goals, at institutional levels traversing the local and national scales, 
and across policy areas from criminal justice to welfare, was accompanied by the 
geographical shift in the activities and responsibilities for service provision from state to 
                                                          
11 Peck (2001), Jessop (Jessop, 2002b), and others have analysed the transformation of welfare from a 
Fordist-Keynesian settlement of universal, rights-based social protections supporting individuals 
against the vagaries of the market, to ‘workfare’, which aims to shrink the welfare rolls through work-
inducing conditionalities and the reduction of supports to a bare minimum. The Welfare Reform Act of 
2012 has further weakened supports with the “Bedroom Tax”, work activation measures, and disability 
claimant restrictions. 
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civil society, in line with the attempt to construct a “Big Society” (Peter Alcock, 2014). 
SIBs advance this goal as well, as they “are designed”, according to the Cabinet Office, 
“to help reform public service delivery” (Cabinet Office, 2013a), involving the “opening 
of public services”, to “public, voluntary and private sector” providers of probationary 
services (Rand Europe, 2014, p. 14), and organised with business management techniques 
already deeply established by New Public Management practices to rationalise the social 
sector by putting them in service of the goal to “reduce need” of welfare and remedial 
services by “re-ablisation” of persons, to become independent through labour market 
inclusion. 
Fiscal context: Public debt crisis and austerity politics 
The second important contextual shift since 2008 which is important for the emergence 
of SIBs is the fiscal crisis, namely the perception that the state’s deficits were too 
excessive in relation to GDP growth. Public debt rose enormously after the financial 
meltdown, with gross public debt jumping over 62 points in the U.K. and 43 points in the 
U.S., compared to an OECD average of 38 (McBride, 2015, p. 74). Three factors 
contributed to these changes. The main factor was, as Blyth (2013, pp. 48, 52) and Alcock 
(2014, p. 255) explain, the public’s re-capitalisation of the financial sector and some of 
the major automobile companies, as a way to prevent major bankruptcies and to contain 
a broader contagion of the ‘real’ economy. Second, automatic stabilizers raised 
expenditures in the form of unemployment aid, food stamps, and other social supports. 
Third, tax revenues shrunk as economic activities slowed down. 
Although a variety of political responses were possible, both countries turned to fiscal 
austerity in 2009/10, following a brief period of neo-Keynesian stimulus policies. 
Governments sought to reduce public deficits through public sector expenditure cuts, 
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especially welfare but also to local government. The U.S. ‘debt ceiling’ debate limited 
welfare spending and applied pressure to state and local governments to comply with 
reduced budgetary targets in a form of ‘austerity urbanism’ (Peck, 2012a, 2014b). The 
U.K.  government announced an ‘age of austerity’ in 2009 (The Guardian, 2009b), and 
sought a 25% reduction in welfare budgets beginning in 2010, a 10-15% reductions to 
local government budgets (O’Hara, 2015, p. 177), and similarly high level of cuts to 
departments (Pete Alcock, 2012), including for our purposes, the Ministry of Justice. 
‘Fiscal constraint’ led to efforts to reduce both the quantity of overall welfare claimants 
as well as the qualitative ‘value of benefits’ (Farnsworth, 2011, p. 265). Following such 
pressures, government was drastically limited in its ability to respond to increased need 
and maintain or expand social protections. 
The contradiction between austerity-induced cuts to welfare at a time of increasing social 
need provided the grounds for ‘social investment market’ and SIBs which promised to 
‘leverage private capital’ in a way that would protect the public from fiscal risk. In fact, 
a ‘social investment paradigm’ had already been developed in both countries with the 
‘third way’ turn during the 1990s, with the idea of investment in ‘productive’ rather than 
‘ameliorative’ or ‘consumptive’ social policy, but this direct state financing model had 
been stalled by the ‘general squeeze on resources’ in the context of fiscal crisis (Diamond 
& Liddle, 2012, p. 287). Facing public fiscal deficits, the state now turned to private 
investors holding capital surpluses. The ground was set for the re-emphasis and remaking 
of public-private partnerships in addressing social crises that avoided tax-raising revenue 
generation, and relied instead on incentivising private investment. 
In the U.S., President Obama proposed funding ‘pay-for-success’ schemes in the annual 
federal budgets of 2011 and 2012 and afterwards, and for specific departments such as 
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the Department of Labor (Azemati et al., 2013, pp. 24–25). Similarly, the Ministry of 
Justice, sought to expand ‘pay for success’ schemes (Ministry of Justice, 2010b) while 
central government aimed to increase the social sector’s access to capital markets by 
“growing the social investment market” in the U.K. (Cabinet Office, 2013b, 2014; 
Cabinet Office, Hurd, & Maude, 2011). 
Economic context: crisis of accumulation and uneven growth 
The third shift in the historical conjuncture and political context which allowed for the 
sudden emergence and rapid spread of SIBs since 2008 was the economic crisis. There 
are two aspects to consider here. As Harvey (2010, p. 45) explains, the financial meltdown 
in 2008 expressed a crisis of capital over-accumulation, in which there was an “excess of 
capital relative to the capacity to use that capital profitably”. The wave of house 
foreclosures in the U.S., and thereby, the breakdown in payments to the securities market, 
meant a massive halt in payments to global investors. This disruption of the circulation 
of capital ricocheted on the international financial markets, destroying values and 
bringing economic growth to a standstill. Following the crash of the U.S. housing market 
and the related derivatives, the IMF maintained that the world was ‘awash with liquidity’ 
(Harvey, 2010, p. 28), in the search of investment opportunities. Surplus capital can be 
then seen as one push factor behind the growth of the ‘social investment market’ since 
2008 which is analysed in the case studies. 
But there is a critical, second dimension to the changed economic context, implied in the 
over-accumulation crisis, namely the deep polarisation of the economy. As Bryan and 
Rafferty (2010) explain, the breakdown in the circulation of capital was due on the one 
side, to the inability of increasing numbers of U.S. households to maintain their mortgage 
debt levels in the face of stagnant or falling real incomes. On the other side, mortgages 
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were being pushed onto ever larger groups of financially precarious people, because of 
the supply of surplus capital and the search for yield. The foreclosure crisis which 
triggered the financial market crisis then, was due to deeply uneven economic 
development (Bryan & Rafferty, 2010). This uneven growth contributed to the implosion 
of the U.S housing market, and destroying values of global investors in securities. 
For these reasons, the case studies analyse the significance of slow and uneven growth as 
a push factor for the development of SIBs. Not only does the idea of ‘producing shared 
value’ express an ethical idea of just distribution, and hence, seek to address legitimacy 
gaps, the cases are also analysed as an effort to address the economy’s reproduction 
problems and as a way to place it on new footing. 
For these reasons, we should consider the economic push factors in the development of 
SIBs after 2008, namely as an opportunity for individual and institutional investors, as 
well as for states seeking to develop the opportunities for ‘inclusive’, economic growth. 
This is the economic background underlying the U.K. government’s support and 
development of the ‘impact investment market’ (Cabinet Office et al., 2011). The 
Peterborough SIB, and subsequent projects, may be understood as part of the UK 
government’s economic growth strategy, and the financial industry’s search for yield. 
Such investments have multiple economic motivations, as described above, for which one 
advantage is the promise of achieving “blended returns” of financial benefits to investors 
and social improvements for society. The Peterborough SIB can be contextualized within 
these economic dynamics and as part of a move towards ‘ethical capitalism’.  
This shift marks a change from earlier forms of philanthropy and Corporate Social 
Responsibility, based on a zero-sum notion in which a portion of surplus capital would 
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be subsequently distributed to a specific cause following its accumulation through 
business practices. Dowling and Harvie explain that SIBs instead make “social impact” a 
source of profitability, writing “the social or environmental impact is decidedly internal 
to the ways in which business seeks to create and capture value” (2014, p. 13). The 
intellectual leaders of the self-described movement of “philanthrocapitalism”, Bishop and 
Green (Bishop & Green, 2009), coined the motto “doing well by doing good” to articulate 
these intensions. According the Global Impact Investing Network (2017), the ‘impact 
investment market’ was nearly $114 billion in 2017.  
The following section discusses the organisational developments in the emergence of 
SIBs 
4.2.2. The roll out of SIB policies since 2008 
Though originally conceived more than two decades before (Horesh 1988), SIBs were 
only first implemented after the outbreak of the crisis of 2007/08. In 2009, the U.K. 
government took the lead and was quickly followed by the U.S. with its own “pay for 
success” model in 2010, before the idea spread to Canada, Australia, Germany, Israel, 
and elsewhere (Joy & Shields, 2013; McHugh et al., 2013; Warner, 2013), and was then 
adapted for the global South in the form of ‘development impact bonds’ (Center for 
Global Development and Social Finance 2013). Today more than 100 SIBs’ exist 
throughout the world, though they are mostly concentrated in the global North and 
especially in the liberal market economies of the U.K. and U.S. 
The U.K. government initiated the search process for what would become the Social 
Impact Bond in 2007 (Nicholls and Tomkinson 2013). At that time they formed the 
Council on Social Action, which became a centre for cross-sector collaboration between 
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government, civil society, philanthropies, and private capital holders, aimed the 
development of “social technology; social leadership; collaborative commitments; and 
new models for financing social action” (Cabinet Office 2009)”. A central participant in 
this forum was the non-for-profit organisation, Social Finance, founded in 2008, whose 
aim was to construct the “financial products [which] forge essential links between the 
market, government and society for the greater good” (Social Finance 2014). 
The “basis for the SIB structure” adopted in the U.K. was inspired by the “Contingent 
Revenue Bond”, developed for financing sanitation projects in the global South, which 
was developed by the “former investment banker turned social investment specialist” 
Arthur Wood (Nicholls and Tomkinson 2013, p. 10). Social Finance was approached by 
the Council on Social Action to develop a new financing mechanism, which took the 
structure of the Contingent Revenue Bond, and developed the SIB (ibid).   
At this time, New Philanthropy Capital worked with Social Finance to “consider whether 
financial structures could be developed to fund early intervention work”, and support 
from the UK Treasury was secured (Nicholls and Tomkinson 2013, p. 10). The Young 
Foundation put SF in touch with policy makers and other “outcome-based 
commissioning” projects and ideas, leading them to take up preventative services in the 
field of criminal justice (ibid). In late 2008, they were working with the Ministry of Justice 
and the Treasury. 
Though incorporating central aspects of Horesh’s conception, these developments 
resulted not from state and private parties alone, but from the active work of the non-
governmental organisation Social Finance. And the SIB only emerged after this 
organisation worked closely with civil society service providers: “Social Finance engaged 
with a wide range of key groups including: prison staff; local stakeholders; voluntary 
   
104 
 
organisations working in the field; other criminal justice experts; and potential investors 
(such as trusts and foundations)” (Nicholls and Tomkinson 2013, p. 11).  
These developments gained state support from different sections of government in 2009. 
The ministry of justice advocated innovations in preventative services, while the ruling 
government sought “a new way of funding the third sector to provide services” (HM 
Government cited in Nicholls and Tomkinson 2013, p. 11). In early 2010, the Ministry of 
Justice announced the launching of the Peterborough Prison Project. 
The SIB received popular attention, moving from the Labour government to Conservative 
party, in their “Big Society” platform, and called to life another important institution, a 
“social investment bank”, Big Society Capital (Nicholls and Tomkinson 2013, p. 11), 
which secured capital for investment. In August 2010, the government's Big Lottery 
Fund, which provides funding to a variety of social provisioning initiatives, signalled its 
support for SIBs with a £5 million donation to Social Finance for development purposes 
(ibid). And importantly, they offered, in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice, to “co-
fund the outcomes payments for the Peterborough pilot SIB” (ibid). This was a crucial 
and often overlooked aspect of SIBs, because they provide risk mitigation for investors, 
and hence complicates the idea propagated by SIB proponents that the new policy 
instruments shift financial risk from public to private hands. 
In contrast to Horesh's concept, SIBs were pushed by a cross-sector collaboration of 
distinct state, private, and non-governmental forces rather than investors alone. NGOs 
became the ‘intermediary’ negotiating between the state, private investors, and service 
organisations.  
While the U.K. remains the global leader of the ‘social investment market’, the U.S has 
been playing catch with its own SIBs and “pay for success” programs, which have taken 
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off since the outbreak of the economic crisis. On both the federal and state level, these 
initiatives are spreading. The new wave began in 2009 with the White House Office of 
Social Innovation and Civic Participation for cross-sector social policy programme 
development (Tyson and Greenblatt 2014). It established the Social Innovation Fund, and 
in 2010, a $1 billion fund for “'impact investing' venture funds” (ibid). In January 2012, 
SIBs became a federal policy agenda of the U.S. government, with the issuing of $100 
million for “pay for success” programs, directed at seven departments addressing social 
policy in “workforce development, education, juvenile justice and care of children with 
disabilities” (Office of Management and Budget 2012). These are directed to five 
departments: “the Department of Education, the Social Security Administration, the 
Department of Justice, the Department of Labor and the Corporation for National and 
Community Service” (ibid). As of 2014, fourteen state governments were working on SIB 
development in 2014, and the U.S. Treasury has allocated $300 million for such 
programmes (Lower-Basch 2014). Individual states invested $50 million as of March 
2014, and the federal government proposed $80 million in its 2015 budget (ibid). 
Additionally, the Treasury Department dedicated $300 million for a Pay for Success 
Incentive Fund. The aim is that, the Fund “would mobilize private capital to finance and 
expand effective social programs, with significant benefits for vulnerable populations, 
risk-taking investors and the general public” (ibid). 
These developments have been supported internationally as well. The OECD has argued 
for a recovery strategy “towards a different capitalism, an ethical one”, that is aimed at 
“sustainable” and “inclusive growth”, and which is led by social enterprises and “social 
venture capitalists” (OECD 2010). States could play a crucial role in the expansion of this 
“social economy” through the construction of an “enabling environment” including a 
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“legal framework and fiscal policies” (ibid). According to the statement of the institution's 
Secretary General, the leading innovation of this trajectory is the “Social Impact Bond”, 
which provided an innovative “institutional framework” for this agenda. The OECD 
commits itself to the advancement of this agenda, and in cooperation with the G20, to 
encourage this project amongst other leading international organisations, to “support the 
social economy, social enterprises, and civil society more generally to help address the 
social impact of the crisis” (ibid). 
The G8 established the “Social Impact Investment Forum” to scale-up to the global level 
(Cabinet Office 2013b). This strategy involves the “use of finance to tackle entrenched 
social issues” (ibid). Hence, the construction of the legal infrastructure would be 
complemented by the development of a “global market for social impact investment”, 
organised by a collaboration between state actors, business leaders, philanthropists, social 
entrepreneurs, and scholars (ibid). The project requires new forms of cross-sector and 
cross-national collaboration, supported by a Social Impact Investment Taskforce and 
“working group of development finance institutions”, the construction of “common 
frameworks” supported by the OECD, and prescriptions for policy makers and market 
actors (ibid). 
Social investment strategies have also received support from the European Union, 
especially with the focus on developing state structures opening the field for “payment 
by results” social investment projects and the support for social enterprises (O’ Sullivan 
et al. 2012). According to an E.U. report, the social economy provides both a “short-term 
buffer against [the] crisis” and a potentially key element for an exit strategy from it 
(CIRIEC 2012, p. 49). Viewed as an alternative to trickle-down theory, the Social 
Economy strategies are seen as holding the potential to advance “a more cooperative form 
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of socio-economic regulation”, albeit not a general principle, but rather “alongside 
administrative and competition regulations” (ibid). They could “combin[e] economic 
development and social development”, rather than treating the latter as a product of the 
former (ibid). 
Efforts to modify the concept for global South produced in 2014, the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) Group plans to “launch a $5.3 million program to test a new 
social sector financing model called Social Impact Bonds in Latin America and the 
Caribbean”, through the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) (Multilateral Investment 
Fund 2014). 
Hence, Social Impact Bonds are promulgated as a policy solution with sweeping 
corrective powers to address across social, fiscal, and economic problems in the context 
of a crisis-ridden neoliberalism, and initiate an ‘ethical capitalism’ for the twenty-first 
century.  
  
   
108 
 
5. Chapter 5 – Case Study 1: The Peterborough Social Impact Bond 
This chapter presents the first of two empirical case studies, analysing the world’s first 
Social Impact Bond in the U.K. city of Peterborough, implemented between 2010-2015, 
as an attempt to bring about a form of ‘ethical capitalism’. As briefly described in chapter 
3, the Peterborough SIB was located at the intersection of social, fiscal, and economic 
policy in the post-2008 crisis conjuncture. It responded to the intensifying crisis of mass 
reincarceration (Wacquant, 2010), seeking to reduce reoffending through new 
probationary services (Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2015; Warner, 2013). In the context of 
austerity and ‘public fiscal constraint’ (Blyth, 2013; Peck, 2012a), these services were 
financed by non-governmental investors in a scheme to ‘mobilise private capital for 
public good’. And as a corrective to embedded patterns of uneven economic growth 
(Harvey, 2010; Piketty, 2014), the SIB promised only to pay investors if the project 
achieved measurable ‘social impact’, implementing a vision of ‘shared [economic] value’ 
combining ‘social and financial benefits’. 
The case is analysed from a cultural political economy (CPE) perspective, as described 
in chapter two, in the context of a manifold and mutating crisis of neoliberalism, and the 
related pressures for new governing approaches. According to this approach, policy is not 
the automatic outcome of context, nor of single actors alone, but instead, as their 
combination, i.e. as provisional outcome of hegemonic struggles between competing 
perspectives and strategies advanced by different actors, each hoping to shape the 
“contours, forms, norms, procedures and practices” of society and its institutions, and to 
“impose[s] a developmental trajectory” upon the state, economy, society nexus (Hay, 
1999, p. 331). From this perspective, the case is analysed in terms of its multiple causes 
and a multi-actor perspective, and the negotiation between these actors and their 
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competing perspectives. The SIB is reconstructed as the provisional settlement achieved 
in the given spatio-temporal setting. Therefore, we are dealing with the iterative 
reconstitution of the political economy, the dynamic production of ‘common sense’, and 
the production and modification of hegemony. 
The chapter critically analyses the harmony discourse of SIBs – that of a ‘mutually 
beneficial’ arrangement between all stakeholders (a ‘win-win-win’ situation (Eccles, 
2015; Joseph, 2013)) – to reveal instead the multiplicity, provisional agreements, and 
underlying and unresolved tensions in the assembled discursive and material practices 
aiming to reduce, manage, and displace unruly variation. This allows me to analyse the 
Peterborough SIB as a case of ‘ethical capitalism’, understood here in John Clarke’s 
(2010a, p. 388) words, as a “muted echo of popular scepticism and outrage about the crisis 
of the present”. Following this interpretation, the case analyses the presence of the former 
in the latter. To cite Jayasuriya (Sprague, 2010), I analyse how ‘public responsibility’ is 
developed within modes of market governance in the Peterborough SIB, and how the 
latter attempts to hold markets accountable to the public. Secondly, I investigate how this 
‘scepticism’ or ‘outrage’, in Clarke’s terms, is ‘muted’ in this specific project. That is, I 
analyse how ‘public responsibility’ is subordinated to market forces in the Peterborough 
case. 
A historical materialist policy analysis (HMPA) contributes importantly to the tasks set 
out for this chapter, as it enhances cultural political economy by focusing on the mutual 
presence of competing ‘hegemony projects’ as agents of social and political struggle and 
reconfiguration. The diverging visions can be understood, in reference to this concept, as 
competing strategies that push in different directions, and we can make sense of the 
convergence and divergence of such strategies within the single policy and case. 
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Following the case study chapters, the analysis chapter focuses on the convergence and 
divergence of these competing hegemony projects, as a contribution to our 
understandings of ‘ethical capitalism’ as part of the reproduction of hegemony. But 
HMPA is important to this case analysis for a second reason, namely, because of the way 
it links scales between meta-level hegemony projects and more circumscribed and 
concrete objects of investigation. The multiplicity of strategies in the analysed case has 
to do with the perception by different actors that the Social Impact Bond provides a 
potentially advantageous ‘politico-strategic terrain’ for their particular visions or the 
achievement of their goals. 
The chapter is organised around the reconstruction of the three central ‘objects of 
steering’ that this ‘ethical capitalism’ project seeks discursively and materially to reshape. 
It shows how social, fiscal, and economic ‘objects’ are selected, construed, and reshaped 
in the Peterborough case. I describe three moments of steering and structuration (see 
chapter 3) focusing on discourses, knowledging technologies (that is, those mechanisms 
governing the interpretation of social processes), and social practices. And I explain the 
production of consensus between different perspectives with regard to these objects 
among the multiple actors involved in the examined policy. But I also identify the 
instability of these settlements, highlighting remaining tensions and problem 
displacements of this experiment in ‘ethical capitalism’, as a limited response to the 
ongoing hegemony crisis. 
The chapter is structured into five main sections:  
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Section one provides a short description of the dominant narrative of the Peterborough 
SIB drawn from the primary literature and produced by central policy actors belonging to 
what Rosenman calls the ‘social finance industry’.  
The following three sections provide thick descriptions of the project’s intervention into 
the three objects of steering – social, fiscal, and economic crises – in the attempt to 
advance an ‘ethical capitalism’. These interventions are analysed in terms of the three 
modes of steering discussed in chapter 3, which are discourse, knowledging technologies, 
and collective action. This allows me to tease out the multiple and competing meanings 
within the discursive struggle to define common sense on these projects, the related 
practical efforts to stabilise certain meaning systems through knowledging technologies, 
and their institutionalisation through the advancement of specific forms of collective 
action. 
Accordingly, section three focuses on the first policy ‘object’, namely the effort to create 
‘social impact’ by reducing recidivism. It focuses on the discourses of social crisis and 
resolution, incarceration, and the decarceration policy goal. It describes the competition 
between broad socio-economic explanations and agent focused narratives. I describe how 
discourses are translated into knowledging technologies to fix particular interpretive 
frameworks. In the final step of this section, I describe how the social impact narrative is 
transformed into specific social practices aimed at reducing recidivism through 
behavioural change. 
Section four turns to the fiscal dimension, and the idea and effort to ‘mobilise private 
capital for public good.’ It describes, in the first sub-section, the case as a discursive 
intervention into debates about austerity, and an effort to fund services despite fiscal 
constraint. I explain how the idea of ‘leverage’ is transformed into interpretive categories 
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to identify and design means for achieving ‘shared savings’ for government and private 
investors. I then explain how these effect social practices for the circulation of private 
capital to services organisations for frontline services, and how public assets are shifted 
back to investors as return on investment. As in the other sections, emphasis is laid on the 
partial and selective incorporation of alternative ideas for the elaboration of new 
mechanisms, trying to balance contradictory objectives. 
Section five turns to the economic dimension by looking at the discursive-material 
practice of “producing shared value”. The discourse is the first object of analysis here, as 
I describe the narrative of mutually-beneficial economic activities for investors and 
society. As a component of the ‘ethical capitalism’ narrative, this articulates a clear 
correction to the idea of the pursuit of self-interest and trickle-down theory. I describe 
how this discourse is translated in to knowledging technologies for the interpretation of 
societal events, namely, incarceration and offender behaviour. I describe how these 
support the deployment of certain social practices, i.e. particular kinds of probationary 
services, for the pursuit of common economic goals. 
Section six describes outcomes of the social, fiscal, and economic strategies. It asks 
whether and how ‘social impact’ was achieved. Which strategies were deployed and with 
which results? Do these represent repressive and fragmentary responses to social crisis, 
or rather ameliorative ones? Also discussed here is the fiscal strategy. It discusses the 
implications for public finances of ‘mobilising private capital for public good’. The 
economic outcomes are also discussed here. I explain whether ‘shared value [was] 
produced’, and if so, on which grounds. This section focuses on uneven outcomes, the 
remaining tensions, and displacement of problems resulting from this provisional 
arrangement. 
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5.1. Dominant narrative of the Peterborough SIB 
This section describes the official account of the Peterborough Social Impact Bond, found 
in the literature of the Ministry of Justice (2010a), Social Finance (Ministry of Justice & 
Social Finance, 2010; 2011), and Rand Europe (Rand Europe, 2011, 2014, 2015).  
The Peterborough SIB sought to achieve the social change in the area of criminal justice 
by reducing incarceration levels. This questioned established practices of mass 
incarceration and rapid prison growth. According to the Ministry of Justice (2010b, p. 5), 
the prison population nearly doubled since the early 1990s, and there was a two-fold 
increase in prison budgets in the first decade of the new century. The SIB formulated an 
alternative ‘decarceration’ goal to reverse these trends by reducing re-incarceration. The 
government ‘stakeholder’, the Ministry of Justice, framed the Peterborough SIB as an 
opportunity to operationalise a new position, articulated in its Green Paper of 2010, 
“Breaking the Cycle” (2010b), to “reduce reoffending” (2010b, p. 1) through a 
“rehabilitation revolution” (2010b, pp. 1, 5, 12, 77). 
According to the joint press release of the MOJ and the Social Finance organisation, 
announcing the Peterborough scheme, the former organisation described how this 
“rehabilitation revolution” was being operationalized in the new Social Impact Bond. 
Justice Minister Crispin Blunt described it as part of a change of course in criminal justice 
policy that “re-think[s] whether putting more and more people into custody really does 
make people safer” (Ministry of Justice & Social Finance, 2010). This “constructive 
approach to rehabilitation” aims to “keep people out of the criminal justice system in the 
first place” (Ministry of Justice & Social Finance, 2010), and Secretary of State for Justice 
Kenneth Clarke MP says that the “radical approach” applied in Peterborough seeks “to 
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get offenders away from the revolving door of crime and prison” (Ministry of Justice & 
Social Finance, 2010). 
Despite the rhetoric, the MoJ’s “rehabilitation revolution” was not directed towards the 
imprisoned population as a whole, but only a fraction of it. The majority of people in 
detention would experience an increase in punitive measures, as the MoJ intensified its 
efforts to make prisons “a place of hard work and industry”, and probation schemes based 
on “strenuous, unpaid work”, and increased economic stress through the more active 
“enforcement and collection” of fines (2010b, p. 1). But for short-term offenders, of 12 
months or less, the MoJ advanced ‘community re-settlement’ programmes. Describing 
the Peterborough SIB, the MoJ wrote that “3000 short-sentence prisoners” would be 
worked with “intensely” by community organisations to “help them resettle into the 
community” (2010b, p. 42). 
In line with a tradition of public sector outsourcing, the Big Society, and the government’s 
“welfare reform” plans, this probation pilot would be contracted out to civil society 
groups, with “[t]he voluntary and private sectors [being] crucial to our success”, said 
Secretary of State for Justice Kenneth Clarke MP (Ministry of Justice & Social Finance, 
2010). Contracted organisations would be responsible for “prepar[ing] around 3,000 short 
term prisoners for their lives post-release and [to] work with them to prevent a return to 
a life of crime” (ibid). 
Yet this service expansion ran up against funding problems. It was difficult to secure 
public resources “at a time of fiscal constraint”, the press release stated, and offered the 
idea of “tap[ping] into new sources of funding” that would come “from investors outside 
government” (Ministry of Justice & Social Finance, 2010). Social Finance, an 
organisation set up by the government to help build the “impact investment market” had 
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already “raised capital from social investors” in the sum, eventually, of £5 million, which 
would fund “services in the prison and outside in the community” (Ministry of Justice & 
Social Finance, 2010). 
Unlike direct government funding or charitable donation, this “new source of funding” 
had to be secured, and so the “mobilisation of private capital” to reduce recidivism in 
Peterborough was achieved by incentivising it as a private investment with the potential 
for profitable returns (Ministry of Justice & Social Finance, 2010). This arrangement is 
supposed to achieve mutual benefits (or ‘shared value’) for both the private investors and 
the public, the former in the form of profit and the latter in the form of additional resources 
for social services. 
The Peterborough scheme implemented the principles of the social investment market, 
pinning private rewards to identifiable social change. “[I]nvestors will only receive 
returns (…) if they reduce reoffending by a set amount,” the MoJ and Social Finance 
(2010) wrote. That is, investor returns are based on service performance rather than 
quantity, or in other words, they’re based on ‘outcomes’ rather than ‘outputs’. The returns 
for the Peterborough SIB would be paid if “re-offending drops by more than 7.5 per cent 
within six years,” with pay-out sums rising in inverse relation to the level at which 
recidivism rates fall, with a total outcome payment “capped at £8m” (ibid). If these 
outcomes are not achieved, however, the investors lose their capital entirely (Ministry of 
Justice & Social Finance, 2010). 
The Peterborough project was pitched as fiscally sound in favour of taxpayers because, 
in the case of a successful social outcome, the investor returns are only paid from a portion 
of the overall anticipated government savings resulting from reduced expenditures in 
remedial services. “[I]nvestors receive a payment representing a proportion of the cost of 
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re-offending”, that is, they will be paid by the Ministry of Justice out of the savings 
accrued through reduced expenditures due to reduced need (Ministry of Justice & Social 
Finance, 2010). 
All together then, the Peterborough SIB is framed as resolving the conflicts between the 
state, private actors, and civil society, as it “align[s] the interests of government, charities, 
social enterprises and socially motivated investors around a common goal”, as the Social 
Finance Chief Executive David Hutchinson says (Ministry of Justice & Social Finance, 
2010).  
These goals were brought together in the following scheme. It was commissioned by the 
Ministry of Justice in March 2010, who set the policy goal in the area of criminal justice, 
to reduce re-incarceration among men serving short-term sentences released from Her 
Majesty’s Prison (HMP) Peterborough (Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2013, p. 9). Social 
Finance acted as “intermediary” organisation to coordinate the multiple “stakeholders” 
(Rand Europe, 2011), involving two central tasks, the securing of private investment for 
the project, and the selecting and coordinating of the service providers to deliver the 
intervention. As described above, this money was used as the working capital by Social 
Finance and the service providers for their daily activities, but was also an investment 
from which the investors hoped to see a return. 
Social Finance secured a total of £5 million from 17 mostly “social” investors, including 
philanthropies, foundations and trusts, some with histories of supporting criminal justice 
interventions and others bringing new resources to this policy area (Nicholls & 
Tomkinson, 2013, p. 13). The service intervention was also coordinated by the London-
based Social Finance, who established the Peterborough-based “One Service”, consisting 
of a Director from Social Finance who selected, monitored, and directed the activities of 
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multiple providers offering mixed probation services, including St. Giles Trust, Ormiston 
Children and Families Trust, YMCA, and SOVA (Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2013, p. 13). 
The project’s focus on measuring impact led to the inclusion, in the project design, of 
additional organisations tasked with establishing methods to conceptualise practical 
indicators of decarceration, and to identify variables for measuring it. This responsibility 
was taken up by scholars at the University of Leicester together with the firm QinetiQ, 
appointed as “independent assessors” to develop measurement techniques and to assess 
the outcomes of the intervention (Rand Europe, 2011, p. 3). Broader assessment was to 
be undertaken by RAND Europe for future policy considerations (Rand Europe, 2011, p. 
4). 
If the intervention achieved the predetermined threshold of recidivism reductions, above 
7.5%, the Ministry of Justice and the BIG Lottery Fund would repay investors a return 
between 7.5 and 13% depending on the level of reductions. These “outcome payments” 
would be made from a portion of anticipated savings to the Ministry of Justice accrued 
through reductions in the cost of remedial services corresponding to reduce reconvictions. 
The investors risked losing their capital however, if the project failed to hit its social 
outcome target, hence shifting the risk of service innovation to the private sector. The 
project design described above is illustrated in the figure below designed by Rand Europe. 
5.2. Governing the social crisis: decarceration, prevention, individualisation 
This section analyses the Peterborough SIB from the perspective of a strategy to manage 
the social crisis. As discussed in chapter 3, this builds on Dowling and Harvie (2014), to 
show how the Peterborough case selects the policy object of social crisis – particularly 
mass incarceration – and discursively-materially reshapes it. 
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The section has three parts: First, I analyse the ‘social impact’ narrative, with its 
construals and ‘imagined solutions’ bearing down upon the issue of incarceration. This 
means, showing how the Peterborough SIB ‘select parts of the world’, ‘represents them’, 
and does so ‘from a particular perspective’ (Fairclough, 2003, p. 129). From a hegemony 
perspective, it focuses on how consensus is produced out of multiple, even competing 
positions, and how neoliberal and progressive post-neoliberal ideas are renegotiated and 
fused into a new consensus. This lays the basis for a second part, where I explain how the 
Peterborough SIB measures ‘social impact’ by transforming discourses into knowledge 
practices and ‘technologies’ – defined by Jessop/Sum as “rules for conceptualization 
[which] selectively define what and how objects are created, ordered and classified” 
(2013, p. 216) – centring in this case around the idea of ‘reconviction events’. The final 
sub-section describes how the case seeks to produce ‘social impact’, that is, it describes 
the practices deployed in its decarceration strategy. 
5.2.1. Narrating ‘impact’: decarceration and personal responsibility 
As a form of ‘ethical capitalism’, the Peterborough SIB aimed to present a positive 
response to its construal of existing and intensifying social crises. The SIB expressed 
dissatisfaction with a plethora of social ills, and the Peterborough case targeted high rates 
of prisoner reoffending in particular. This status quo was to be challenged by achieving 
‘social impact’. On the general level, this articulates a distinction from two dominant 
modes of dealing with social crises. First, the interventionist discourse contrasts with 
trickle-down theory, laissez faire attitude towards social marginalisation, and the 
individualisation of social problems. The SIB calls for a new role for the state, together 
with market and societal actors, to directly address social crises. The idea of reducing 
recidivism also contrasts with the repressive mode of social crisis management, described 
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by Wacquant (2010, 2011), as the way in which marginalised populations facing 
economic insecurity are punitively punished and contained. That is, a decarceration idea 
challenged the idea of ‘prisonfare’, which played an important role in controlling socially 
marginalised populations since the 1990s (Wacquant, 1999). 
The discourse of ‘social impact’ was central for SIBs and for the Peterborough case. 
Social Finance described SIBs as having “the potential to address some of society’s most 
intractable problems” (Social Finance, 2009, p. 4), and instead of remaining on the 
surface, to “address the causes of deep-rooted social problems” (Social Finance, 2009, p. 
2). The Social Investment Taskforce, founded by the government to develop the impact 
investment market, wrote that “[t]he SiB focuses on specific deep-rooted social problems” 
(Social Investment Taskforce, 2010, p. 18). 
The Peterborough project specifically is framed in the same way. In their joint press 
release announcing the Peterborough pilot, the Ministry of Justice and Social Finance 
described it as a way to “address [society's] most intractable problems” (Ministry of 
Justice & Social Finance, 2010).12 This narrative found a direct media echo, with the 
Financial Times describing it as a ‘structure for social change’ (2010), and The Guardian 
as a way to “tackle some of the most difficult social problems” (2010a). 
Social Finance described the SIB as having “the objective [of] solv[ing] a social issue” 
(personal communication, Social Finance, 2015), and the organisation’s purpose to be 
geared towards solutions for “those that are on the most disadvantaged end of society, 
                                                          
12 In a statement with just 740 words, the BIG Lottery Fund, which provides financial and moral support 
for social investment projects in the UK and the Peterborough SIB in particular, describes SIBs as 
addressing “social problems” or “social issue” eight times. The SIB is described as “a tool for preventing 
social problems across the UK” (Big Lottery Fund, 2010). It “presents a new way to tackle social 
problems”, to “solve specific social problems”, and to provide “benefits to society”, to “address its most 
intractable problems”, to “target deep-rooted social problems”, and to bringing about “solutions to old, 
entrenched problems” (Big Lottery Fund, 2010). 
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who are facing specific social problems”, with the SIB “addressing social problems and 
achieving social change” (Social Finance, 2015). The government’s social investment 
bank, Big Society Capital, also described the SIB as a way to “solve social problems and 
social challenges” (Big Society Capital, 2015). 
But the solutions SIBs claimed to advance were not surface-level responses, They were 
intended instead to “solve social problems” at a deep level by “address[ing] root causes” 
(Social Finance, 2010b, p. 7). They do so by “provid[ing] longer term private investment 
to fund early intervention that addresses the root causes of social issues”, writes the Social 
Impact Investment Taskforce (Social Investment Taskforce, 2010, p. 19). The SIB could 
fund interventions to “tackle the root causes of the social issue” (Social Finance, 2010a, 
p. 47). In their “Fact Sheet” on Social Impact Bonds, Social Finance writes, SIBs could 
“tackle the root causes of a range of social issues” (Social Finance, n.d., p. 4). In their 
workshop on the topic, they write, SIBs strive to “[e]nsure the root causes of the problems 
are addressed and comprehensive solutions developed” (Social Finance, 2013c, p. 34), 
and to “[e]nsure the root causes of the social issue are addressed and comprehensive 
solutions developed” (2013c, p. 35). 
In the Peterborough case, the general idea of social change was connected to the particular 
criminal justice issue, to reduce high rates of re-incarceration amongst short-sentenced 
prisoners. Social Finance and the Ministry of Justice wrote in their press release launching 
the pilot that 60% of people released from short-term sentences are reconvicted in the 12 
months following their release (Ministry of Justice & Social Finance, 2010), a statistic 
repeated in countless policy documents (Big Lottery Fund, 2010; Social Finance, 2010b, 
p. 1, 2011, p. 6) and the popular media (BBC, 2010; Financial Times, 2010; The Guardian, 
2010a, 2010c). 
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“Forced to Reoffend” – Socioeconomic causes of incarceration 
One reason for the characterisation of the Peterborough case as an ‘ethical capitalism’ 
project, is its discursive variation in relation to the social crisis which included a mix of 
narratives about incarceration, ranging from structural arguments focusing on 
socioeconomic causes to individualist positions focusing on personal behaviour. The 
Social Finance (2016, p. 3) organisation listed a range of explanations for social problems, 
a way of incorporating diverse perspectives into the SIB project. They wrote for example 
that: “[t]he roots of most social problems are structural, from economic forces and market 
failures, to political systems, to sociocultural factors.” This section discusses first, the 
broad arguments before showing how these were narrowed down, and how 
socioeconomic explanations are backgrounded, especially in translating discourses into 
knowledging technologies to interpret societal processes, organise data, and shape 
collective action. 
It was not uncommon to find socioeconomic explanations of incarceration in the SIB 
policy literature and that of the Peterborough case in particular. Social Finance linked 
reoffending to poverty, writing, in multiple documents, that short-term offenders “leave 
prison with typically £46 in their pocket, often with nowhere to live, no job to go to and 
no family waiting for them. An extremely high proportion of them leave prison only to 
return a few weeks/ months later” (Social Finance, 2011, p. 6). 13  The economic 
desperation of offenders was confirmed by the One Service’s “needs assessments” 
(discussed below), which found that over 80% of survey participants had a “Finance, 
Banking, and Debt (FBD) need”, nearly a quarter had been homeless upon their re-entry 
to prison, 16% had debt problems, more than half lacked bank accounts (Social Finance, 
                                                          
13 The same organisation repeats this statement for its U.S. audience (Social Finance, 2012, p. 9). 
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2011, pp. 17–18). Social Finance wrote that “[m]any [ex-offenders] are homeless and do 
not access public services such as health care or state benefits” (Social Finance, 2011, p. 
16). 
Yet these narratives did not find their way into social practices. Instead, SIBs target the 
‘shortcomings of “service design, delivery and accountability” of “public, non-profit and 
voluntary sector organisations”, as Fraser et al. argue (2016, p. 6). That is, although roots 
of social problems are identified in socioeconomic structures, SIBs target the welfare 
system as an object of transformation. 
In effect, they do not eliminate but rather shift socio-economic factors to the ‘background’ 
(Fairclough, 2012, p. 463), de-politicise and naturalise them as immutable parts of the 
social world. In an interview with Big Society Capital (personal communication, Big 
Society Capital, 2015), we see the process by which the selection of an object for steering 
involves a process of construal whereby other objects are excluded and shifted to the 
background. In this example we see how economic determinants remain present, but 
recast as part of a ‘macro-economic environment’, and simultaneously the new objects of 
steering are construed and selected, in this case, the “additional barriers” which 
economically disadvantaged people face when encountered by inadequate welfare 
services. My interviewee says: 
[Y]ou’re obviously always constrained by the macro-economic environment and 
the opportunities that are provided to people generally, and to generally enter the 
workforce and things like that. But within that context there are many 
disadvantages that in this case, ex-offending groups are subjected to, which make 
it harder for them to reengage. So it’s a question of how we lower those barriers 
   
123 
 
and address all the different challenges to the individuals as they face them. 
(personal communication, Big Society Capital, 2015) 
This person explains that SIBs do not address the socio-economic causes directly but 
instead target the additional factors that drive someone facing an economically desperate 
situation into reoffending. Stressing in a direct way the weight of pressures driving such 
individuals back into prisons, he says that projects should “enable someone to not be 
forced to reoffend” (emphasis added). 
This same operation is undertaken by Social Finance, where the interviewee similarly 
acknowledges and then brackets out economic causes as explanation of crime and object 
of policy intervention. This person said: 
I think framing it just through the poverty lens is an over-simplification. There are 
people who are equally poor who are not committing crime, or who have much 
more stable lives. So, there could be a whole range of things happening. (personal 
communication, Social Finance, 2015) 
Conceptualising socio-economic causes as background context, the Peterborough SIB 
turned its attention to the additional problems of current (gaps in) service provision 
driving low-income people into crime. The systemic problems located in the economy 
and economic policy are backgrounded through privileging the “individual needs” and 
“practical problems” of persons in economic distress. According to Rand Europe (2014, 
p. 3), “the One Service aims to provide individualised support and to address offenders’ 
practical problems such as those relating to accommodation”. 
Here we see how the Peterborough SIB both acknowledges the class determinants 
underpinning the “cycle of reincarceration”, and take these interdependencies apart 
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conceptually, selecting as preferred ‘object of steering’ the ‘culture of poverty’ and the 
existing system of “welfare dependency”. These are the real objects of steering, which 
are to effect decarceration and create ‘social impact’, as I explain below, with material 
support reduced to the bare minimum, and the decarceration goal being sought with the 
method of shifting individuals from the institutions of prisonfare to those of workfare. 
Here, the Peterborough case exemplifies how “[t]he overall social context is subdivided 
into specialized policies to dis-identify societal interrelations”, and how, discourses as 
well as social and institutional practices are advanced “to individualize the problems of 
social groups” (Candeias quoted in Brand 2014, 436). 
The insulation of socioeconomic factors as potential objects of steering and policy 
renegotiation does not mean that they disappear entirely from view. Instead, we can 
observe what Fairclough calls their “backgrounding”, which allows them to remain 
present in the discourse, but not as objects of steering or intervention. Pushed to the 
background, socioeconomic factors are ‘de-politicised’, ‘reified’, ‘sedimented’, or 
‘naturalised’, which “gives them the form and appearance of objective facts of life” 
(Jessop, 2014, p. 216) beyond the purview of policy intervention.14 The socioeconomic 
context remains a cause of reoffending, but as an object that is insulated from policy 
selection, enabling the selection of other objects for steering.15 Socioeconomic factors are 
                                                          
14 The original conception of SPBs also included a critical attitude towards the inequalities produced by 
market economies and the focus on self-interest. However, Horesh too criticized the failure of states to 
compensate for this situation, and saw with the SPB, the insertion of (market) incentives that could better 
serve that function. 
15 That socioeconomic factors are retained in the SIB discourse as cause for reoffending retains – and 
backgrounded, rather than eliminated – plays an important function in allowing them to resonate, and dodge 
public criticism, which will be discussed in the hegemony chapter. 
   
125 
 
shifted to the background by re-framing them as part of a restrictive, yet immutable, 
context.16 
‘Preventing practical problems’: Personal coping strategies and restructuring welfare 
In this reframing, poverty is an important condition of reincarceration, but not the object 
of steering. The SIB focused on changing the behaviour of ex-offenders and improving 
their personal resilience, and changing welfare to become more effective in producing 
‘social capital’. Former offenders were targeted for their own ‘rehabilitation’ and 
‘resettlement’ failures. 
The Peterborough SIB reflected a general trend among councils (dealing with budget 
cuts), to achieve efficiency gains by investing in “preventative” programs to reduce future 
need through “re-ablement” (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2013, pp. 21–22). In a host of 
policy areas, the council sought to “reduce people’s reliance on care services”, by 
“prevent[ing] [those] with ‘emerging vulnerabilities’ from needing ‘the most expensive 
services’” (BBC, 2011b). 
As a One Service caseworker explained, the program sought to change personal behaviour 
by “put[ting] in a strong coping strategy for the client” dealing with the situation of 
economic desperation (Rand Europe, 2015, p. 31). While poverty remained in the 
literature as an explanation for reoffending, the focus turned to changing personal 
behaviour and addressing welfare gaps. Social Finance wrote, for example: “We wanted 
to understand why the re-offending rate of short sentenced prisoners was so high and what 
hampered good organisations in their work.” Having framed the socioeconomic 
                                                          
16 While the socioeconomic factors are moved to the background, and the interdependencies are broken 
apart, their presence in the SIB discourse, plays an important part in the broad consensus behind them. 
These causes are not absent. And although the practice is an individualising one, the SIB is absent an 
explicitly moralising and stigmatising narrative that would cause friction among certain audiences. 
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“background” causes, the increasingly singular “challenges identified” by the authors are 
the limitations of service organisations – for example, funding issues, contractual 
arrangements, and service design – moving the socio-economic causes of blue-collar 
reoffending to the background (Social Finance, 2011, pp. 6–7). 
Another example of this manoeuvre can be seen in the following text fragment, again 
from Social Finance. They write: 
Prisoners serving sentences of less than a year typically receive little support upon 
release; they often leave with just £46 (~us$70) in their pocket and no housing, 
job, or family support. Consequently, over 60% become repeat offenders within 
one year. The SIB contracts organizations, including the St Giles Trust, Ormiston 
Children and Families Trust, the YMCA, and SOVA, to provide tailored wrap-
around services to 3,000 prisoners before and after their release to facilitate 
successful re-entry into the community. (Social Finance, 2012, p. 9). 
In these passages we see a certain representation of the social causes of reoffending, 
where the socioeconomic determinants are stated alongside the service gaps. This allows 
for the retrenchment of remedial services to proceed through the expansion of 
preventative interventions. The socioeconomic causes are not eliminated from the 
discourse, but backgrounded, allowing “preventative” practices to advance, which focus 
on changing personal coping strategies, and inclusion in the labour market. 
5.2.2. Measuring impact: ‘reconviction events’ 
Above I described how the concept of ‘social impact’ is used to narrate the problem of 
mass incarceration in the Peterborough SIB, and how the goal of decarceration was 
articulated. I explained how structural and individual construals were negotiated and how 
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an approach favouring the latter was elevated, and linked to the strategy of optimising 
personal coping strategies at the expense of reforming structures. This entailed too, the 
partial and selective refashioning of some welfare institutions away from punitive, 
remediation towards preventative interventions with the aim of ‘community re-
settlement’. 
Situated between this discursive focus and the material practices of collective action 
described below, is the mediating zone in which discourses are translated into 
‘technologies’ for organising social processes. These are the quantitative measurements 
developed in the SIB to identify meaning and produce sufficient categories, in this case, 
to translate ‘re-offending’ into ‘reconviction events’, as explained below, and to provide 
structure of meaning to legitimise and coordinate social practices to ‘impact’ (i.e. reduce) 
it. 
A SIB’s emphasis on quantifiable assessments of social impact required categories for 
conceptualising and measuring changes in reincarceration levels resulting from the One 
Service’s intervention. The contracted researchers at the University of Leicester and 
QinetiQ  selected the proxy of “reconviction events” to measure reoffending (Rand 
Europe, 2011, p. 33). This refers to new court convictions (Rand Europe, 2011, p. 33), 
the “last step in a criminal justice process, in which there are high rates of attrition: an 
actual offence must be reported to the police, recorded by the police, a suspect must be 
detected, a criminal prosecution be taken against them and a conviction secured at court.” 
So, while this proxy “underestimate[s] the actual number of offences”, the proxy had the 
assumed advantage of being closely linked to costs and potential savings for the Ministry 
of Justice and other departments. The MoJ prefers this measure as well because it is 
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“likely to have a close relationship with costs to the criminal justice system” (Rand 
Europe, 2011, p. 33). 
The project’s effectiveness would be assessed by comparing offending figures between 
test group with a matched control group (Rand Europe, 2011, p. 33). And the project was 
to be assessed at three intervals, of “three cohorts of [1,000] offenders” (2011, p. 33).17 
The programme would be judged based on its ability to hit “outcome targets”, which 
would also “result in an outcome payment to investors” (Rand Europe, 2011, p. 33), as 
described in detail in the following sections. Two targets were set. The first is a 10% 
reduction in any cohort of 1,000 persons, compared to the control group (Rand Europe, 
2011, pp. 33–34). The second target refers to the entire 3,000 persons, and is equivalent 
to 7.5%. These figures were regarded as “statistically significant” by the Ministry of 
Justice, meaning, they allow causal attribution for changes to the intervention rather than 
to external factors (Rand Europe, 2011, p. 37). 
5.2.3. Producing ‘impact’: optimising personal coping strategies 
In the above sections, I showed that while the SIB often frame the ‘cycle of reoffending’ 
as strongly influenced by socioeconomic factors, its strategy to reduce recidivism focuses 
on personal behaviour of offenders. This coheres with a broader ‘resilience’ framework 
in the U.K., and particularly, with a “highly agent-centric conceptualisation” that neglects 
social conditions “when applied to how individuals and households respond to hardship” 
(Dagdeviren et al., 2016, p. 1). Individual coping strategies should be optimised to deal 
with the stressful situation of economic desperation, and the psychological pressures that 
                                                          
17    To prevent cherry picking, and incentivise One Service to focus on all prisoners, the figures of 
reconviction events would be compared for all cohort members, not only those who participated in the 
program. 
 
   
129 
 
often accompany it, so to prevent these struggles to reproduce themselves from spilling 
over and transgressing the border of legality. Hence, the Peterborough SIB may be 
understood in terms of poverty management, where the One Service is tasked with 
governing the porous boundary between poverty and incarceration. This section focuses 
on the social and institutional practices aimed at governing this boundary and these 
subjects to reduce their risk of reoffending, to “focus resources on those most likely to 
reoffend” (Rand Europe, 2014, p. 24). 
The One Service’s practical focus was to reduce risk of reoffending by “re-settling” ex-
offenders in the community through a multi-service intervention focusing on 
employment, training, behavioural adjustment, and minimal material and psychological 
support for dealing with poverty. This meant that the policy goal of decarceration and 
rolling back of the state’s remedial services was to be achieved by rolling out 
“preventative services” in civil society – the recoiling of the repressive apparatus of 
punishment pursued through the roll out of activation policies of “rehabilitation”. The 
Peterborough SIB acted here as a bridge for ex-offenders passing from the institutions of 
prisonfare to those of workfare, and the shift of state resources from the former mode of 
social regulation to the other, preparing the soft and hard skills for potential absorption in 
the labour market. 
Precarious social reproduction 
If the Peterborough SIB was based on addressing, what it saw as, a poverty-induced ‘cycle 
of reincarceration’ (as described above), the One Service’s research only reinforced this 
view. Through its “needs assessments” and interviews with ex-offenders, it created a 
picture of people struggling for survival, both materially, and with the social and 
psychological stress induced by the pressures of subsisting at a bare minimum. It echoed 
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what research had already confirmed, that much blue-collar crime was the result of efforts 
amongst precarious workers to sustain themselves and the way these efforts sometimes 
defied the boundary of legality and resulted in reconvictions. 
The porousness of this boundary was emphasised in interviews conducted by Rand 
Europe for a report for the Ministry of Justice, where cohort members explained that it 
was their difficult struggles to satisfy their basic material needs within legal parameters 
that would drive them to reoffend. One interviewee said that if s/he had not been supplied 
by the One Service with a £25/week voucher, while his/her benefits were being sorted 
out, “then I would have gone out and committed a crime to get the money, just to feed 
myself. (…) That prevented me from going out and committing a crime” (Rand Europe, 
2015, p. 48). 
Another cohort member expressed his/her economic desperation and pointed to One 
Service’s minor financial support as critical factor in stopping offending: “if you didn’t 
have money or you’re thinking about robbing something to get some food, you don’t have 
to do that. Or if you have to get somewhere, you don’t have to jump on the train and stuff” 
(Rand Europe, 2015, p. 48). 
A third example from this same report points again to the central role the crisis of social 
reproduction played in determining recidivism or not. “[I]f I didn’t have my flat when I 
came out,” the cohort member said, “I would have done whatever means possible really 
to make money…” The One Service “kept a roof over my head and, at the end of the day, 
if you’ve got a roof over your head the rest comes in time, doesn’t it?” (Rand Europe, 
2015, p. 47). Nor was the porousness of this boundary lost on actors far removed from 
the frontline of the social reproduction crisis. Emphasizing the strong material restraints 
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a Big Society Capital interviewee portrayed a very narrow space for agency, describing 
deeply precarious persons as being “forced to reoffend” (personal communication, Big 
Society Capital, 2015). 
This social crisis was confirmed by data generated by One Service in the form of their 
“needs assessment” surveys with cohort members. Conducted by St. Giles Trust working 
under the umbrella of the One Service, these presented a general situation of precarious 
housing, employment, and health. “Housing, employment and benefits support”, the Rand 
Europe team reported (2014, p. 23; 2015, p. 40), “were the most common service user 
needs recorded in case files and mentioned in interviews”. An “interim snapshot” in 
September 2011 showed 94% of “needs assessment” surveys expressed “accommodation 
need”, with 23% of people “sleeping rough on reception to prison” (Social Finance, 2011, 
p. 17). More than a third of cohort members of the first two cohorts expressed needs 
relating to “accommodation; finance, benefit or debt; and education/training and 
employment.” One fourth “had needs relating to addiction, with about a fifth having a 
health and well-being need” (Rand Europe, 2015, p. 30). 
Reducing reoffending risk through individualised support, monitoring, and control 
Yet, while such data confirmed existing research on the socio-economic causes of crime, 
for example, of “[t]he importance of housing in desistance [which] is also reflected in 
wider empirical literature” (Rand Europe, 2015, p. 44), it was not its purpose to increase 
housing support, but instead, to provide a picture of individualised offenders. The aim 
was to improve casework, to identify persons at high risk of re-offending, i.e. to better 
manage reoffending risk, not to secure basic necessities. In other words, reoffending was 
to be reduced by lowering its risks through the targeted and limited deployment of 
support, but not by providing social protections to solve needs. The data was used by the 
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One Service as a technical part of its work in assessing whether certain unmet needs 
would raise risks of reoffending, which ones to respond to, in what capacity, at what 
moment, and which what intensity and duration. 
This “individualised approach” to social work was to be “tailored to the specific range of 
needs presented by each offender” (Rand Europe, 2014, p. 21). The “needs assessment” 
was an ongoing process, initially involving a “short screening instrument”, and “the 
second part contain[ing] more detailed questions about identified areas of need” (Rand 
Europe, 2014, p. 22). It was a “flexible and individualised service to be delivered to cohort 
members” (Rand Europe, 2014, p. 5). And it was used to “address needs and prevent 
reoffending’” (Rand Europe, 2011, p. 44). 
Having recognized structural and economic sources for reincarceration, yet bracketed 
these out as potential objects of steering, the One Service also rejected outright any 
“theory of change” that might clearly identify the causes and solutions for reoffending. 
“[T]here is no fixed intervention model or single theory of change articulated for the One 
Service” (Rand Europe, 2014, p. 1). Instead, the One Service translated general social 
problems into “practical” ones, preferring “a pragmatic and client-led approach, in which 
the mix of activities for each offender is determined by caseworkers according to 
individual need” (Rand Europe, 2014, p. 1). 
Hence the needs assessment was serving the higher purpose of a “risk assessment” (Rand 
Europe, 2011, p. 67), and the practice involved addressing unmet needs insofar as these 
presented a risk of reoffending and could not be resolved by other sources. This meant 
the support always tended towards limitation rather than extension. Addressing unmet 
needs was not in the form of generalized support, but rather filling in holes, first perceived 
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through “risk assessment”, then filled through minimal, targeted, and time-limited 
supports, as I explain below. 
As Rand Europe (2015, p. 48) explains, “the One Service provided material support in 
situations that might otherwise have created acute pressures on cohort members, and 
which in turn could have led them to reoffend.” Strong conditionalities were linked to any 
effort to reduce these unmet needs. 
‘Community resettlement’ 
Tasked with reducing reoffending risk was Social Finance’s One Service organization, 
which adopted the “Through the Gates” (TTG) programme developed by the St. Giles 
Trust, which focused on addressing a variety of “resettlement needs” amongst offenders, 
beginning during their time in detention, and supporting them throughout the first year 
after their release (Rand Europe, 2015, p. 37). The One Service contracted services from 
St Giles Trust, Sova, Ormiston Families, the YMCA, and Mind. 
TTG “focuses on establishing a credible working relationship with each offender while 
they are in prison, and transferring this relationship into the community” (Rand Europe, 
2011, p. 66). Their “buy-in” was “primarily related to the help they expected to receive 
upon release − for example, with housing, benefits, or accessing specialist help” (Rand 
Europe, 2015, p. 41). 
A central plank of TTG was the risk and needs assessments it made with cohort members, 
initially during their time in custody and late renewed following their release. The One 
Service attended the “discharge boards” before an offender’s release, in order to “identify 
service users’ unmet needs” and to “ensure necessary arrangements for a prisoner’s 
release were in place” (Rand Europe, 2015, p. 37). 
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Hence, rejecting general solutions for a social problem with common causes, the 
generally observable (economic) causes of blue-collar crime were fragmented, and the 
One Service pursued individualized “risk” and “needs assessment” for each of the 3,000 
cohort members. “Undertaking assessment of the risk of reoffending is the starting point 
of focusing resources on those most likely to reoffend” (Rand Europe, 2014, p. 24). As 
Rand Europe (2015, p. 30) writes, the One Service sought to “identify a cohort member’s 
most pressing resettlement needs” and “provided material support in situations that might 
otherwise have created acute pressures on cohort members, and which in turn could have 
led them to reoffend” (2015, p. 48). 
Hence we see “crisis management” transferred to the micro-level of crime prevention 
where “prevention” means policing the boundary separating the struggles among 
precarious individuals to sustain themselves from spilling over into petty crime and small 
infractions.18 These minor material supports were combined also with repressive means 
of achieving the ‘social impact’ targets, namely through the attempt to reduce ‘idleness’, 
for example, by taking ex-offenders ‘litter picking’, as one interviewee revealed to me 
(personal communication, Sova, 2014b).  
Supporting benefit claims 
Having assessed accommodation (and other) needs, the One Service sought to address 
these, not by expanding services, but by supporting offenders’ benefit claims with 
existing institutions. It did so by doing “more than just mak[ing] referrals or advis[ing] 
cohort members where they [could] get help. They support[ed] cohort members to 
                                                          
18  Hence, while earlier forms of social welfare provision were based on the idea of ensuring the persons’ 
welfare bound to the idea of social rights, access to services achieved by the one Service is of a “flexible” 
nature like a fire-fighter addressing unmet needs when they appear to cause risk to boil over into the area 
of crime. 
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overcome practical barriers to using existing services, sometimes physically transporting 
and accompanying cohort members to appointments” (Rand Europe, 2014, pp. 29–30), 
or “filling out forms, arranging appointments, and in some cases advocating to relevant 
services on behalf of the service user” (Rand Europe, 2015, p. 45). Having these basic 
material needs fulfilled, the One Service understood, lowered the risk of reoffending.  
Minimising material support 
But while the One Service was attuned to the material needs of cohort members, they 
could not always rely on available services, and were compelled to fill gaps. But they 
sought answers without establishing stable supports. They wanted to avoid “creat[ing] 
new dependencies” on services which would end when the SIB was completed (Rand 
Europe, 2014, p. 35). One specific problem were the formal restrictions on housing 
accessibility for ex-offenders, for example, “where accommodation providers required 
abstinence from alcohol or drugs as a condition of residence” (Rand Europe, 2015, p. 45), 
and due to the lack of affordable housing stock in the city. The One Service approached 
this contradiction by offering targeted, temporary, and limited support to address unmet 
needs.19 
The intended limited nature of the One Service’s support is exemplified in the figure 
given by Social Finance, wherein they write that 99% of accommodation requests of 
cohort members were met for the first night of release (Social Finance, 2011, p. 17). In 
other cases, the One Service supported cohort members for “a first week’s rent” or with 
                                                          
19 The One Service Director also advocated for the expansion of statutory services, at least in one case, but 
the expansion of services was not a general practice. “An example of where this issue was reported to 
have arisen was in relation to mental health services. The One Service had commissioned Mind to 
provide support to cohort members with low-level mental health needs. However, for cohort members 
with higher levels of needs, the One Service Director reported holding constructive discussions with 
commissioners of mental health services about the possibility of extending existing statutory provision” 
(Rand Europe, 2014, p. 35) 
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deposit funds for accommodation at local B&Bs. Yet not only were the time-frames 
strongly limited, the funds were initially provided as “loans to service users” with the 
expectation of reimbursement, and only later issued “without expectation of repayment” 
after encountering the “complications in tracking these” (Rand Europe, 2015, p. 44). 
Eventually, the difficulties in securing housing for cohort members led the One Service 
to support Sova in hiring a “landlord liaison caseworker” as a “point of contact with 
landlords, to encourage them to take and keep service users as tenants” (Rand Europe, 
2015, p. 35). But accommodation needs remained unmet through the life of the project, 
as relayed to me by an interviewee with Rand (2016), and in response to this problem, the 
One Service Director went off course and sought to purchase housing stock near the end 
of the project to provide these material supports. So long as the programme remained 
within the narrow path of providing only minor minimal supports, the director assumed, 
these unmet needs might negatively affect the project’s ‘impact’ levels. 
Emotional support: ‘my job is to put in a strong coping strategy for the client’ 
The One Service also recognized that the challenge of living on the edge of precariousness 
is also a source of emotional stress that places strains on personal and familial 
relationships, and drives some cohort members to substance abuse, or makes it difficult 
for them to give up these habits. The organization approached this with the idea of 
installing personal coping strategies, in order to improve cohort members’ skills in 
managing stress related to personal economic difficulties. 
One St. Giles Trust caseworker explains for example the challenge to one cohort member 
whose recovery from addiction was destabilized by the financial pressures of personal 
debt, and how these layers of stress would be dealt with by installing more durable 
personal coping strategies: 
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I’ve just finished with one client who has, over the past 10 years, been drinking 
heavily, continuously in trouble, and we’ve managed to settle him down. He’s 
now engaging with probation, he’s doing some volunteer work, he’s also liaising 
with his doctor on mental health support. But with all that came the rent arrears 
and so on that the council wanted, and that adds to the issue. Where you think 
your client is stabilised, he then becomes very anxious and mental health issues 
start coming in. He may start drinking, because his coping strategies aren’t there. 
So my job is to put in a strong coping strategy for the client, or through the help 
of others. (Rand Europe, 2015, p. 31) (emphasis added). 
As explained above, insofar as the One Service is not involved in directly addressing 
personal debt, other than supporting cohort members to access existing services, the 
development of a personal coping strategy to deal with stress meant counselling and 
‘mentorship’. Sova recruited 50 volunteers and St. Giles coordinated 6 of them, to work 
as mentors, meeting with cohort members on a weekly basis, providing an opportunity to 
talk, but also providing ‘practical support’ in accompanying them to appointments, 
completing administrative tasks such as filling out forms (Rand Europe, 2015, p. 33). 
Volunteers saw their role as transferring positive energy to cohort members. One Sova 
volunteer said, for example: “the more positive you are with them it starts to transfer onto 
them a bit and they become more positive about their own life chances about receiving 
help, about how you can help them” (Rand Europe, 2015, p. 31). 
Disciplinary workfare 
Yet while these examples describe how the decarceration agenda involved minor material 
supports, it more so showed how punitive prisonfare was being replaced by disciplinary 
workfare (Peck, 2002). Any kind of employment activities were seen as countervailing 
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forces to reincarceration, and this meant for most people released from Peterborough 
Prison, low-wage work, and cohort members were willingly or unwillingly connected to 
the local labour market. Hence, the One Service pushed its own agenda beyond the 
expressed needs of cohort members, particularly in relation to employment. “The needs 
assessment”, Rand writes (2011, p. 66), “includes a discussion about their 
accommodation requirements and history,” but this “in turn can divulge useful 
information about their other needs”. The “hope” is to “secure their engagement” and to 
“allow the St Giles Trust team to focus on other needs, such as employment or drug 
rehabilitation” (2011, p. 67). 
The One Service sought to “remove the barriers to work”, connecting skilled and 
unskilled workers with training or job opportunities with the Job Deal programme, 
especially in construction (Rand Europe, 2014, p. 35), while the others were brought to 
“motivational workshops” to get them back in the workforce (Social Finance, 2011, p. 
17). 
5.3. Fiscal strategy: ‘impact investment’ to ‘counteract austerity’ 
The current section focuses on the second dimension of the Peterborough case, and, 
following the methodology presented in chapter 3, analyses the intervention into the fiscal 
policy object and attempt to discursively and materially reshape it. The financial sector 
rescue of 2008/09, directly following the market crash created enormous public deficits 
(Blyth, 2013), as described in chapter 4, resulting in declarations of a fiscal crisis of the 
state (Hendrikse & Sidaway, 2010). This was followed by political pronouncements, for 
example, by David Cameron, of an ‘age of austerity’ (The Guardian, 2009b) demanding 
deep cuts to the public sector and local government.  
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In fact, local governments were required to cut their budgets by 30% between 2008 and 
2015 (O’Hara, 2015, p. 177) and Peterborough reductions amounted to £15 million 
annually (Peterborough City Council, 2010), and a pledge in 2011 to cut social care by 
£75 million over the following five years (BBC, 2011a). 
In this context, it was “envisaged”, Dowling and Harvie (2014, p. 9) write, “that where 
the state steps back” from financing social protections, SIBs will “help mitigate [the 
state’s] own fiscal crisis” by drawing in private resources from the impact investment 
market. And as Dowling writes (2016, p. 12), “[i]n the UK where austerity is a dominant 
policy orientation, there is a focus on the role of the social investment market in plugging 
the public funding gap.” Hence, as we’ll see, the SIB’s fiscal strategy is closely 
intertwined with its social strategy, as it creates new links in the funding, logic, and 
operations of social and fiscal policy. As Hedderman (2013, p. 52), a researcher on the 
team of independent evaluators for the Peterborough SIB writes, “it is not surprising that 
the Ministry of Justice (2013a:3) is hoping that [the SIB] will help to ‘free up funding 
through increased efficiency and new ways of working’”. 
Following the structure in above section on the social dimension, this section has three 
parts. It begins with the fiscal discourse of narrating ‘leverage’ (“leveraging private 
capital for public good”); it continues by describing the measuring of leverage and the 
technologies developed; the final sub-section describes the practices arranged to produce 
leverage, thereby operationalising the SIB’s fiscal strategy. 
5.3.1. Narrating ‘leverage’: “private capital for public good” 
A dominant narrative of the Peterborough SIB, and of the social investment market more 
broadly, was that there was a way around austerity. While public fiscal deficits and 
budget regulations limited certain policy options for local governments and ministries, 
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they hoped with SIBs, to manoeuvre around these problems, by tapping into the large sum 
of surplus capital held in the private sector. As JP Morgan wrote, the Peterborough SIB 
is a way for government to “counteract fiscal consolidation with impact investment” (JP 
Morgan, 2011).  
Announcing the Peterborough Social Impact Bond in 2009, for example, the Ministry of 
Justice and Social Finance wrote in their joint press release that, “[a]t a time of tight public 
finances” SIBs “can tap into new sources of funding to reduce reoffending and provide 
value for money for the tax payer” (Ministry of Justice & Social Finance, 2010). 
Throughout the policy literature, the media reports, and my interviews with policy 
advocates and practitioners in the field, a dominant fiscal argument was made that in 
“time[s] of great pressure on public sector budgets” (Rand Europe, 2011, p. 9), 
government needs to draw in new resources. In only slightly modified form, Social 
Finance writes: “At a time of tight public finances, payment by results models such as 
this can tap into new sources of funding to help reduce crime, change lives and provide 
value for money for the taxpayer” (Social Finance, 2011, p. 33). 
Social Finance had already begun preparing this narrative in 2009, promoting the idea of 
bringing in non-governmental resources “[i]n these budget-constrained times” (Social 
Finance, 2009, p. 6). Such resources, they write, “could enable the public sector to achieve 
more with less – a likely necessity over the coming years” (Social Finance, 2010a, p. 20). 
The SIBs could “open-up a seam of new capital for public good” (Social Finance, 2010b, 
p. 2). The Peterborough SIB, Rand wrote, was successful in attracting new resources: 
“some of the investors in the Peterborough SIB had not previously funded criminal justice 
interventions” (Rand Europe, 2011, p. ii). And Big Society Capital also wrote in 2014 of 
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the development of a “social investment market” in a time of “significant cuts in public 
spending” (Big Society Capital, n.d., p. 30). 
‘Counter(imp)acting austerity’ 
These first elements of SIB’s fiscal narrative challenge in a limited way the discourse of 
fiscal austerity. This is done by partially challenging the notion of scarce resources, by 
pointing out that public fiscal deficits are the flipside of private capital surpluses. The 
Peterborough SIB suggests a way around austerity that would ensure public authorities 
with access to these resources. This argument steps away from an orthodox neoliberal 
austerity narrative, which demands ‘belt-tightening’ (Blyth, 2013). Yet while SIBs frame 
austerity as a problem, they do not target such policies as an object of steering, but instead 
naturalise it as a background feature of the immutable policy context, within which public 
authorities must operate. 
What this means is that the fiscal strategy does adhere to the ‘austerian realist’ disposition 
of “regretful austerity compliance”, avoiding a direct pushback against fiscal cuts (J. S. 
Davies & Blanco, 2017; J. S. Davies & Thompson, 2016), but it also imagines an 
alternative to political paralysis. SIBs present an ‘imaginary solution’ to the ‘problem’ of 
‘scarce resources’, enabling local authorities to maintain services by drawing upon 
alternative resources, namely private capital. This approach implies that the problem is 
not one of scarce resources, but instead the distribution of resources between public and 
private hands (Blyth, 2013, p. 14), with public fiscal deficits directly related to private 
capital surpluses. Instead of scarcity-necessitated-austerity, advocates of SIBs counter 
that there is unevenly-distributed-abundance between public bodies and the private 
market. 
It is important for my argument here to point out that the SIB involves the renegotiation 
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of fiscal discourses (and practices, as we see below), the partial distancing from the 
neoliberal austerity narrative, and the selective incorporation of the progressive post-
neoliberal narrative, mostly in its redistributive, Keynesian variant. Warner and Clifton 
have framed SIBs therefore as a ‘third way’ fiscal strategy, which neither succumbs to a 
passive ‘hollowing out’ of the welfare state, nor participates in an anti-austerity ‘push 
back’, but instead seeks to ‘ride the wave of financialisation’, wherein local governments 
“us[e] markets, as one of the few tools left, to continue to provide basic public services” 
(2013, p. 54). 
Incentivisation 
Pointing to private capital surpluses as the counterpart to public fiscal deficits, was a 
central point of post-neoliberal perspectives calling for the rebalancing of resources 
(Blyth, 2013). The idea of putting such surpluses to public use resonates with such a 
position. However, the Peterborough SIB did not tax private wealth, but instead, attracts 
them by incentivizing investors with the possibility of profitable returns. Here, surplus 
private capital is not redistributed to the public, but instead circulated through social 
policy channels, with the intention of absorbing larger sums upon its return to the private 
investors. This may be understood as the reformulation of a post-neoliberal perspective 
within a market-centric framework, or as Fairclough describes, referring to New Labour 
‘third way’ appropriation of the concept of ‘social cohesion’, “a strategy of legitimizing 
the discourse” of an opposing viewpoint “in terms of the neo-liberal discourse” (2003, p. 
128)20. But this occurs not simply at the level of discourse, it has to do with social 
practices, as we see below. 
                                                          
20 Fairclough describes the third way politics in a similar fashion, arguing that, “although these discourses 
can be seen as fundamentally incompatible in how they represent and imagine people, what we have 
   
143 
 
Efficiency gains and public savings 
The fiscal strategy was only possible, it was argued, if the Social Impact Bond would 
create government savings, from which to repay investor profits. Not only would the £5 
million investment offset government funding shortfalls, and allow up-front financing for 
service organisations – these interventions were expected to reduce long term welfare 
need and remedial expenditures, with significant corresponding savings. 
For the Ministry of Justice, cost savings play an important legitimising role for 
decarceration policies. These fiscal goals of justice policies are repeatedly emphasised as 
positive outcomes of the social goals. In a typical passage by the Ministry of Justice, the 
social goals of prevention are connected to the fiscal goals of public savings: 
In the UK around 60% of adults who enter jail on short-term sentences (less than 
12 months) will go on to re-offend within a year of release. The Ministry of Justice 
manages the outcomes of criminality, but the Peterborough SIB aimed to tackle 
the problem at its root by providing rehabilitation support in the community, 
including services to improve participants’ employability, to prevent reoffending. 
(…) Thus reducing recidivism amongst those most likely to re-enter the system 
stands to make considerable savings. (Ministry of Justice, 2014) 
In fact, fiscal savings played an important role in the conceptualisation of the social 
objective itself and the strategies to achieve it. The social outcome measurement chosen 
by the project as a proxy for reduced reoffending was in part selected because of the 
assumed correspondence with Ministry of Justice cost savings. They wrote: “This 
                                                          
here is a strategy of legitimizing the discourse of social cohesion in terms of the neo-liberal discourse” 
(2003, p. 128). 
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outcome was chosen as it aligned most closely with the costs to the criminal justice system 
that it was seeking to reduce” (Ministry of Justice, 2014). 
The idea is that such savings will result from less costly “preventative” services compared 
with remedial expenses. The cost savings the MoJ expected from the Peterborough SIB 
is formulated in the following terms: the “[s]avings will be made through reduced 
administrative costs associated with any crime, plus reduced prison costs associated with 
housing an inmate”(Ministry of Justice, 2014). 
This same link between social and fiscal objectives was made in a Social Finance Press 
Release by a representative from the Peterborough Community Safety Partnership, who 
spoke of the Peterborough SIB as “leading to significant public sector direct and enabled 
savings and a real reduction in re-offending with fewer victims of crime as a result” 
(Social Finance, 2014, p. 4). Social Finance provided an illustration of this view in a flow 
chart where “The Social Impact Bond Model” is said to involve “improved social 
outcomes [that] leads to cost savings” (Social Finance, 2011, p. 5). 
Referring to a Social Finance publication of 2010, the Ministry of Justice report by Rand 
Europe explains that: “Clearly, while there are other good reasons for seeking to improve 
outcomes for the target group in this SIB, the SIB model is based on the premise that the 
interventions funded will deliver cashable savings to government within the period of the 
bond” (Social Finance, 2010e, p. 52)” (Rand Europe, 2011, p. 8). 
“If these programmes succeed in improving social outcomes,” Rand Europe writes (2011, 
p. 1), “this could result in savings to government (which will not need to pay for services 
that otherwise would be used by individuals with poor social outcomes) and wider 
benefits to society.” A near identical formulation appeared in the Rand Europe team's 
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second report on the Peterborough SIB in 2014 (Rand Europe, 2014, p. 1). In the same 
document, they write: “there were clearly potential savings from improving those 
outcomes” (Rand Europe, 2011, p. 10). One of the “anticipated outcomes” was to achieve 
“[f]inancial savings to taxpayers” (Rand Europe, 2011, p. 71). In another formulation, the 
link between social and fiscal goals was described this way: “If outcomes do improve, 
then return on investment is likely to be paid by the government departments and agencies 
that have incurred savings from the improvements resulting from the provision of 
services” (Rand Europe, 2014, p. 7). 
This fiscal argument was uncritically repeated in media reports with the Peterborough 
SIB framed as a way to save government and the public money. The BBC directly quotes 
Social Finance director Emily Bolton as saying: “Investors benefit and the government 
gets some cost savings” (BBC, 2010). The Economist writes: “A social impact bond (SIB) 
works by using private investors to fund preventative social projects and paying those 
investors back from public funds if targets are met. The theory is that successful projects 
ought to translate into savings for the public purse, meaning that the SIB entails no 
additional public spending” (The Economist, 2013). 
‘Shared savings’ between private investors and the public 
The final element of the fiscal strategy was that such savings would be ‘shared’ between 
investors (as profitable returns) and public authorities. The argument is illustrated with 
an image in the policy documents and promotional literature of Social Finance (Social 
Finance, 2013a, p. 18).21 Depicted in Figure 1 is the “Value for Money Case for a Social 
Impact Bond”. The first bar on the left-hand side depicts the “status quo” as a large sum 
                                                          
21 A similar illustration is depicted in Social Finance’s brochure produced for a workshop on Social 
Impact Bonds (Social Finance, 2013c). 
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of expenditures labelled “cost to government”. The second bar depicts this same sum 
“with SIB service”, now divided into four sections. The original “cost to government” 
under the “status quo” has been reduced by the “impact of [the] SIB” to about half its 
original sum, i.e. through reduced expenses in remedial and welfare services. An 
additional 20% of this original sum has been spent on the “cost of intervention” for the 
SIB (in our case, on the One Service and other expenses), raising the total government 
expenditure to about 70%. This is brought up to about 80% because of the government’s 
outcome payment of about 10% labelled “investor return”. This leaves roughly 20% as 
“public sector savings”. In the third bar, this amount is labelled the “savings retained by 
the government” as the “potential cost saving from SIB service.” 
For Peterborough, the initial investment by the 17 investors was expected to produce cost 
savings for the Ministry of Justice from which it would repay investors. 
 
Figure 1- Cost-Savings Argument of a SIB (Social Finance, 2013a, 18) 
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5.3.2. Measuring leverage 
Between the discursive intervention and the material practice are the mediating 
technologies which transform narratives into categories for measurement. The Ministry 
of Justice, Social Finance, and the investors decided that investors could expect a 7.5-
13% return if recidivism was reduced by at least 7.5%, and that they could lose their 
investment, if the outcome target is not achieved.22 
Subsequent government efforts have been sought to expand non-governmental 
investment in the “social sector”, the market logic, and the incentivisation mechanism. 
According to a Big Society Capital interviewee, the state tries to “stimulate investment 
through economic incentives” (personal communication, Big Society Capital, 2015), by 
reducing investor risk and increasing their financial rewards. A central device was 
developed, namely, the Social Investment Tax Relief of 2014 (Nonprofit Finance Fund, 
2013), offering investors a 30% deduction on the cost of investment amongst other 
benefits (Cabinet Office, HM Revenue & Customs, & HM Treasury, 2015).23 
Locating anticipated savings 
The narrative of previous section presented the Peterborough SIB’s discourse of fiscal 
savings in its generality, articulating the normative goal of fiscal and shared savings 
through a social intervention, and the shared outcomes between the public and private 
investors. The project did not remain at this general level but rather specified what kinds 
of savings would be anticipated, and their specified sums. The Ministry of Justice 
                                                          
22  This represented what the G8’s Social Impact Investment Taskforce (set up under the G8’s UK 
Presidency) regards an investment “revolution” of a shift towards the “triple-bottom line”, where 
investment links not only risk and return, but also impact. This point is discussed in more detail in the 
section on Investment. 
23 The SIB discourse involves a mixture of pragmatist argumentation that focuses on private investment to 
offset public funding gaps, and an affirmative argumentation that is less context specific, framing the market 
governance as offering a superior organisational logic to those guided by non-market ideas of public 
administration and social provision. This mixture and convergence of moderate and radical social neoliberal 
frameworks will be discussed in the chapter on hegemony. 
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specified a measured amount of savings it anticipated from the project, and the amounts 
to be shared between the public and the private investors as their return on capital. 
Public savings were a central component of the justification for the Social Impact Bond. 
Social Finance wrote that a “[p]recondition for a successful Social Impact Bond” is that 
the “[c]ost of intervention is smaller than [the] public sector savings within the Social 
Impact Bond period” (Social Finance, 2010a, p. 52). These “cashable savings”, the Centre 
for Social Impact Bonds at the Cabinet Office writes, “are those savings that are reflected 
on a [commissioner’s] budget line” (Centre for Social Impact Bonds, n.d.), and relate to 
reduced fixed costs such as the cost of buildings, or in variable costs including labour or 
utility expenses, both of which may correspond to reductions in remedial services. 
Calculating (anticipated) cashable savings 
The Ministry of Justice specified both the source and sums of anticipated savings. In 
calculating the anticipated government savings, the Ministry of Justice was said to have 
“undertook detailed analytical work to support the value assigned to each reduced 
reconviction event” and furthermore, that this “business case” for the Peterborough SIB 
“was signed-off by HM Treasury as representing value for money for government” (Rand 
Europe, 2011, p. 42). Rand writes however that they “did not have sight of this as part of 
the research” and “so [they] are unable to comment on its content” (2011, p. 14). Despite 
the proclamations of transparency, my interviewee with the MoJ also refused to disclose 
this information nor their methodology, writing in an email correspondence that “the 
figure comes from the business case which for commercial reasons [they] cannot provide 
the further detail which underpins it” (personal communication, Ministry of Justice, 
2016). 
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The Ministry of Justice wrote that the “savings will be made through reduced 
administrative costs associated with any crime, plus reduced prison costs associated with 
housing an inmate” (Ministry of Justice, 2014). These refer to “reductions in court, police 
and prison costs as a result of reduced re-offending” (ibid). Currently, these cost the 
Ministry large sums of money, writing that “[i]t is estimated that the cost of imprisoning 
a single person in the UK is £40,000 plus an extra £40,000 for each year they spend 
incarcerated” (Ministry of Justice, 2014). 
The Ministry of Justice held enormously inflated expectations for the project, with an 
anticipated savings between 8.8 and 18-times the sum of the original £5 million 
investment. The Ministry wrote: “The anticipated savings associated with the entire 
scheme have been calculated at approximate £44m, although savings of £90m could be 
made should the scheme produce a higher than anticipated reduction of re-offending” 
(Ministry of Justice, 2014). 
5.3.3. Producing leverage 
Having now described the fiscal narrative and the technologies used to measure how 
private resources would be ‘leveraged’ in the Peterborough case, I now describe how 
these ideas were to be practiced. In practice, investment in the One Service was meant to 
achieve cashable savings which were to be divided (‘shared’) between the Ministry of 
Justice and the investors as return on the latter’s capital.  
For this purpose, value determinations for reduced reconviction events were arrived at 
through “detailed analytical work” by the Ministry of Justice and a “considerable process 
of negotiation over the value of the ‘tariff’” between it, Social Finance, and the investors 
(Rand Europe, 2011, p. 42). HM Treasury signed off on these numbers as “representing 
value for the money” (ibid). 
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While the specific values for reduced reconvictions have not been disclosed to the public 
(Rand Europe, 2011, p. 40), and my own inquiries to the Ministry of Justice have not 
turned up information, the value of outcome payments are based on the “(undisclosed) 
value of each reduced reconviction event” and “the number of reduced reconviction 
events” in terms of “the difference in mean reconviction events between the Peterborough 
cohort and the comparison group” (Rand Europe, 2011, p. 40). 
As mentioned above, the MoJ had enormous expectation for the project, anticipating a 
gross savings of between £44 and £90 million on the £5 investment. They offered a 7.5 
and 13% rate of return for outcome payments, depending upon the rate of reductions, 
which was capped at £8 million (Ministry of Justice, 2014; Rand Europe, 2011, p. 40, 
2014, p. 13; Social Finance, 2011, p. 7). This would have left the MoJ was a net savings 
of at least £36 million. (This figure is based on the difference between the highest possible 
pay-out of £8 million from the lowest estimated level of savings of £44m. If however, the 
initial savings are even higher, and the outcome pay-out lower, the final savings should 
be even greater.)  
This cost savings argument is illustrated in Figure 2, where I’ve entered the figures 
provided by the Ministry of Justice into Social Finance’s “value-for-money” model that 
is provided in the section above on “shared savings”. 
   
151 
 
Here I draw attention to the disproportional relationship between the sum of the 
investment and the much higher level of expected savings, which, even after outcome 
payments, suggests a large final savings to the government. These highly inflated 
expectations of fiscal savings did not prevent the cost-savings argument from occupying 
a key place in the justification and promotion of this policy. In the section on fiscal 
outcomes below, we will see how the inflated expectations led to the opposite of its 
intended effect, namely to public expenditure growth rather than to cost savings and fiscal 
consolidation. 
Identifying outcome funds 
The investor returns or “outcome payments” are to be made from a portion of the savings 
created by the SIB, “through [the] reallocation of budgets” (Centre for Social Impact 
Bonds, n.d.), when reductions in fixed and variable costs associated with reductions in 
reconviction events produce savings. The Ministry of Justice was expected to accrue the 








Status Quo With Peterborough SIB Anticipated Cost Savings
after Outcome Payment
£
Anticipated Fiscal Outcome of the Peterborough SIB: 
Government Savings





Figure 2 - Cost Savings Argument for the Peterborough SIB (own depiction) 
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However, a clear deviation from SIB-theory meant that the returns were not to be paid 
strictly from MoJ savings alone, but would be subsidised by the Big Lottery Fund, who 
agreed to “part-fund” “outcome payments” in the case of success (Rand Europe, 2011, p. 
41). This critical point will be discussed in detail in the section on ‘fiscal outcomes’ 
below, where I discuss the implementation of this fiscal strategy in the Peterborough case. 
5.4. Economic strategy: ‘producing shared value’ 
This section analyses the third dimension of the Peterborough case, namely its economic 
strategy in the context of neoliberal crisis. As discussed in chapter 2, SIBs are understood 
as a response to problems of accumulation and profitability following the financial market 
meltdown of 2008 (Dowling & Harvie, 2014). In a global economy “awash with liquidity” 
(IMF), SIBs are promoted as a new investment opportunity for holders of capital and as 
“new drivers of economic growth” for states (Dowling & Harvie, 2014, p. 6). 
Yet, additionally, this strategy promises more than investment and growth opportunities; 
in the face of deep economic polarization (Piketty, 2014), they promise ‘inclusive 
growth’, thereby responding to a moral and structural problem of contemporary capitalist 
development. By linking market modes of governance to notions of ‘public 
responsibility’, SIB appear to re-embed the market and market actors in constructive 
economic activities that diverge from the earlier practices of destructive neoliberalism. In 
the post-2008 conjuncture, where the zero-sum game has eroded public legitimacy 
(Montgomerie, 2015), SIBs aim to create “shared” value (Social Finance, 2010a). 
Business leaders promoting and investing in SIBs no longer promote Milton Friedman’s 
(1970) doctrine, that ‘the business of business is business’, and instead promote the idea 
that firms and investors should contribute substantively to social cohesion through market 
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activities. But they maintain the central market logic that investment in ‘social impact’ 
aims to expand their own sum of capital. 
As described above, two aspects of the SIB’s economic dimension are of importance for 
analysing this policy’s contribution to stabilising and modifying hegemony. In this 
section I analyse both of these aspects in the Peterborough case. In general terms, they 
can be described as the value creation element and the value sharing element. The first 
aspect involves the SIB’s stated goal of wealth creation and economic growth and the 
second refers to the ethical promise of creating “blended” returns with both financial and 
societal benefits.  
Following an analysis of the social and fiscal dimensions of the Peterborough SIB, the 
economic analysis brings me to the third reason for the rapid emergence and broad 
resonance of SIBs in the U.K. The analysis follows the same structure of the previous 
sections, analysing first the economic discourses, narratives, and stated policy goals; 
second, the technical practices of conceiving and measuring shared value and its creation; 
and third, the social and institutional practices for ‘producing shared value’. The section 
shows how competing strategies are negotiated and a provisional (and asymmetrical) 
settlement between them is achieved. 
5.4.1. Narrating ‘shared value production’ 
The economic strategy of the Peterborough SIB was to ‘produce shared value’. The social 
impact investment market articulated two interlinked goals, namely, to spur economic 
growth and open new investment opportunities based not on the trade-off between 
financial returns and social benefits, but rather to create value that is shared through 
products with both financial and social benefits. 




Seventeen, mainly “social” investors were attracted to the Peterborough SIB, whose 
search for yield led to them to advance a total sum of £5 million. “The majority of 
investors were charities or foundations” Rand explains (2014, p. 12), “including the 
Barrow Cadbury Charitable Trust, Esmée Fairbairn Foundation, Friends Provident 
Foundation, The Henry Smith Charity, Johansson Family Foundation, LankellyChase 
Foundation, The Monument Trust, Panahpur Charitable Trust, Paul Hamlyn Foundation 
and the Tudor Trust (Social Finance, 2010).” 
Profitability played a critical part in drawing investors to the SIB, who had the opportunity 
of a 7.5-13% rate of return, depending upon the level of reduced reoffending (Rand 
Europe, 2014, pp. 12–13). Though predominantly non-profit organisations, the investors 
did not give grants, but rather expected a financial return (Rand Europe, 2011, p. 26). In 
accordance with this expectation of financial return, charitable organisations “invested 
using their endowment capital rather than by giving a grant” (Rand Europe, 2011, p. ii). 
However, securing such investments meant the SIB competed with other investment 
products. Financial returns levels were raised as charitable organisations stated that they 
were under the legal obligation to optimize their investments to increase capital and 
income (Rand Europe, 2011, p. 31). This competition presents a “barrier to investment” 
(Rand Europe, 2011, p. 55), as the SIB might offer “a financial return on investment that 
may not be as high as [the organization’s] other highest possible returns” (Rand Europe, 
2011, p. 21). Rand Europe (2011, p. 31) writes: “One investor reported concerns that 
undertaking social investment (and accepting a blended return) may conflict with their 
fiduciary obligations as trustees of charities to maximise return on investment.” 
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This investment barrier was overcome in the Peterborough SIB by mitigating investor 
risk by raising their financial returns through tax relief and other techniques (Big Society 
Capital, 2015).24 Social Finance created for this purpose a “corporate feeder vehicle” 
(Rand Europe, 2011, p. 26 fn46) – sometimes called a “charity feeder instrument” (Rand 
Europe, 2011, p. 31) – allowing UK tax-exempt charities to avoid tax payment on 
outcome payments, by allowing them to receive returns as donations. 25  Such risk 
mitigation techniques attracted investors by enabling the SIB to heighten its 
competitiveness against other investment products: it raised the return level of the SIB, 
which initially was below the organization’s most profitable investments, by adjusting its 
after-tax income upward by avoiding tax obligations. 
Tax relief strategies were broadened in 2014 with the enactment of the Social Investment 
Tax Relief, aimed at providing financial incentives to investors in the impact investment 
market generally, who would receive a 30% reduction in tax liability on their investments 
(Cabinet Office et al., 2015), and through “tax relief on investment in social impact 
bonds” in particular (Nonprofit Finance Fund, 2013).  
Not only did these changes seek to increase investor returns, they were also articulated as 
“part of the [economic] growth plan” centred around the social sector (Nonprofit Finance 
                                                          
24 My interviewee from Big Society Capital mentioned a variety of ways of mitigating investor risk by 
raising their financial rewards, aside from tax relief, including “first loss” (personal communication, Big 
Society Capital, 2015). This is a way of shifting philanthropic or public assets to private investors in projects 
when they do not achieve anticipated results, and can not fulfill the payout expectations of all parties. The 
ethical mission of philanthropies allow them to accept smaller returns than mainstream investors. This topic 
will be discussed in more detail in the New York City case, where Bloomberg Philanthropies offered a 75% 
loan guarantee on the investment from Goldman Sachs, essentially accepting a large financial loss to lower 
the risk for Goldman Sach, and to keep the firm involved as an investor for future SIB projects. 
25  Rand Europe (2011, p. 31) writes: “[I]n the Peterborough SIB, charities can receive outcome payments 
as donations by investing through a charity feeder instrument (which was set up by Social Finance in this 
SIB)”. This meant that “[i]nvestors had a choice of investing directly in the limited partnership or via a 
corporate feeder vehicle. The feeder vehicle was set up to enable UK charitable investors to receive any 
outcome payments as donations” (Rand Europe, 2011, p. 26 FN 46). 
   
156 
 
Fund, 2013), by increasing capital flows by incentivizing investment through higher 
financial returns.   
Value sharing  
The Peterborough SIB advanced an ethical component of the economic dimension 
through the idea of a harmony between the profitable interests of the investor and the 
objectives of social progress framed by government. For advocates of “shared value”, 
Social Impact Bonds project the possibility of a shift away from a zero-sum game. As the 
G8’s Social Impact Investment Taskforce wrote, this “new paradigm” asserts that 
“in many situations there is no inevitable trade-off between financial and social return” 
(G8 Social Impact Investment Taskforce, 2014, p. 1). According to the Harvard Business 
Review, new and transformed business practices that focus on “creating shared value” 
can break “zero-sum competition” (Porter & Kramer, 2011). 
The Peterborough SIB is a specific example of how shared value can be created, the 
policy’s advocates argue. Foreign Affairs describes Social Impact Bonds as a “financial 
innovation” advancing a non-zero sum game, with the Peterborough project serving as an 
example of how “Creative Finance Helps Everyone—Not Just the Rich” (Palmer, 2015). 
It does so by “align[ing] the incentives of diverse market participants—in this case, 
governments that commission services, social organizations that provide them, and 
investors that supply capital”. Furthermore, they write that SIB’s “require payouts only 
when the programs they fund achieve results.” In other words, investor profits are based 
on tangible social achievements. At the core of this argument is the view that value 
creation is shared between the private and the public. 
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“In the field of social investment the mix of financial and wider social outcomes is 
sometimes called a ‘blended return on investment’” writes Rand Europe (2014, p. 2). It 
is “built on an expectation that there may be both a financial and a social return on the 
investment (in the form of some improvement in social, health or wider outcomes)” (Rand 
Europe, 2014, p. 2). With the SIB, “investors receive some financial return if [social 
policy] outcomes are improved” (Rand Europe, 2014, p. 8, 2015, p. 10).  
This idea was articulated by Social Finance, the inventor of the SIB, in the title of one of 
its earliest documents on SIB: “Towards a new social economy. Blended value creation 
through social impact bonds” (Social Finance, 2010a). In it, they argue that "[i]nvestment 
in Social Impact Bonds by commercial investors, trusts and foundations, and High Net 
Worth Individuals offers an opportunity to generate a blended (social and financial) return 
on investment. The social and financial imperatives are aligned – investors receive greater 
financial returns as the social return improves” (Social Finance, 2010a, p. 7). 
The Cabinet Office and Ministry of Civil Society emphasise that this market has already 
been in motion for some time, writing that “[t]here is a growing social investment market 
which is prepared to blend financial return with social impact” (Cabinet Office et al., 
2011, p. 5). Demand for investment products is a push factor for the market’s growth. In 
April 2010, the government's Social Investment Taskforce stressed that there was 
concrete demand among investors for social investment products in particular. They 
wrote: “our view [is] that the market is ready for the SIB (…) [T]here is demand from 
investors for a range of investments blending social and financial returns” (Social 
Investment Taskforce, 2010, p. 17). Social Finance confirmed this push factor, saying in 
an interview that “there are people looking for financial investments that have social value 
to them” (personal communication, Social Finance, 2015). 
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5.4.2. Measuring ‘shared value’: a social policy derivative 
As explained in chapter 2, SIBs seek to operationalize “shared value” through a social 
policy derivative. This entails the commodification of social policy performance whereby 
investors in the Peterborough SIB own “exposure” (and risk) to the outcomes of an 
intervention, but do not own the service organisations themselves. As Bryan and Rafferty 
explain, this is fundamentally different model of ownership that those where the firm 
owns “the ‘underlying’ physical assets” (Bryan & Rafferty, 2014, p. 891). In other models 
of public sector privatization, firms purchase and/or operate organisations and receive 
incomes based on government payment (either based on fee-for-service or outcome-based 
contracts such as “payment by results”).  
In Peterborough, Bryan and Rafferty write, “we see the playing out of a derivative logic 
within the state in which private organizations are trading exposures to the performance 
of (and funding from) the state but without ownership of the ‘underlying’ state 
institutions, policies or practices” (Bryan & Rafferty, 2014, p. 897). The derivative’s 
potential for a pay out, based on the likelihood of social impact, and judged against its 
risk of failure, is what attracts investors. The state’s anticipation of achieving a greater 
savings from the intervention that that which it will pay investors, is a central component 
defining it as having a shared value. 
Sources of value and outcome payments 
As described above, the source of value of these projects are the anticipated efficiency 
gains resulting from successful interventions that turn “government waste”26 into surplus, 
which would be translated into “cashable savings” and shifted to investors as their 
                                                          
26 In SIB discussions, remedial services are often framed as a “waste of public funds” (The Guardian, 
2010c), and the “cycle of reoffending” involving “wasted lives” (Cabinet Office & Hurd, Nick, 2011). 
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realized profit. But the SIB had to calculate how it would divide value between the public 
and the private investors. According to Rand (2011, p. 42), “the Ministry of Justice 
undertook detailed analytical work to support the value assigned to each reduced 
reconviction event”. This was based on existing data about the costs “incurred at different 
stages of the criminal justice system” and “took into account the broader societal benefits 
of reduced reoffending” (ibid). 
5.4.3. Producing ‘shared value’ 
Although outcome payments are supposed to be paid from savings accruing to the 
Ministry of Justice for reduced remedial expenditures, the MoJ had its outcome payments 
subsidised by the BIG Lottery Fund. An interviewee at the Centre for Social Impact 
Bonds at the Cabinet Office said that the breakdown “might be £5 million from BIG and 
£3 million from the Ministry of Justice” (personal communication, Centre for Social 
Impact Bonds, 2015). 
5.5. Contradictory outcomes of the Peterborough SIB 
This chapter has described the strategy of the Peterborough SIB in the context of 
neoliberal crisis. This focused on the policy’s intervention into three policy objects, 
namely social, fiscal, and economic crisis. It described efforts to reshape these objects 
through three modes of steering, namely discourse, knowledging technologies, and social 
practices. It has also described the case not in terms of a singular logic of management, 
but has rather identified the conflicts internal to the process, between competing 
perspectives and hegemony projects. It has sought to show that the SIB is an encounter 
between two competing restructuring projects. On the one side, there are market-centric 
conceptions of policy, advancing individualist conceptions of social problems, fiscal 
constraint, and private investment schemes. But I have argued, based on idea of policy as 
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a ‘strategic terrain’, that SIBs also contain market-constraining impulses within them, 
albeit in more diffuse ways. These are present in discursive fragments which represent 
incarceration as caused by socio-economic factors. Progressive perspectives are also seen 
in the idea of escaping an austerity scarcity logic, and seeking to solve public fiscal 
deficits through access to private capital surpluses. They too are seen in the effort to link 
economic with socially-beneficial practices.  
But I have also shown how structural selectivities act to rework these diverging ideas, and 
in a process of ‘complexity reduction’, create a passive consensus and provisional 
compromises favouring neoliberal governing practices. Hence, the ‘progressive 
neoliberal’ compromises are asymmetrical and produce uneven outcomes, as I describe 
below. The incorporation of progressive actors into such arrangements is a reflection of 
their weak status in the overall balance of social forces and the specific political context. 
They are able to achieve certain immediate material concessions, but their capacity, 
through strategic action, to achieve larger goals is strongly limited. This concluding 
section describes these dynamics in detail. 
Designed as a 7-year project to be completed in 2017, the Peterborough SIB was 
prematurely terminated by the Ministry of Justice in 2015 due to the rolling out of a 
country-wide probation scheme covering all short-sentenced offenders (personal 
communication, One Service, 2014; Rand Europe, 2015, p. 1). “Transforming 
Rehabilitation” (TR) eliminated the control group required for comparing recidivism 
levels between Peterborough with groups not receiving probationary support. As a result, 
project results would be assessed for only the first 2, rather than all 3 cohorts. In July 
2017, Social Finance (2017) announced that the Peterborough project had reduced 
reoffending by 9% exceeding their 7.5%. This was based on ‘reconviction events’ for 
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2,000 persons after a 12-month period of release from Peterborough Prison (ibid). In a 
press release drafted for the Ministry of Justice and Social Finance (2017), they 
announced that the “World’s 1st Social Impact Bond [was] shown to cut reoffending and 
to make impact investors a return”. As discussed below, investors would receive “a single 
payment representing their initial capital plus an amount that will represent a return of 
just over 3% per annum for the period of investment” (ibid). 
The Peterborough SIB’s early phase out did not signal a change of policy trajectory away 
from SIBs, but rather its geographical shift and entry into other policy areas, including 
health, employment, homelessness, education and other areas. Since the introduction of 
the world’s first SIB in Peterborough, over 100 projects now exist across the globe, with 
most of them concentrated in the U.K. and U.S. (Pioneers Post, 2018). 
5.5.1. Social Outcomes: Decarceration through efficient poverty 
management 
In an earlier section I analysed the social dimension of the Peterborough SIB, discussing 
its selection of a decarceration goal, its contracting of services to non-governmental 
organisations, and its strategy of poverty management. This involved an effort to reduce 
recidivism through the rationalization of social sector provisioning, focusing on lowering 
offending risk through temporary and limited support and improving individual coping 
strategies to better deal with the psychological and social pressures of poverty, and 
resettling persons by attaching them to the institutions of workfare.  
Such practices did make a difference in the numbers of ‘reconviction events’, with a 9% 
reduction, but this tells us little about its ‘social impact’. This is because, as common to 
workfare programmes, they focused mainly on people “already nearest the front of the 
employment queue” (Peck, 2001, p. 347), through application support and training (as 
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discussed in the case studies), who were “the most job-ready”, and offering busying 
activities to those requiring the most support. The projects sought to avoid ‘creaming’, 
but their institutional logics and the fiscal pressures of reducing expenditures in order to 
create savings and profitable returns have just this effect, determining the policy targets, 
and avoiding socio-economic causes of incarceration. 
In fact, despite repeated observations of the socio-economic sources of incarceration – 
e.g. repeated references to the £46 an average person holds upon release from prison – 
this problem was not the focus of sustained concern. Research shows that employment 
growth is rather correlated to economic trends than to welfare-to-work schemes (Peck, 
2001, p. 344). The attempt by the project manager to purchase housing to address unmet 
accommodation needs (see above discussion) reflects an attempt to address such material 
causes of incarceration, in contradiction to the framework of individualist solutions 
defining the main contours of the SIB. 
The discursive framing of incarceration appeared to be central in the construction of 
individualist approaches at the expense of addressing structural causes. We can see the 
SIBs’ intervention into the social policy object then, as part of a broader political shift. 
Just as workfare programmes “pulled the debate into the field of program implementation 
and away from issues of political principle” (Peck, 2001, pp. 92–93), so too did the 
techno-managerial approach to ‘community resettlement’ shift the political terrain for 
debates around the causes of incarceration and possibilities of decarceration. 
The focus on ‘needs’ was not part of a project of poverty alleviation or of expanding 
social protection, but instead of clogging the holes in a porous boundary that allowed 
people struggling to reproduce themselves (materially, socially, and psychologically) in 
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an economically precarious situation from falling through the cracks into repeated 
criminal infractions. 
5.5.2. Fiscal outcomes: expanding public expenditures 
As explained above, the Peterborough case articulates a central SIB promise, to address 
the fiscal crisis by “leveraging private capital” and offset funding gaps resulting from 
austerity measures by central government to the Ministry of Justice and Peterborough’s 
budget. By funding ‘prevention’, it hoped to both fill funding gaps and generate large 
savings through reduced remedial expenditures. The associated drop in administrative 
costs should be captured in public fiscal savings. A portion of this value is shared with 
private investors, creating a win-win situation for the public and private actors involved. 
Yet, the fiscal strategy of the Peterborough SIB completely failed. While the MoJ 
anticipated savings up to £90 million, an evaluation by Rand (2011, p. 8) in 2011 
projecting the project to fail to achieve any public savings has not been contradicted by 
subsequent evaluations. The failure to achieve savings means that investor returns were 
paid from additional expenditure, contradicting the very fiscal justification for the project. 
The failure to create cashable savings is said to be due to the project’s small scale, with 
reduction levels not being significant enough to enable reductions in fixed or variable 
expenses, and hence preventing budgetary changes. While the SIB reduced prison re-
entries, these were not significant enough to close down a wing of a prison, but allowed 
them instead to reduce over-crowding (Rand Europe, 2016). 
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It was in fact the SIB mechanism which enabled, in this political context, commissioners 
to temporarily expand services to a group of offenders who had previously lacked 
statutory support. This immediate possibility was a source of attraction for service 
providers and government alike. But the contractual requirement to repay investors 
independently of accumulated savings left became a public liability. The strategy of 
“harnessing private capital for public good” was inversed. Government busily conjured 
up public funds to subsidise investor returns. Alongside the MoJ’s £3 million outcome 
payment, the Big Lottery Fund contributed £5 to investor outcome payments from public 
money. Hence, the short-term benefit to commissioners became a long-term disadvantage 
as government paid more for the programme through the SIB as they could have paid 
without it. Instead of the SIB filling a public funding gap, government is now “fill[ing] 















Likely Fiscal Outcome of the Peterborough SIB: 
Expenditure Growth




Figure 3: Likely Fiscal Outcome of the Peterborough SIB: Expenditure Growth (Figures 
from Ministry of Justice (2014) and Rand (2011). 
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5.5.3. Economic outcomes: accumulation by dispossession 
Whereas SIBs are framed, according to the economic dimension, as an investment 
product that creates a harmony between private investor interests and those of the public 
interest, we see in the Peterborough SIB instead, an asymmetrical compromise where 
public assets are shifted into private hands without an equivalent financial benefit for tax 
payers. The payment of investor returns out of new public expenditure growth rather than 
from a portion of new savings (as described above), reveals this investment strategy to be 
what Harvey (2005, p. 160) calls “accumulation by dispossession”. This involves “the 
transfer of assets from the public and popular realms to the private and class-privileged 
domains” (Harvey, 2005, pp. 160–161). In the SIB we see how a new investment 
mechanism built around a zero-sum game, where investors’ accumulation problems are 
addressed at the public’s expense. (see also Dowling, 2016) 
This process can be observed when looking at the source of outcome fund capital. Here 
we see that investor returns are being paid by mostly low and middle-income sections of 
the population, either through public tax money to the Ministry of Justice, or through 
ticket sales by the Big Lottery Fund. This source has a clear socioeconomic component 
that is relevant to the question of whether the public benefits from the policy or not, and 
reveals the upward distribution of wealth. As studies show, the disproportionate 
consumption of lottery tickets by lower socio-economic groups (Beckert & Lutter, 2013) 
means that BIG shifted wealth from lower income groups to financial investors through 
the SIB. Rather than creating ‘shared value’, the case distributed wealth upwards. 
5.6. Conclusion 
I have conceived the SIB at the intersection of three policy developments, relating to 
social, fiscal, and economic policy. The first regards social regulation, and the expansion 
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of ‘preventative’ services to address the social crisis caused by economic recession and 
welfare retrenchment. I’ve framed this as a form of poverty management rather than 
alleviation, which provides intentionally short-term and limited support, to prevent people 
in precarious socioeconomic situations from being “forced to re-offend” in order to 
reproduce their livelihoods. While this decarceration goal appears as a corrective to 
established patterns of ‘prisonfare’, and achieved a 9% reduction in reoffending, its 
limited roll-out of ‘workfare’ programmes in civil society does not address 
socioeconomic causes of incarceration but seeks instead to absorb ex-offenders in the 
labour market as a way of lowering the risks of reoffending. 
The SIB’s fiscal strategy also reflects a broader political effort to address public sector 
funding gaps caused by austerity, and the increasing need for public assistance. This 
involves the effort to incentivise private investment to fill public funding gaps, aimed at 
financing necessary services, thought to create ‘shared savings’ for public authorities, 
which can be shared with private investors as return. While this strategy appears as a 
corrective to a strict policy of fiscal consolidation, it failed to meet the inflated efficiency 
expectations and did not achieve the anticipated savings, resulting in the opposite of its 
stated goal, to expand public expenditure rather than to conserve it.  
In terms of its economic goals of “creating shared value,” the project sought to overcome 
zero-sum game and creating “blended social and fiscal returns” by aligning investor and 
societal interests. This discourse also resonates because it appears to be a needed 
corrective to both the economic slump and the destructiveness of many aspects of 
neoliberal accumulation, particularly in the aftermath of the foreclosure wave, the 
financial meltdown, and the loss of jobs, personal savings, and pensions. However, I have 
shown the rather asymmetrical character of the compromise between investors and the 
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public, where the former profits from the shifting of public assets into private hands in a 
form of “accumulation by dispossession.” 
In conclusion, the Peterborough SIB appears to have only fulfilled one of its three 
promises, achieving (short term) social impact by improving personal coping strategies 
and poverty management through workfare. In contrast, it failed to achieve its fiscal and 
economic objectives, of reducing public expenditure or creating shared value. Despite 
these mixed outcomes, SIBs have managed to “fail forward” (Peck, 2012b, p. 6), in a 
situation where “their “manifest inadequacies animate further rounds of neoliberal 
innovation.” Since the introduction of the world’s first SIB in Peterborough, the number 
of SIBs have now surpassed 100 across the globe (Pioneers Post, 2018). 
In chapter 7 I provide an explanation for why SIBs fail forward, based on a case 
comparison of both SIBs. In that chapter, the thesis centres on a theory of hegemony, in 
which I argue that we have to take seriously the ‘positive’ elements of SIBs in a given 
context as source of attraction among progressive actors in a context where they have 
limited opportunities, despite SIBs’ shortcomings. There, the resonance of SIBs is 
explained in terms of a blocked post-neoliberal transformation, and the partial 
incorporation of alternatives, integrated in a passive revolutionary process, which 
provides certain concessions to progressive actors. The result is the simultaneity of 
forward motion and standstill, where endless ‘innovation’ occurs without significant 
change or development – the situation of a persistent, blocked transformation. 
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6. Chapter 6 – Case 2: The New York City Social Impact Bond 
This chapter presents the New York City Social Impact Bond through a cultural political 
economy perspective concerned with the way this policy development addresses specific 
problems encountered by neoliberal governance practices since the financial meltdown 
of 2008. 
The analysis is aimed at providing a rich understanding of the emerging impact 
investment market, and the crisis governance strategy it signifies. I pursue this objective 
by illuminating the policy’s stated goals, claims, and narratives; its methods or social-
institutional practices to achieve these objectives; and the ultimate outcomes of the 
project. The presentation is organised around three general categories, discussed in 
chapter 2, which although overlapping, provide helpful categories for clarifying certain 
aspects of the project. These three aspects pertain to social, fiscal, and economic issues, 
and correspond to claims made by the New York City project itself in each of these fields. 
The chapter is structured in the following way. First, I reconstruct the official account of 
the New York City Social Impact Bond, relying on official policy documents by the main 
actors. This provides a simple description of the expressed goals of the project, and the 
policy mechanism, which is supposed to fulfil these objectives. In section 2, 3, and 4, I 
describe the selection and negotiation over the three central objects of steering by 
representing the social, fiscal, and economic dimensions of the project. Each section 
describes the discursive intervention, the knowledging technologies (which regularise 
particular interpretations of social processes, and supporting specific forms of action) and, 
the social practices aimed at producing the intended effects. Section 5 turns to the 
outcomes of the project, focusing on the fulfilment or not of ‘social impact’, ‘fiscal 
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leverage’, and ‘shared value’. Finally, I evaluate the post-project assessment, and the 
outlook for SIBs in the future through my analytical framework. 
6.1. The dominant narrative of the New York City social impact bond 
The New York City Social Impact Bond was officially announced on August 2, 2012 in 
a joint press release by the City’s Mayor’s Office and the Department of Correction as 
the “nation’s first Social Impact Bond programme” (The City of New York Office of the 
Mayor, 2012). This “public-private partnership” was described as a “New Privately 
Funded Program to Reduce Reincarceration”, and involved a capital investment from 
Goldman Sachs to local service providers to work with adolescents detained in the city’s 
notorious Rikers Island jail to lower rates of readmission. Goldman would fund the 
Adolescent Behavioral Learning Experience (ABLE), a group therapy programme, which 
would be administered to detainees by two local non-profit service organisations, The 
Osborne Association and Friends of Island Academy. If the multi-year programme 
reduced readmissions by more than 10%, the city expected to achieve budgetary savings, 
a portion of which would be used by the Department of Correction to repay Goldman its 
investment plus interest. If the project failed to reduce recidivism, the city would not 
repay the investor, and Goldman would lose its investment, hence involving “no cost to 
taxpayers” (The City of New York Office of the Mayor, 2012). 
The project was articulated as collaborative arrangement between state, private, and civil 
society actors with mutual benefits for all involved. First, it sought to address specific 
social problems in the city. It was part of a broader effort of the Mayor, and part of his 
Young Men’s Initiative, described as a multi-departmental undertaking “to tackle the 
broad disparities slowing the advancement of black and Latino young men” through 
“educational, employment, and mentoring opportunities” (The City of New York Office 
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of the Mayor, 2012).27 Similar to the U.K.’s first SIB in Peterborough, the NYC project 
was located in the policy area of criminal justice, with the expressed goal of decarceration, 
to be achieved through community re-settlement for a population group negatively 
affected by socio-economic problems. With these goals, the SIB was said to help make 
social provisioning more effective, with methods that focus on individual change, or in 
the words of the press release, “focuses on personal responsibility education, training and 
counselling, with the goal of reducing the likelihood of reincarceration” (The City of New 
York Office of the Mayor, 2012). 
The SIB was expected also to address fiscal concerns arising out of the pressures to 
support social programmes, by offering a solution to the contradiction between growing 
social needs and shrinking public resources. The reliance on private investment and an 
outcome-based pay-out scheme, the project promises to expand new programmes with 
“no cost to taxpayers” (The City of New York Office of the Mayor, 2012). It does so by 
“leverag[ing] upfront funding from the private sector”, or “harness[ing] private sector 
financing for important public initiatives”, which is to be paid back only in the case of 
cost-reducing effective social interventions (The City of New York Office of the Mayor, 
2012). 
Additionally, the project offered a chance for private firms – in this case Goldman Sachs 
– to contribute to the well-being of New York City residents through a “Privately Funded 
Program to Reduce Reincarceration” (The City of New York Office of the Mayor, 2012). 
The company would only profit from it if a measurable “social impact” were achieved, 
and it would risk losing its capital if the programme fails to affect the status quo. 
                                                          
27 On the Young Men’s Initiative, see: http://www1.nyc.gov/site/ymi/about/about.page (Young Men’s 
Initiative NYC, n.d.). 
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While the above section provided the basic overview of the New York City project, I now 
describe the institutional arrangements that were put in place with the intention of 
operationalising the interlinking objectives. 
First, the Mayor’s Office identified a specific social crisis, namely the high rate of 
reincarceration among young men of colour in the city. Selected was the specific social 
policy goal of reducing this high rate of recidivism to the city’s notorious Rikers Island 
Jail. “Currently”, the press release states, “nearly 50% of adolescents who leave the New 
York City Department of Correction return within one year” (The City of New York 
Office of the Mayor, 2012). The policy goal is “to reduce the likelihood of 
reincarceration”, and to “help more young men stay in school, find and keep a job and 
decrease their likelihood of future criminal behaviour” (The City of New York Office of 
the Mayor, 2012). 
The method to achieve this objective was the deployment of group therapy to change the 
attitudes of youth detained at Rikers Island. The particular programme deployed would 
be the “Adolescent Behavioral Learning Experience” (ABLE), which “focuses on 
personal responsibility education, training and counselling, with the goal of reducing the 
likelihood of reincarceration” (The City of New York Office of the Mayor, 2012). This 
programme would be “incorporated into the regular school day and be offered as a one-
hour class throughout the week and during school breaks” (The City of New York Office 
of the Mayor, 2012). It would be administered by two local non-governmental 
organisations with experience in the field of criminal justice and offender support who 
were contracted by the City. The Osborne Association (Osborne) and Friends of Island 
Academy (Friends) would “deliver the intervention through trained facilitators working 
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with the East River Academy School on Rikers Island” (The City of New York Office of 
the Mayor, 2012). 
Funding for the intervention for up to four years would come from a private investment 
by Goldman Sachs in the amount of $9.6 million. Responsibility for overseeing and 
monitoring the intervention was contracted by the City to MDRC, an established policy 
think tank in New York City (The City of New York Office of the Mayor, 2012). The 
evaluation of the ABLE programme to reduce readmission levels was contracted to the 
Vera Institute of Justice, a non-governmental organisation advocating criminal justice 
reform, to “assess the rates of reincarceration and determine the program’s effectiveness 
over time” (The City of New York Office of the Mayor, 2012). 
The public-private-partnership was arranged in such a way that an effective reduction in 
recidivism would create budgetary savings for the Department of Correction, from which 
it could repay the investor (with interest), while still retaining a financial saving for the 
public. As previously commented, this threshold was determined to be 10% reduction 
(MDRC, 2013a, p. 12). At this level, the DOC could expect to shrink its operational 
budget for the Rikers Island facility (described below in the Fiscal Strategy section), and 
share the savings between the private investor and the public. 
The City determined that it “would need to see at least a 10 percent average reduction in 
future jail time. If the program did not reduce recidivism by at least 10 percent, it would 
not be worth the investment” (MDRC, 2013a, p. 12). The press release states that, “[f]or 
Goldman Sachs to break even on its original investment, the program will need to reduce 
reincarceration by 10%. Similarly, the City’s payments are based on the success of the 
program and how much the program reduces reincarceration rates” (The City of New 
York Office of the Mayor, 2012). 
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If the project fails to hit the 10% threshold, however, the DoC would not repay Goldman. 
“If the program does not meet its targets for reducing reincarceration”, the press release 
states, “the City pays nothing” (The City of New York Office of the Mayor, 2012). This 
is how the state tries to “leverage private capital for public good”, by shifting financial 
risk for social policy experiments from the public to the private sector.  
However, Goldman refused to accept the full risk and mitigating measures were taken by 
third party actors. The mayor’s organisation, Bloomberg Philanthropies, drastically 
lowered Goldman’s potential financial loss by three quarters, providing a loan guarantee 
in the amount of $7.2 million, to be given to Goldman Sachs in the case of a failed social 
outcome. (In the case of a successful project, these funds will be used by MDRC for future 
SIB or Pay-for-Success projects). 
This presentation provides a basic understanding of the policy design, or the mechanics, 
of the New York City Social Impact Bond. Before going into more detail about the actual 
practice of the policy experiment, I first set the SIB in my broader theoretical framework, 
against which the policy is ultimately assessed. Namely, based on my understanding of 
policies as elements of restructuring processes, or efforts to bring them about, I consider 
how the NYC SIB articulates an approach to the social crisis, the fiscal crisis of the state, 
and economic and investment problems that have arisen since the financial collapse of 
2008. For the remaining part of this chapter, my analysis will be organised around three 
interlinked dimensions: social, fiscal, and economic. It will focus on how the SIB is 
(re)organising both discursive and material practices, and with which outcomes. 
6.2. Governing the social crisis – The NYC SIB’s decarceration strategy 
In this section, I analyse the ‘social’ dimension of the NYC case, describing the effort to 
frame a ‘positive’ response to the social crisis. This is discussed as alternative, on the one 
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side, to neoliberal governance of laissez faire attitudes towards social polarisation, or 
towards its mode of repressive control, and on the other side, to redistributive or 
ameliorative forms of social protection and the promotion of social equality associated 
with market-constraining alternatives. I describe how the NYC case seeks to chart a 
middle route, a ‘third way’, or compromise between the above positions, and can be 
described as part of the effort to advance what I’ve called an ‘ethical capitalism’. In 
essence, this analysis describes the struggle between competing hegemony projects in the 
crisis conjuncture. This involves the articulation of a specific social crisis discourse, 
aiming to respond to increasing pressures from social crises and emerging alternatives, 
and to achieve a new consensus. It encompasses too, efforts to translate this discourse 
into knowledging and governing technologies (as described in the previous chapter). And 
it includes the development of certain forms of collective action with the aim of 
addressing identified social crises, as means towards a certain solution. 
Respectively, this section has three parts: First, I describe the ‘social impact’ discourse, 
including the narration of incarceration and its causes, as well as the projection of an 
imaginary solution. Next, I explain the knowledging technologies for measuring ‘impact’, 
describing how the discursive objects are translated into categories for measurement and 
steering of social life. Finally, I move further into the material field by describing the 
production of ‘social impact’ through the advancement of certain social practices to 
operationalise the goal of decarceration. 
6.2.1. Narrating the social crisis: the ‘social impact’ discourse of 
decarceration 
As described in chapter 2, Fairclough defines a discourse as the selection of parts of the 
world for representation from a particular perspective, and their re-contextualisation in 
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broader systems of meaning, which contributes to the legitimation of specific forms of 
collective action (2003, p. 121). This section describes the articulation of a ‘social impact’ 
discourse in the NYC case, involving the selection of the social crisis of mass 
incarceration, its representation (including its causes and imagined solutions), and its re-
contextualisation in broader systems of meaning, to legitimise specific forms of collective 
action. As Sum (2012, p. 3) and Fairclough (2003: 31-32) explain, this involves 
reconstructing the discursive chains that cut across different sites and scales, between 
diverse actors, seeks to build consensus despite conflict and contestation, in order to 
stabilises a certain common sense or world view, supportive normative collective action. 
The articulation of “ethical capitalism” described earlier ‘problematises’ (Foucault) parts 
of neoliberalism – its failure to address social polarisation, exclusion, and depravity in the 
form of mass incarceration – and articulates parts of an alternative to a repressive mode 
of governance, based ameliorative alternatives to punitive containment. It does so by 
combining market-centric ideas with those of progressive imaginaries through the 
contested process of discursive formation. 
Re-politicising the social crisis 
Fraser et al (2016) show that social crisis is a central object of discursive intervention for 
social impact bonds, pointing to “frequent articulat[ions]” in the grey literature presenting 
SIBs as a way to “prevent or ameliorate complex social problems”. My analysis of media 
outputs shows that this narrative is echoed in the popular literature, with little 
modification. SIBs are described as holding the potential to “solve society’s most 
intractable problems” (The Guardian, 2010a), to “save society” (The Independent, 2011), 
or even to “save the world” (Bank, 2012).  
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These texts select a ‘part of the world’, namely social crises, and, re-present them as 
unresolved problems, they (re)politicise (or ‘problematise’) them, calling for changes in 
existing forms of social action to address them. This is also true for the NYC case, which 
selected social crises as one of three central objects of intervention, justifying specific 
forms of collective action (described below). This section deals with this phenomenon, 
by analysing how the NYC SIB politicizes the issue of mass incarceration and adolescent 
reoffending in particular, and articulates specific representations of these social realities 
from a particular perspective. 
New York City’s mayor Michael Bloomberg was a central actor in the city’s SIB at Rikers 
Island. Against the background of economic recession, social polarisation, and the 
combination of laissez faire attitudes with repressive measures, his attitude on social 
crises and the need for political action are important. Two days before the protest action 
by New York City residents in September 2011 to “occupy Wall Street” – igniting the 
U.S. version of social protest against neoliberal inequalities which had begun in Tunisia 
and Egypt, and stretched to Greece, Spain, and other European countries – the Mayor 
warned of ‘riots’ in the metropolis if unemployment levels were not lowered and social 
polarisation addressed. “You have a lot of kids graduating college can’t find jobs,” The 
New York Times reported (2011) Mayor Bloomberg saying. Citing Cairo and Madrid, 
the mayor exclaimed: “You don’t want those kinds of riots here.”  
While the 2011 assemblies of the squares in Spain and the Egyptian plaza occupations 
were peaceful demonstrations, Bloomberg’s statements made implicit references to the 
London riots, which were still occurring when his comments were made. The statement 
combined a recognition of growing social tensions resulting from social depravity and 
economic recession, legitimacy problems resulting from the lack of political action, and 
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an effort to prevent alternative political forces, or at least alternative interpretive 
frameworks from arising, which might call for more sweeping changes and ameliorative 
action. This statement, made during the SIB project, expresses the attempt at a controlled 
re-politicisation of the social crisis, supporting limited and symbolic forms of 
‘intervention’, symbolising modernisation attempts, which simultaneously sought to 
control the boundaries to prevent re-politicisation from spilling over and supporting 
competing political imaginaries and alternatives. 
The mayor’s perspective was reflected in his support for the NYC SIB as well. The 
Mayor’s Office of New York City, his personal foundation Bloomberg Philanthropies, 
and the global investment bank Goldman Sachs, all deplored the social crisis in the city, 
and targeted the high levels of incarceration at the notorious Rikers Island jail in 
particular. With press statement, policy documents, and media reports, they framed this 
social crisis, presenting their imagined solutions in public forums, and presented the SIB 
as a particularly advantageous solution to advance “social change.” 
In a joint Press Release on August 2, 2010, the Mayor’s Office and the Department of 
Correction, they “announced [the] nation’s first Social Impact Bond program”, which 
claimed to “[t]ackle the most entrenched problems” (The City of New York Office of the 
Mayor, 2012), a narrative chain followed up later in an interim report of the city’s 
‘innovative’ way of “solving social problems” (The City of New York Office of the 
Mayor 2013). Amidst deep social contradictions, the projects would “achieve positive 
social outcomes” (The City of New York Office of the Mayor 2013). 
Goldman Sachs promoted the project in a similar way, framing the SIB as a way to 
“address pressing social issues” (Goldman Sachs, Olson, and Phillips 2013, 97) and 
“achiev[e] social outcomes” (Goldman Sachs, Olson, and Phillips 2013, 98). Bloomberg 
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Philanthropies described the SIB as a way to “unlock a new source of capital for social 
change” (Bloomberg Philanthropies 2015). In an interview with the organization, an 
interviewee described it, like the Mayor, as seeking “positive social outcomes for people 
and for cities” (personal communication, Bloomberg Philanthropies, 2015). 
The non-governmental organisation, MDRC, tasked as ‘project manager’ described the 
SIB in a detailed report as creating “social benefits for participants, families, and local 
communities” (MDRC 2013), and the organisation’s president framed the project around 
the issue of “social problems” (MDRC 2014). 
These messages were transmitted through media outlets in an uncritical way, with the 
New York Times echoing the industry’s claim, that SIBs “ease social problems” and 
achieve “social good”, and presenting the impact investment market as a way to “tackle 
social problems” and “produce measurable benefits to society” (New York Times, 
2012b). The editorial board of the Los Angeles Times characterizes SIBs as a “new way 
to attack social problems” (LA Times, 2014). The Huffington Post published an article 
by Goldman Sachs and Bloomberg Philanthropies describing the SIB as “producing 
positive results” and the NYC case as “help[ing] young people in need” (Bloomberg 
Philanthropies & Goldman Sachs, 2015).  
An interviewee from the Nonprofit Finance Fund emphasised that the discussion around 
pay-for-success (or SIBs) “needs to be, as much as possible, about (…) improving 
conditions and chances in whatever target community of population” (personal 
communication, Nonprofit Finance Fund, 2015). Vera framed the SIB as being about 
“improv[ing] people’s lives” or “well-being” (Vera Institute of Justice, 2015a). In 
McKinsey’s promotional brochure which they advocate to “bring Social Impact Bonds to 
the U.S.”, the think tank writes that SIBs are about life improvement (McKinsey & 
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Company, 2012, p. 15). They write: “Constituents are the heart of a SIB’s work. They are 
the people who will directly benefit from the social interventions funded and scaled 
through a SIB. They might include chronically homeless or incarcerated individuals” 
(McKinsey & Company, 2012, p. 15). 
Not only does this passage show how SIBs are framed, by some actors and in certain 
contexts, first and foremost, as a response to the social crisis, it also provides clues as to 
how such social change is perceived in these projects, namely as an outside intervention 
by specialised, external forces into a population or population group of the downtrodden, 
an act of modification from the outside. The role and perspective on social change is 
hardly questioned among SIB advocates, shown, for example, in the unqualified 
statement by MDRC that “[f]oundations spend grant dollars to improve the human 
condition” (MDRC, 2016b, p. 21).  
According to Third Sector Capital Partners (Von Glahn & Whistler, 2013, p. 58), social 
impact bonds are about “improving the lives of young individuals”, while for MDRC they 
“improv[e] the lives of individuals” (MDRC, 2013a, p. ix), “of young men” (2013a, p. 
45), or “of disadvantaged young people” (2013a, p. 45). 
Yet, the framing of SIBs as an innovative response to the social crisis was supported by 
actors beyond the direct participants in the project and the network of think tanks 
supporting impact investment projects. Even by those holding somewhat critical 
perspectives of marketization helped frame SIBs in this positive light. In a 2014 article 
(The Seattle Times, 2014), a contributor writes that, despite his initial “creepy” feelings 
about SIBs, particularly around the “notion of inviting venture capitalists into the state 
human services system”, the market-centred policy, the author argues, represents a 
discontinuation of the “race-to-the-bottom practices” of the “private prison industry.” By 
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incentivising private actors to achieve profit through the fulfilment of social policy 
targets, the article claims, Social Impact Bonds “might get bankers to pay to reduce prison 
recidivism”, and supports the passing of the Washington State Bill HB 2337 (The Seattle 
Times, 2014), a bill to establish a “Washington Social Investment Steering Committee” 
for the introduction of “at least one pilot that uses social impact bonds or other public-
private financing for social or health care services” in 2016 (House Committee On Early 
Learning & Human Services, n.d.).28 
Media contributions such as these, which contribute to a SIB discourse as a solution to 
social crises, were joined by left-leaning authorities as well, such as the Roosevelt 
Institute. The think tank promotes the market-centric SIB as a policy instrument for social 
good through multiple texts on its online platform. Social Impact Bonds are framed as a 
tool of a progressive repertoire, writing, they are “instruments to get at entrenched social 
problems” (Keohane, 2013, p. 1), and they can “Help Achieve Progressive Goals in an 
Era of Austerity” (Bosserman, 2011), and are recommend by the Institute’s Campus 
Network Budget for a Millennial America, as a “resource” in “rebuilding the social safety 
net” which “draw on the capacity of the private sector to provide needed public goods” 
(Roosevelt Institute, 2011).  
Problematising prisonfare and (re)incarceration 
Like in Peterborough, mass incarceration was the construed social crisis towards which 
the NYC SIB was directed. MDRC wrote: 
At the inception of the Rikers Island SIB, some 3,000 16- to 18-year-old, mostly 
low-income adolescents of colour were spending anywhere from a few days to as 
                                                          
28 The author articulates a standard third-way position, in his opinion article in the same paper on upcoming 
city elections, he urges “smart, progressive, business-friendly candidates to step in to” the race (Martin 
2016). 
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much as a year in jail awaiting trial, and nearly one in two returned to jail on a 
new charge within a year of being released. For the young people themselves and 
for society at large, this downward spiral was tragic and costly. (MDRC, 2016b, 
p. 3) 
In response, the NYC SIB aimed to “break the cycle of reincarceration” (Vera Institute 
of Justice, 2015b). Against the background of decades of incarceration growth, the NYC 
SIB appears, like the Peterborough case, as a change of course, as a corrective to the 
“punitive containment as a government technique” and rationality “for managing 
deepening urban marginality” (Wacquant, 2010, p. 204). 
Here, the SIB drew and built upon a shift in common sense away from prisonfare and the 
punitive management of poverty, and towards the search for alternatives to incarceration. 
According to the New York Times, the idea of decarceration has increasingly resonated 
with the public, with “polls consistently show[ing] that Americans are now more 
interested in spending money on education and health care than on building more 
prisons”, this corresponding to downward growth trends in the prison population (The 
New York Times, 2013b). The shift in common sense has strengthened the search for 
alternatives to incarceration.  
This sentiment was also articulated by my Interviewee from Vera, who argued that there 
is an “increasing awareness that something needs to be done to reduce the incarcerated 
population” (personal communication, Vera Institute of Justice, 2015a)  The Economist 
reflected, articulated, and contributed to this shift in popular consciousness in an article 
whose title reworked the phrase of mass incarceration “lock ‘em up and throw away the 
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key”, with a decarceration message: “Let ‘em out and throw away the key” (The 
Economist, 2010).29 
The social policy goal of the NYC SIB was framed as part of this shift, for example, as 
an effort to “reduce the reincarceration rate” (The City of New York Office of the Mayor, 
Bloomberg Philanthropies, Goldman Sachs, & MDRC, 2012), as a project that “could 
close jails” (The New York Times 2012), shrink prison sizes, and scale-back human 
warehousing.  
As I highlighted earlier, reincarceration rates among people previously in detention was 
highlighted as a specific and unnecessary problem. In the mayor office’s presentation, 
“Bringing Social Impact Bonds to New York City”, the city leaders highlighted again that 
“[n]early 50% of 16- to 18-year-olds who leave Rikers return within one year” 
(Bloomberg, Michael & Gibbs, Linda, n.d.). And this line was repeated in the post-project 
co-written op-ed by Bloomberg Philanthropies and Goldman Sachs (2015). An 
interviewee from MDRC extended the point, emphasising that 50% extends to 70% with 
a 3-year time span after release (MDRC, 2015a). The incarceration crisis was echoed in 
media reports on the SIB (New York Times, 2012a), and Reuters writing: “Goldman will 
create one of the nation's first ‘social service bonds’ [sic] to help fund a New York City 
program that aims to lower the 50% recidivism rate among youthful offenders jailed at 
the Rikers Island correctional facility” (2012).  
                                                          
29  The article focused on criminal justice reforms in the UK discussing the Peterborough SIB in particular, 
but the international readership of the magazine reflects a changing US mood as well, as mentioned in 
the NYT article cited above, and the magazine has written often about SIBs in the US and the Rikers 
Island project in particular. 
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Identifying causes of (re)incarceration – construing solutions 
Representing the causes and construing solutions to incarceration was also important to 
the ‘social impact’ discourse. Two narratives could be identified, one articulating a ‘social 
capital’ narrative narrowly focused on individual behaviour, and a broader one focused 
on social conditions. The presence of multiple discourses reflected the diversity of 
perspectives articulated by multiple actors, and allowed the SIB to be understood as a 
corrective measure to existing practices focused on repression or fragmentation. But as 
Fairclough argues, it is important to consider not only the plurality of discourses but the 
‘order of discourses’, that is, how they are structured and related to one another. As 
explained below, and like Peterborough, we see the ultimate marginalisation of 
explanations focused on social conditions and the centring of narrow, agent-based 
explanations. 
As previously demonstrated, all data sources revealed elements of a social condition 
explanation for incarceration. These relate to socio-economic causes (namely poverty), 
criminal justice policy (particular strict sentencing laws), and policing practices 
(especially racial profiling). In an article by the MDRC President, for example, the author 
identifies economic recession, aggressive police practices, and sentencing laws as having 
an impact on incarceration levels. He writes: 
“[M]any factors can influence whether recidivism rates rise or fall: an unusually 
strong or weak economy, a change in policing tactics (for instance, a modification 
of “stop and frisk” policies), or a change in court practices, since most of these 
young people are awaiting trial and unable to make bail” (MDRC 2014) 
This knowledge was reflected in my conversations with interview partners from the 
project manager MDRC and the project evaluator Vera, and actors in the broader SIB 
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policy network, such as the Nonprofit Finance Fund. All of these individuals attributed a 
structural cause to the problem of incarceration. Asked whether building social capital 
among detainees will help improve their life chances and keep them out of the criminal 
justice system, an interviewee at MDRC drew attention to the negative actions of 
powerful economic players further up the hierarchy. This interviewee said that real 
progress requires “not just changing the behaviour of the working population, but in 
changing the behaviour of employers. There’s multifaceted factors to it” (personal 
communication, MDRC, 2015). 
Attention to structural determinants was also given by the Vera Institute of Justice 
(2016b), which described “system-level factors” contributing to reincarceration: “[W]ider 
shifts in the city’s economy, crime trends, criminal justice policies, or other factors may 
also aff ect recidivism,” the organisation wrote (Vera Institute of Justice, 2016b, p. 8). 
These ‘environmental features’ and “shifts” in “‘system-level’ factors’ (…) may influence 
the number of days people are held in the jail—and the likelihood that they will return” 
(Vera Institute of Justice, 2016b, p. 8). 
Harsh sentencing laws were represented by a Vera interviewee as a particularly strong 
cause of jail growth. The interviewee said: “In terms of SIBS, if you really want to think 
about reducing mass incarceration, providing therapy to people who are incarcerated, to 
reduce recidivism, that’s a component of doing that. I don’t think you’re ever going to 
realise dramatic decreases in the prison and jail populations by doing that” (personal 
communication, Vera Institute of Justice, 2015a). 
This person continued: “[P]roviding services to people who are in jail and prison is 
important and essential but its front-end kind of interventions which you’re gonna need 
really to reduce prison and jail populations” (personal communication, Vera Institute of 
   
185 
 
Justice, 2015a). Probed to specify these measures, my interviewee said “sentencing 
reform,” by which he meant changing the “decisions about who needs to go to prison and 
jail in the first place. Addressing the way that pre-trial detention is used” (ibid). 
A similar social critique was articulated by the two service organisations (Osborne and 
Friends) contracted to deliver the ABLE programme. Both emphasised material supports 
as necessary components for detainees resettlement in their communities (personal 
communication, Friends of Island Academy, 2016; personal communication, The 
Osborne Association, 2016). And an interviewee with CLASP, an organisation involved 
in the broader SIB policy network, pointed to structural causes of reoffending, while 
discussing the NYC project, describing “recidivism [as] an effect of economic recession 
and employment”, and harsh drug laws (personal communication, CLASP, 2015). 
But this selection of incarceration discourses, focused on social conditions of offending, 
while revealing the presence of ‘progressive’ perspectives, and linked to visions of 
decarceration based on forms of increased social protection and economic security, were 
marginal to the dominant ‘social impact’ discourse. The latter, as I now describe, focused 
on individual agents, personal behaviour, and failed coping strategies of individual 
persons in the context of economic recession. This hierarchy in the order of discourse also 
reflects segmentation between different policy actors, with progressive narratives 
expressed largely by those with less power to determine the policy, and those with 
individualist narratives holding more institutional power, for example, the Mayor’s 
Office, Goldman Sachs, and Bloomberg Philanthropies. 
While the NYC SIB politicises mass incarceration as policy failure, its dominant 
discourse de-politicises the social determinants behind it, and foregrounds explanations 
centred on personal attitudes and behaviour of detainees. One condition for the possibility 
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of this mutual presence of competing narratives was, as in the Peterborough project, the 
absence of explicit moralising, and the framing of the social intervention in the terms of 
‘support’. Just as the U.K. case rejected grand “theories of change” in favour of a 
“practical” mode of operation, the NYC case also prefers a technical-managerial approach 
of “problem solving”, viewed within a narrow frame of the behaviour and psychology of 
individual detainees. 
The dominant narrative about the causes of incarceration were rarely articulated 
explicitly, but rather expressed implicitly through the descriptions of the “antirecidivism 
programme” (Wall Street Journal, 2012) selected by the SIB. The name of the ABLE 
programme itself showed that the focus was on the personal behaviour of people in a 
harsh social, political, and economic “environment”, alluded to by the statements above 
regarding economic recession, poverty, racially discriminatory police practices, and harsh 
sentencing laws. The assumption was that personal coping strategies were ineffective and 
required improvement. ABLE set the “goal of reducing the likelihood of reincarceration” 
through its “focus on personal responsibility education, training and counselling” (The 
City of New York Office of the Mayor, 2012). 
This approach focused on increasing personal skills of people navigating difficult 
circumstances with the project described as providing detainees the “opportunity to 
develop the problem-solving and decision-making skills necessary to turn them[selves] 
around” (The City of New York Office of the Mayor, 2012). It focuses on the personal 
“skills” that “young people need to avoid future incarceration” (The City of New York 
Office of the Mayor, 2012). It seeks to “reduce the likelihood of reincarceration by 
providing education, training and counselling to improve personal responsibility skills, 
including decision-making and problem-solving” (The City of New York Office of the 
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Mayor, 2012). According to a Fact Sheet published by the Mayor’s Office the project 
aims to “reduce the reincarceration rate” by “improving personal responsibility and 
decision-making” (The City of New York Office of the Mayor et al., 2012). By its own 
description, ABLE is an invasive behavioural modification technology, described by 
MDRC as “designed to restructure distorted thinking and perceptions, which in turn 
changes a person’s behaviour for the better” (MDRC, 2013a, p. 29). 
Silver and Clarke are correct then to describe SIBs as “individualis[ing] blame for social 
problems such as poverty and crime” and “denying the structural and systemic 
inequalities” at their root (Silver and Clarke 2014). The result, they stress, is the 
“stigmatisation of [affected] communities” which “deflect[s] attention away from 
structural inequality and from more equitable solutions to the crisis through, for example, 
addressing tax avoidance” (ibid). Furthermore, “solutions”, they write, “are seen in terms 
of changing the behaviours of individuals who are socially, culturally and politically 
marginalised and often living in poverty. This is central to the idea of Social Impact 
Bonds: change the way that people in poverty behave, but leave the system intact” (ibid). 
Yet, while they are correct in disclosing SIBs’ individualizing approach, the policy’s 
success in framing an individualist solution to a publicly-recognised socially-caused 
problem, lies in the policy’s reliance on a technocratic-managerial or post-political 
language, rather than a directly moralising one. The absence of a language and attitude of 
moral blame through technical language avoided an outright conflict between actors 
holding social critiques from those with narrowly individualist foci.30 
                                                          
30 Jamie Peck makes a similar argument about the way technocratic language defused potential political 
conflicts during the replacement of welfare with workfare in the U.S. In fact, he also points out MDRC’s 
role at that time, as an important actor within the welfare-to-work policy network, which “took much of 
the heat out of the debate traditionally fought out in emotional language on the partisan terrain of 
political and moral principle”; “they pulled the debate into the field of program implementation and 
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In broad terms, the social crisis of mass incarceration was to be dealt with through a 
process of individualisation. This reflects what Candeias describes as the act of 
“subdividing the overall social context into specialized policies to dis-identify societal 
interrelations and changes, and to individualize the problems of social groups” (quoted in 
Brand 2014, 436). 
David Harvey describes individualism as a way of making persons wholly accountable 
for their own well-being, a “principle [that] extends into the realms of welfare, education, 
health care, and even pensions” so that: 
“success or failure is interpreted in terms of entrepreneurial virtues or personal 
failings (such as not investing significantly enough in one’s own human capital 
through education) rather than being attributed to any systemic property (such as 
class exclusions usually attributed to capitalism)” (Harvey, 2005, pp. 65–66). 
Yet this shift of responsibility for mass incarceration onto the individual and his or her 
poor behaviour came without an explicit argument based on moral blame. Instead, it 
explicitly recognised social causes, yet bracketed out them out as immutable objects of 
the background environment. Framed as a “pragmatic” approach, it applied technocratic 
managerial practices to a population group, which required a kid of psychological 
medicine. MDRC wrote of the “exposure” of “participants” to treatment (MDRC 2012: 
30), and both MDRC and Vera referred to the “dosages” and “dosage levels” of therapy 
to which “clients” were exposed, in order to cure presumably behavioural disorders 
(MDRC, 2013a, p. 23; Vera Institute of Justice, 2016b, p. 20). 
                                                          
way from issues of political principle” (Peck, 2001, pp. 92–93). 
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Yet, as we know, the individualisation process was one directly organised and monitored 
for a purpose of “social impact”. This objective could only be secured by actively 
producing a different subjectivity out of the participants in the ABLE programme. “Re-
ablement”, as it is called in the U.K., requires in the U.S. as well, the transformation of 
welfare institutions, not retrenchment, because subjects are to be persuaded to refrain 
from criminal activity, or other activities, that may see them return to Rikers Island in the 
future. 
Welfare transformation 
While emphasizing the individualising character of the SIB, this does not mean the 
separation of individuals from institutions, or welfare retrenchment per se. Instead, we 
see that the process of individualisation brought about by the NYC SIB is deeply 
organised by the state and its private and civil society “partners”, to create new subjects, 
and to insert them into institutions of monitoring and control for external purposes. We 
do not see the isolation of detainees from societal institutions, who are left alone with 
“their” problems, which they have to solve on their own. Rather, with “social impact” as 
the goal of a collaborative process spanning across state, market, and society, individuals 
are framed as the target population for coordinated intervention by the state, and in doing 
so, the second “object of steering” is the existing welfare institutions and the logic and 
values of social services, which coming under criticism, and are given new meanings and 
functions. 
6.2.2. Measuring ‘social impact’ with knowledging technologies 
Having now construed the main contours of the social discourse deployed in the NYC 
case, I now describe how the SIB transformed this discourse into operable categories and 
technologies for quantifying and measuring ‘impact’. These sought to capture through 
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quantification, the numerical effect of the ABLE programme upon recidivism levels. For 
this, the project required measurement techniques and categories to assess potential 
changes. 
Recidivism rates were to be measured according to the proxy “readmission bed days” 
(RBDs), which “captures the number of days [people] were held in jail during the 12 
months following their release from Rikers” (Vera Institute of Justice, 2015b). The 
project’s intended target group were “16- to 18-year-old youth detained at New York 
City’s Rikers Island jail”, to whom the ABLE programme was administered, and whose 
RBDs were to be assessed by Vera (Vera Institute of Justice, 2015b). 
The proxy of RBDs was chosen because of its intended total effect upon the size and 
capacity of the facility, hoping that lower RBDs will lead to reduced facility expenditures. 
The aim is to “reduce permanently the number of jail beds operated…” (MDRC, 2013a, 
p. 15). The ABLE programme was rolled out as wide as possible, because “jail bed 
savings are the result of both the size of the program’s impact and the number of program 
participants” (MDRC, 2013a, p. 15). They sought therefore to “serve a large number of 
people in order to produce the desired cost savings”, and the contract “set minimum 
requirements for the number of participants that must receive the ABLE program” at 
9,240 over four years (MDRC, 2013a, pp. 15–17).31 Only at this level could it be expected 
to hit the 10% level of reduced RBDs. 
According to the city’s calculations, a 10% reduction in RBDs would create enough 
savings to repay investors their original investment. The city: 
                                                          
31 This broke down as follows: “1,440 in Year 1, 2,500 in Year 2, 2,500 in Year 3, 2,400 in Year 4, plus an 
additional 400 participants who can be engaged at any time during these four years” (MDRC, 2013a, pp. 
15–17). 
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“believed it can save approximately $4,600 per jail bed for reductions of less than 
100 beds, but approximately $28,000 per jail bed for reductions of 100 beds or 
more. This is the case because many jail costs are fixed, particularly those related 
to staffing. If it could eliminate 100 beds or more DOC would be able to close a 
housing area, which in turn would allow the agency to lower its staffing needs (in 
this case, by reducing spending on overtime for uniformed staff). (MDRC, 2013a, 
pp. 15–17). 
The programme was to operate for at least three years, allowing Goldman to decide on a 
fourth year following Vera’s first cohort assessments.32 
In order to assess ABLE’s effect upon RBDs, Vera developed a quasi-experimental 
design, employing the same Propensity Score Matching system used in the Peterborough 
project that allows a test group to be compared with a control group determined by 
multiple characteristics that match individuals according to a variety of similar 
characteristics. “[T]hese groups were matched on a variety of factors including charge, 
criminal history, gender, and age using a statistical technique called propensity score 
matching” (Vera Institute of Justice, 2015b). It also controlled for “system-level factors” 
which could also affect readmissions, for example “citywide changes that are not related 
to the program, such as shifts in policing practices or changes in the use of community-
based alternatives to incarceration” (Vera Institute of Justice, n.d.). 
Assessing the impact of ABLE upon recidivism levels, Vera compared the “RBDs for 16- 
to 18-year-olds who were eligible to participate in the ABLE program during 2013 with 
                                                          
32 “Specifically, the SIB guarantees financing for the first three years, but investors must make a decision 
to continue financing the program for the fourth year. That decision will be based on the 12-month 
evaluation results for the cohort admitted between January 1, 2013 and December 31, 2013. Year 5 and 
Year 6 require continued funding from the city, as the SIB will have ended.” (MDRC, 2013a, p. 17) 
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a matched historical group who passed through the jail before the program was 
established (from 2006-2010)” (Vera Institute of Justice, 2015b). If they “determines that 
the intervention (a cognitive behavioural therapy program) reduces recidivism by at least 
10 percent, the project will be deemed a success and the Department of Correction will 
pay back the investors for the cost of operating the program” plus interest, depending 
upon the degree of reductions (MDRC, 2013a, p. ix). 
6.2.3. Producing ‘social impact’ 
Having now described both the social discourse, and the social technologies for 
measuring and governing recidivism, I now explain the social practices deployed to 
restructure collective action with the aim of reducing recidivism. As I explain in this 
section, this change was to be produced by reshaping the personal attitudes and behaviour 
of detainees held at Rikers Island, induced by inmates’ participation in group therapy 
sessions at the prison. 
Selecting an intervention: cognitive behavioural therapy 
Means for achieving the ‘social impact’ objective had already been decided by the 
Mayor’s Office in September 2011, when it began working with MDRC and Bloomberg 
Philanthropies on the SIB (MDRC, 2013a, p. 29). At this time, it decided on a therapeutic 
approach, and the intermediary (MDRC) was tasked with “selecting a cognitive 
behavioural therapy curriculum”, which decided on “moral reconation therapy” (MDRC, 
2013a, p. 30). Vera described MRT, as an “evidence-based intervention that focuses on 
improving social skills, personal responsibility, and decision making” (Vera Institute of 
Justice, n.d.). Among MRT, MDRC selected ABLE as the best and most flexible fit for 
the Rikers environment. 
   
193 
 
Cognitive behavioural therapy is an invasive behavioural modification programme 
“designed to restructure distorted thinking and perceptions, which” according to MDRC, 
“in turn changes a person’s behaviour for the better” (MDRC, 2013a, p. 29). It is 
“premised on the idea that beliefs, attitudes, and values affect the way people think and 
how they view problems. These beliefs can distort the way a person views reality, 
interacts with other people, and experiences everyday life” (MDRC, 2013a, p. 29). 
For people in detention, it is supposed “to improve social skills, problem-solving abilities, 
critical reasoning, moral reasoning, cognitive style, self-control, impulse management, 
and self-efficacy” (MDRC 2013, 29). The programme focuses on “moral development 
and seeks to improve moral reasoning by addressing participants’ beliefs and reasoning 
in a systematic, step-by-step way” (MDRC, 2013a, p. 30). 
MDRC continues: 
Participants use a workbook to progress through the eight stages of development 
in a group with the help of a trained facilitator. They progress from one moral 
stage to the next by delivering “testimonies,” or presentations about themselves, 
that indicate that they have begun to internalize the content of the moral stage 
associated with each step in the program. (There are 12 such steps in total, 
beginning with “honesty” and culminating in “choosing moral goals.”) The group 
and the facilitator vote on the testimonies, and a passing vote enables a participant 
to move up the “Freedom Ladder” (MDRC 2013, 30). 
It is organised around 50-minute group discussions, five days a week, and is integrated 
into the school day at Rikers Island (MDRC, 2013a, p. 34). 
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Outsourcing the Programme 
The administering of the programme was conducted by two long-standing non-profit 
organisations, The Osborne Association and the Friends of Island Academy, contracted 
by the City government (MDRC, 2013a, p. 32). Both organisations have long-term 
experience in supporting offenders. “Osborne has extensive experience running cognitive 
behavioural therapy programs and has worked in prisons for over 30 years. Friends has 
worked with young people in New York City for two decades, much of it with young men 
and women in the public school that operates on Rikers, East River Academy” (MDRC, 
2013a, pp. 31–32). 
Service delivery was tied in the NYC case to a strict definition of the programme to be 
delivered, the ABLE programme. Both organisations had experience with ABLE, yet 
understand incarceration as having social causes, and therefore typically offer multiple 
service support (e.g. housing, community service). The NYC SIB restricted activities to 
the ABLE programme, as a way of testing whether this single method could achieve the 
reductions that rounded service delivery is usually required. The hope was that 
effectiveness with this single method would set a precedent for limiting services in other 
areas, which would have been proved unnecessary. 
Narrowing and distorting categories: simulating ‘social impact’ 
The bracketing out of social features of incarceration and the narrow focus on individual 
agency/subjectivity, resulted in the distortion of the very category “offender” upon which 
the project rested. The “antirecidivism programme” (Wall Street Journal, 2012), as it was 
called, was actually administered to people who for the most part were “pre-trial 
detainees”, meaning people who “haven’t been convicted” and are “in jail awaiting the 
outcome of their trial” (MDRC, 2015a). Up to ninety percent of persons in the ABLE 
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programme were not convicted, but instead, detained and awaiting their court appearance; 
they were “un-sentenced young people who remain in New York City Department of 
Correction [DOC] custody while their cases are pending in court”, MDRC wrote (2013a, 
p. 32). 
An interviewee with Vera said (personal communication, 2015a) that at “most jails – 
certainly Rikers Island – most people are held pre-trial. There’s been no decision in their 
case. They’re just being held pending their trial”. Pre-trial detainees, as they are called, 
may be legally held up to twelve months while awaiting an appointment in court. 
This reality reveals a glaring contradiction in the project because it seeks to reduce 
reoffending among people who had not been convicted of a crime. It sought to reduce 
criminal behaviour among people who had not committed crimes. It was not the sources 
of incarceration that were targeted, but the people who were suffering under punitive 
policing and racial profiling practices. Or, as one Vera interviewee (personal 
communication, 2015a) said, they were victims of harsh sentencing laws that kept low-
income people captive: “[M]any people in New York City are held in jail because they 
can’t afford to pay low bails. So it’s basically because they’re poor.” And according to 
the project manager, even convictions do not mean they really committed crimes, as many 
take plea bargains (personal communication, MDRC, 2015a). 
This contradiction – this mismatch of an anti-recidivism programme targeting non-
convicted persons – was an open secret among the actors directly involved in the NYC 
project. Some of the policy literature pointed out that ABLE’s target population were not 
convicted persons, but instead ‘pre-trial detainees’, but it was only marginal in the 
literature (MDRC, 2013a, p. 32; Vera Institute of Justice, 2016b, p. 16). In those seldom 
cases when it is mentioned, it is done so in passing. It is not discussed as an issue of 
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concern (let alone problematized), but instead allows for a simple equation of ‘detainees’ 
with ‘offenders’. In media reports, no instances could be found where this false 
categorisation and false targeting was questioned. 
These facts reveal how social impact is being simulated, and yet has not negatively 
impacted the project’s public standing. Here it is clear the way policy plays a legitimising 
role, as an imagined solution contributing to the maintenance of the status quo, and to 
prevent alternative strategies from emerging. 
Passive consent and contradictory practices 
These contradictions are dealt with in particular ways by the policy actors. The first tactic 
is a discursive shift from the popular usage of the term “offender” as meaning someone 
who has been convicted of a crime, to the technical language, in which “offender” is 
defined as someone who has been detained.33 This backgrounds or brackets out the social 
environment and moves to a level of techno-managerial control of persons. We see this 
for example in the following interview selection with Vera (personal communication, 
2015a): 
Q: There’s something peculiar about this situation because the issue is to stop 
reoffending, but these are people who haven’t been convicted of offending in the 
first place, right? 
A: [Pause] Um, well actually... 
Q: Or am I misunderstanding something? 
                                                          
33  Even on this point, one interviewee from MDRC challenged the notion that criminal convictions 
correspond to actual crimes, saying that especially poor, defendants of colour face pressure to take a 
plea bargain, to avoid lengthy and costly trials, even if they are innocent (MDRC, 2015a). 
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A: ... [inaudible] many have been convicted earlier.. But the goal is not um ... well, 
reoffending... the definition of offense in the criminal justice system includes 
arrest, includes any incarceration… (emphasis added) 
 
We also see in this selection how the interviewee, uncomfortable with this technical 
argument, shifts the discussion to a moral one, which provides a new basis of legitimacy 
for the project. This emphasises the good intentions of service providers for people in 
detention, independent of their guilt or innocence. 34  The interviewee (personal 
communication, Vera Institute of Justice, 2015a) continues: 
A: …and when you’re in jail or in prison or convicted or not convicted and 
sentenced, your life is affected. You spend time in jail, your life is affected. That 
affects your employment prospects. 
Q: Sure… 
A: We’re reaching them before they’re convicted in many cases. 
But this point is also a contradiction, as the interviewee criticises the narrow methods of 
behavioural therapy to reduce prison numbers: “I don’t think you’re ever going to realise 
dramatic decreases in the prison and jail populations by doing that” (personal 
communication, Vera Institute of Justice, 2015a), the interviewee told me. “[P]roviding 
services to people who are in jail and prison is important and essential,” the person said, 
“but its front-end kind of interventions which you’re gonna need really to reduce prison 
and jail populations” (ibid). After further probing, the interviewee stressed the need for 
                                                          
34 The interviewee says that many convictions do not reflect the actual guilt of defendants but the pressure 
upon them to take plea bargains, because of the lack of desire by the court to lawyers to take on the time 
and resources expenses. 
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“sentencing reform” to change the “decisions about who needs to go to prison and jail in 
the first place” and to “[a]ddress the way that pre-trial detention is used” (ibid). 
But how does the interviewee deal with what this person perceives as a mismatch between 
the project’s methods and its goals? How could a consensus be achieved among policy 
actors when some of them clearly state their contradictions? As we’ve seen above, this is 
accomplished by shifting grounds. Asked how the organisation supports a project, which 
appears to contradict its own knowledge about incarceration, there is a retreat to an ultra-
pragmatist position. Behavioural therapy is part of a “multiple tactics” approach: It is 
“[o]ne part of a coordinated strategy to reduce the use of jail and prison” (personal 
communication, Vera Institute of Justice, 2015a). A similar reconstruction of the project 
and its embedding in a broader reform perspective was also articulated to me in my 
interviews with the project manager (personal communication, MDRC, 2015a; personal 
communication, Vera Institute of Justice, 2015a). But both interviewees seemed to 
believe that the project’s symbolic value was more significant than its practical value. It 
was part of a shift in public consciousness towards prison downsizing and rehabilitation, 
and against punitive containment. My conclusion here is that direct participants holding 
elements of a progressive post-neoliberal perspective, accept, even reluctantly, a passive 
consensus, despite its practical contradictions, because they do not see concrete 
alternatives available to them in the current moment, but that they do see these projects 
as part of a potential shift from repressive to ameliorative ways of dealing with social 
crises in the future. 
6.3. Governing the fiscal crisis by ‘mobilising private capital for public good’ 
This section focuses on the SIB’s second object of intervention, namely the fiscal crisis 
of the state (Dowling & Harvie, 2014), by analysing the strategy of the NYC SIB to 
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‘mobilise private capital for public good’. As a ‘third way’ strategy linked to ethical 
capitalism, this entails the partially loosening grip of the dominant austerity position, 
without directly challenging it. The case appears then as a ‘third way’ position between a 
hard neoliberal austerity line on the one side, and an anti-austerity ‘push back’ (M. E. 
Warner & Clifton, 2013) on the other.  
Just as in the Peterborough case study then, the NYC case is examined here in terms of 
its fiscal strategy. I begin by analysing the fiscal narrative of ‘leveraging private capital 
for public good’. This describes the discourse of ‘counteracting austerity’ through ‘impact 
investment’. Second, I discuss the knowledging technologies for transforming discourse 
into interpretive practices that categorise data and social events for their management 
towards the fiscal goals. The third sub-section explains the social practices intended to 
operationalise the fiscal strategy and produce ‘leverage’. 
In accordance with the hegemony approach described in chapter two, the fiscal narrative 
is reconstructed in terms of the negotiation of multiple and often competing perspectives, 
into a provisional compromise. In particular, I am concerned with showing how at least 
two different perspectives are present and reorganised, referring to an orthodox neoliberal 
austerity narrative on the one hand, and a Keynesian-inspired public investment 
perspective. The divergence between these two perspectives is provisionally bridged 
through a conditional private investment strategy linked to public policy goals. This 
struggle and renegotiation plays out too, through the operationalisation of the fiscal 
narrative in measuring technologies and the development of collective action to ‘leverage’ 
private capital. The description shows how unequal power relations and a ‘strategically 
selective’ (or ‘biased’) context impacts the process of negotiation and shapes the 
processes of selection, and eventually the fiscal outcomes as well. 
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6.3.1. Narrating ‘leverage’: ‘impact investment’ to ‘counteract austerity’ 
The Rikers Island project articulated a specific approach to fiscal policy that sought to 
expand social programmes in a political mood dominated fiscal constraints. This section 
discusses the discursive framing of this strategy in the New York City project. 
Public fiscal deficit and private capital surplus 
As in the Peterborough case, the central ‘problem’ from the New York City Mayor’s 
Office, from a fiscal perspective, was managing the conflict between shrinking public 
expenditure and steady or growing social needs. As the Nonprofit Finance Fund, as 
market creator for SIBs, stressed to me in an interview, SIBs are a way of dealing with 
“shrinking social programming budgets” (Nonprofit Finance Fund, 2015). Project 
advocates emphasised the narrow room for manoeuvre due to strict policy constraints 
dominated by the fiscal conservative argument based on the need to minimise social 
spending. In a “time of fiscal constraints”, the mayor's office argued in a presentation on 
the project (Bringing SIBs to NYC), the project will have no fiscal footprint. In the 
opening sentence of its initial press release announcing the project, the Mayor’s Office 
writes that the New York City Social Impact Bond is “an innovative way to fund 
promising new programs at no cost to taxpayers” (Mayor’s Office 2012).  
The “intermediary” organisation wrote similarly of the “[b]udget constraints” which limit 
the ability of “governments to invest in innovative preventive services” and that “SIBs 
help to address that problem” (MDRC 2013, 5). The think tank McKinsey propagated 
similar arguments in support of SIBs, writing that “government’s existing legacy systems 
tend to focus on remediation, and fiscal constraints can make it tough to introduce 
alternative approaches” (McKinsey & Company, 2012, p. 12). In this context, MDRC 
wrote, “[t]he New York City SIB allows the city government to secure investment for an 
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innovative program in a time of fiscal constraints, and requires it to pay only if the 
program meets its definition of success” (MDRC 2013: 45). In their joint statement on 
the project, following its early completion, Bloomberg Philanthropies and Goldman 
Sachs framed the SIB once again as having “allowed the government to take serious steps 
to help find the right mixture of policy prescriptions to address a pressing policy priority 
in a time of budget constraints” (Bloomberg Philanthropies & Goldman Sachs, 2015). 
SIBs “unlock [a] new source of capital for government”, says an interviewee with 
Bloomberg Philanthropies (personal communication, 2015).  
These examples show how the topic of fiscal constraints played an important role in the 
NYC SIB discourse. The project accepts the narrow limits imposed upon social policy by 
dominant positions regarding fiscal constraints. Yet, while the SIB accepts the austerity 
narrative and policies, it also avoids a determinism implying the need for welfare 
retrenchment. This is achieved by avoiding a strict argument based around the idea of 
resources scarcity, and instead acknowledging the problem as resource maldistribution, 
but as we shall see below not one to be addressed through progressive taxation. As the 
quote above says, public fiscal deficit sits aside a private capital surpluses. 
As MDRC writes: “Private wealth that could be directed at [social] problems is at an all-
time high — banks are seeking to invest in their communities, donor-advised funds house 
more than a billion dollars in wealth, and a new generation of philanthropists has pledged 
billions more to social purposes” (MDRC, 2016b, p. 22). This statement describes the 
increasing readiness among societal actors, to re-conceive private wealth as being a 
potentially constructive force in the achievement of public goals. 
The resonance of the NYC SIB has to do with this effort to present a fiscal strategy that 
appears as an alternative to public spending cuts. In the articulation of the fiscal strategy, 
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the NYC SIB frames a counter-movement to the contraction of public funding, namely, 
the expansion of private investment. Linked to this is an argument that the SIB does not 
reduce welfare services, but shift from remedial to preventative ones, expanding the latter 
as the use for the former recedes.35  
This frame was not only offered by direct actors such as Bloomberg Philanthropies, but 
also by organisations that describe themselves on the progressive end of the political 
spectrum, and which otherwise call for policies of de-commodification and social 
protection. The Roosevelt Institute, for example, supported Social Impact Bonds, despite 
their commodifying logic, on the grounds that they writing that “[i]t is incumbent upon 
progressive policy leaders to not only consistently make the case for robust funding, but 
also advance ideas that can generate the most value for citizens in an increasingly 
resource-constrained environment” (Bosserman, 2011) SIBs, they continue, “hold the 
potential to be one of those ideas” (ibid). 
SIBs received support across the political spectrum, with a progressive narrative framing 
the narrow policy corridor as the result of political forces (i.e. ‘deficit hawks’), and others 
naturalising these constraints as mere background structure. While the former articulates 
the need to challenge the politically-shaped constraints, the SIB provides a point of 
consensus between liberal and conservative actors in which resource scarcity is replaced 
by the issue of resource maldistribution. The problem is rearticulated as one of how to 
gain access to the capital resources held in private hands. 
                                                          
35 Hence, we can see why Warner and Clifton (2013) conceptualise SIBs as a way for cities to find a 
compromise that try to use financial markets and resources to maintain or even expand services. I believe 
this understates the many constraints that outweigh the openings. This point will be further developed in 
the following chapter. 
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Numerable examples show how the NYC SIB highlighted not only public deficits, but 
also the surplus capital held by private firms and individuals. As the city government’s 
“Fact Sheet” (The City of New York Office of the Mayor et al., 2012) argued: 
“This innovative model brings in new private financing for preventive services, 
especially important in these times of constrained government spending. It aims 
to unlock a new pool of funding – commercial investment – for evidence-based 
social services interventions in New York City and throughout the country”. 
An interviewee from Bloomberg Philanthropies echoed this sentiment, saying: “When I 
think about the possibility of unlocking this entirely new pool of capital for this type of 
intervention, like I, that’s exciting” (Bloomberg Philanthropies, 2015). The Executive 
Director of Friends of Island Academy agreed, saying that a “SIB leverages private 
investment to achieve public good. It’s a whole potential pool of dollars that were 
otherwise completely removed from our universe” (Christine Pahigian quoted in MDRC 
2013: 6). And Bloomberg Philanthropies and Goldman Sachs wrote in post-project 
assessment that they’re “proud to have opened up a new pool of capital to enable 
governments to bring more promising social service approaches to young people in need” 
(Bloomberg Philanthropies & Goldman Sachs, 2015). 
MDRC too described SIBs as “innovative financing arrangements that aim to increase the 
pool of money available for preventive services” (MDRC, 2013b). In an interview with 
them the interviewee told me, that “[i]f we’re to secure more resources for this purpose – 
which was a big goal for us going in – we have to get those private investors involved” 
(personal communication, MDRC, 2015). 
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In the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco's newsletter Community Development 
Investment Review, Third Sector Capital Partners presented the argument in the same 
way, writing: “Given the challenges of today’s funding environment for the nonprofit 
sector, the multiple benefits of SIB, and the opportunity to access new pools of capital, 
the social impact sector should feel compelled to investigate the development and 
application of the social impact bond here in the United States” (Von Glahn & Whistler, 
2013, p. 68). Media reports echoed this message, with the New York Times writing of the 
Rikers SIB: “The program is financed by an innovative mechanism called a social impact 
bond, one of a handful of ways that philanthropy is trying to tap new pools of funding to 
produce measurable social results” (New York Times, 2012b). 
The reference of ‘new pools of capital’ have an interesting way of structuring discourses. 
Implicitly, the idea acknowledges that public fiscal deficits is not a problem of scarce 
resources, but instead, one of uneven distribution. The flipside of public fiscal deficit is 
private capital surplus. Yet, instead of government using taxation to absorb such surpluses 
and raise revenue, SIBs opt to incentivise holders of surplus capital to supply these 
resources, yet on the basis of potentially receiving profitable returns. 
Incentivising private investment by commodifying social provisioning 
While the SIB acknowledges the uneven distribution of capital between public and private 
sectors, and seeks to put it to socially-beneficial use, it rejects taxation as a mechanism of 
revenue generation and for the expansion of social protections as a service model or value. 
Instead, the NYC SIB gained access to these oft-cited “new pools” of capital through 
commodification, that is, by turning social policy “outcomes” and the “performance” of 
service delivery into a purchasable product, under the misnomer “bond”. This “mutation 
of privatisation”, as Whitfield (2012a, 2015) calls it, involved the commodification of 
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social policy performance rather than the delivery organisations themselves, is framed as 
a way to draw private capital in for addressing public needs. 
The government's active effort to enlist private capital in projects focused on “creating 
social change” (see section above on the social change narrative), signifies at least 
symbolically, a deviation from neoclassical orthodoxy. State interventionism, aimed at 
addressing the clear social divisions, contrasts conceptually with the ideas of supply-side 
economics and trickle-down theory, which claims that “a rising tide lifts all boats”. It does 
so however, without (re)turning to a Fordist-Keynesian or social democratic models of 
tax-generated revenue and redistribution and the associated expansion of social 
protections. Instead, the state accesses private surplus capital by commodifying social 
policy performance and offering SIB "Bond" holders (i.e. investors) the prospect of 
profitable returns. This is what the language of ‘new pools of capital’ forecloses. This 
expresses what Jayasuriya called an effort to create “public responsibility within modes 
of market governance” (Sprague, 2010), and typifies the ‘third way’ politics of a 
compromise between orthodox neoliberalism and social democracy. 
As we saw in the previous section as well as in the Peterborough case, the model of “social 
impact” advanced by the SIB precipitates the deepening of control and a workfare regime, 
not the strengthening of solidaristic ties, nor the strengthening of social protections 
against the vagaries of the market, but rather the weakening of social rights and the 
strengthening of notions of market citizenship (Jayasuriya, 2006). 
The NYC was to address the public funding gap by accessing the capital surpluses that 
have accumulated in the private sector by creating a capital flow that allows them to 
circulate through the social sector in such a way that avoids their “absorption” through 
redistributive “transfers” by social protections for people at the bottom of the socio-
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economic hierarchy, a process that is put in motion by the profit-motives of investors (the 
“Bond” holders) in the social policy outcome of the recidivism-reduction programme. 
This strategy was articulated in the language of “mobilising”, “harnessing”, or 
“leveraging” private capital “for public good.” Goldman Sachs, the single investor in the 
New York City project describes the Social Impact Bond, for example, as an “innovative 
approach to harness private sector financing for important public initiatives” and as a 
“new type of instrument that enables the public sector to leverage upfront funding from 
the private sector” (Lloyd Blankfein  quoted in MikeBloomberg.com 2012). Friends of 
Island Academy also frame the SIB with the same words, saying: “A SIB leverages 
private investment to achieve public good. It’s a whole potential pool of dollars that were 
otherwise completely removed from our universe” (Christine Pahigian quoted in MDRC 
2013: 6). Bloomberg Philanthropies, who mitigated Goldman’s risk on its investment 
through a large loan guarantee (discussed below), described the SIB as a “financing tool 
that leverages private investment for government projects" (Katie Appel Duda quoted in 
MDRC 2013: 6).  The "independent evaluator", Vera, used the same words to describe 
the way government accesses private capital in the SIB, writing that it "leverages private 
funding to finance public services" (Vera 2015, Vera 2016: 6).  
The term ‘leverage’ is central to the SIB discourse, which avoids tax-based revenue 
generation, and relies on profit-based investment. By ‘leveraging’ private capital, 
commissioners are liable for ‘outcome payments’ in larger sums than the original ‘loan.’ 
This common frame was also articulated by indirect policy actors, such as the White 
House, which wrote of “Pay for Success bonds” that “leverage philanthropic and other 
private investors to provide services for a target population that measurably improve the 
lives of individuals while also spending taxpayer dollars wisely”(Office of Management 
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and Budget, White House, 2012). Media reports commonly re-used this language, with 
Reuters (2012) directly citing central stakeholders, for example Goldman, saying “We 
believe this investment paves the way for a new type of instrument that enables the public 
sector to leverage upfront funding from the private sector.” 
But this language is not created out of thin air, but instead organically picks up on popular 
desires to give private excesses a social function, without however reducing/harming the 
private owners. “Mobilising” and “harnessing” are positive words, just as “leverage”, 
which has a particular use in the financial industry, meaning to “borrow”. 36  Though 
borrowing is not completely accurate due to investor risk in a SIB arrangement, and may 
have a negative connotation in a policy context dominated by austerity, where public debt 
is a dominant concern. “Leverage”, “mobilise”, and “harness” have neutral or positive 
qualities that draw organically on popular attitudes, yet simultaneously, through their 
opaqueness, hide the transformations of the practices. 
It selectively borrows the progressive idea about imbalanced resources and the need to 
put surpluses to social use, doing so however, in such a way that follows the neoliberal 
logic that avoids having capital be absorbed “unproductively”, it is supposed to generate 
both more social efficiency and capital growth.   
In this arrangement, “leverage” meant from the state’s perspective, using “borrowed” 
private capital to finance preventative services, and using a portion of the expected public 
savings resulting from the expected reduction in more expensive remedial services, to 
repay the “lenders” or “Bond” holders a return on their investment. This idea is meant to 
enable government to attract the so-called “new pools” of capital accumulated in the 
                                                          
36 The Investopedia entry for “leverage” describes it in terms similar to that of “borrowing” (Investopedia, 
2003). The advantage of this term in the context of austerity politics, is that it refrains from implying 
debt, associated with public borrowing. 
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private sector by offering monetary incentives. As a fiscal strategy, the state sought to use 
the profit-motives of private investors for its own goals of driving “innovation” in the 
social sector, namely, by achieving cost cutting productivity gains in the form of cashable 
savings, which would then be “shared” between the public authorities and private 
investors. As the US National Advisory Board on Impact Investing wrote (2014, p. 16), 
government could “raise revenue” by acting as a “market maker” by stimulating and 
incentivising investment of private capital, by “creating [monetary] incentives to direct 
private capital”. The state incentivised private investment from Goldman Sachs in the 
Rikers Island Social Impact Bond by offering the investors the prospect of profitable 
returns, which would be paid by the government, through the Department of 
Correction. As The Osbourne Association's Executive Director Elizabeth Gaynes said in 
an MDRC report, it is a matter of “private investment, which is repaid by the government 
if it is successful” (Elizabeth Gaynes, Executive Director, The Osborne Association 
quoted in MDRC 2013: 6). The motivation of investors is their monetary self-interests, 
as well as in the case of Goldman Sachs, the improvement of their public image following 
their role in the financial meltdown of 2008. 
Efficiency gains and shared savings 
According to this argument, “leveraging private capital” does not simply fill a funding 
gap, but creates revenue beyond the sum of the original investment. Therefore, the next 
link in the discursive chain of the fiscal strategy advanced in the New York City case is 
that of increased productivity of the “social sector” with the hope of efficiency gains, 
which will create monetary cost savings for the government. These are important 
elements, as private investment is secured through the prospect of profitable returns, 
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which are expected to be paid out of new government resources resulting from more 
efficient services. 
As Andrea Glick of the Mayor's Office (The City of New York Office of the Mayor, 
2013) wrote: 
“The SIB model utilizes private funding to fund certain social service initiatives, 
which are intended to have cost savings for government. In a SIB setting, 
government funds are utilized only if the human services-related initiatives meet 
pre-established outcomes, and actual government funds are saved due to that 
initiative meeting the outcomes. If the outcomes are met, the resultant cost savings 
are used to not only fund the initiatives in the long term, but to also to return the 
private investors’ outlay of initial funding.”  
One interviewee from Osborne articulates this point by saying that SIBs in the U.S. 
are “expanding things that already exist” and that “if the potential of cost savings is there 
and real ... it gets the scaling off the ground...” (personal communication, The Osborne 
Association, 2016). These “savings”, the Mayor's Office wrote, “can be recaptured” 
(Bloomberg, Michael & Gibbs, Linda, n.d.), and shared. “Increased success”, we read in 
the initial announcement, expressed in “bigger reductions in reincarceration”, it says, 
“will result in greater savings to the City and consequently, greater payments to MDRC”, 
the intermediary organisation responsible for repayment of Goldman Sachs’ investment 
in the case of a successful outcome (The City of New York Office of the Mayor, 
2012). The Department of Correction, the Mayor's Office clarifies, “will be obligated to 
pay for these services only if the ABLE program achieves predetermined reincarceration 
reduction targets that produce cost savings for the City” (Bloomberg, Michael & Gibbs, 
Linda, n.d., p. 6). And an interviewee at MDRC explains in similar terms that: 
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“success in the case of these early SIBs is determined by cost-savings. So, there's 
gotta be savings associated with it. The program in effect has to pay for itself from 
its result. So reducing recividivism means fewer days in jail which has a cost 
savings, and as the numbers increase you reach a point where you can actually in 
theory, reduce, close a wing, reduce part of a dorm, have some effect on fixed 
costs” (personal communication, MDRC, 2015).  
Then the interviewee distances himself from the project, and says: “That's at least the 
theory of how this would work” (ibid). He ends his thought explaining that this argument 
is a political framing in a specific (and constrained) political context: “Cost savings, 
whether they're realised or not, I don’t know, it’s theoretical, it’s not like, it’s not a direct 
result of what you do here, but it has to be believable enough for everybody to agree that 
this makes sense” (personal communication, MDRC, 2015). Whether it “makes sense” 
appears to this interviewee to be an open question, revealing a passive consensus to ‘social 
investment market’ strategies in a context of a political standstill.37 
6.3.2. Measuring ‘leverage’  
The fiscal strategy of the New York City was not only framed discursively, but also 
transformed into knowledge practices and technologies that allow for the selection and 
organisation of data, its categorisation, and its measurement. This involved establishing 
rules for the government’s acquisition of private resources, and their distribution to 
                                                          
37 McKinsey also relativizes the cost-savings claim, revealing their interest in SIBs to be their organisation's 
perception that they enable the expansion of preventative services: "Much of the discourse on SIBs 
emphasizes the financial savings that government may realize by replacing more expensive remedial 
programs with less expensive preventive interventions. However, multiple funding streams, limited data 
systems, and lack of cross-agency coordination may inhibit government’s ability to fully recognize the 
financial savings from a SIB. While some stake- holders describe this as more an accounting problem than 
a savings problem, in our view, SIBs are primarily a vehicle for scaling up a preventive program that 
delivers significant social impact rather than a reliable source of cost savings." (McKinsey & Company, 
2012, p. 18) 
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service organisations based upon expectations and guidelines for courses of action. It too 
involved specific rules for the practices of these organisations, whose activities are 
supposed to affect and reduce public expenditures. These rules also referred to the 
potential distribution of a certain portion of these ‘savings’ to the investors according to 
specific reductions in recidivism and in specific sums. 
Attracting private capital 
The New York City Social Impact Bond negotiated a £6.8 million [$9.6 million] 
investment from Goldman Sachs. These funds were delivered to MDRC to fund the 
ABLE intervention. The City writes that “[i]n this approach, there is no upfront cost to 
the taxpayer, instead: Goldman Sachs funds the project’s delivery and operations through 
a $9.6 million loan to MDRC” (The City of New York Office of the Mayor et al., 2012). 
These funds will go towards “the intervention, fully funding the ABLE program at Rikers 
Island during its implementation” (Bloomberg, Michael & Gibbs, Linda, n.d.), over a four 
year time span (MDRC, 2016b, p. 4). MDRC contracted the service delivery to Osborne 
who subcontracted some of the work to Friends, with the funds being used for their 
operating expenses. 
Estimating Savings 
The fiscal strategy was to expand preventative services to reduce remedial expenses – 
especially fixed costs in the operation of Rikers Island facility – and to share these savings 
between city government and Goldman Sachs as a return on their investment. As an 
interviewee with MDRC said: “So reducing recidivism means fewer days in jail which 
has a cost savings, and as the numbers increase you reach a point where you can actually 
in theory, close a wing, reduce part of a dorm, have some effect on fixed costs. That's at 
least the theory of how this would work.” (personal communication, MDRC, 2015) 
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The city hoped to reduce expenses by limiting readmissions into Rikers Island and set a 
concrete target. “[B]ased largely on the historical size of the target population in Rikers 
Island jail”, MDRC wrote, the City and the organisation could “identify the level of 
impact that would justify the program’s cost. In other words, it became possible to 
identify how large the impact would need to be for the city to realize enough savings to 
repay the initial investment.” (MDRC: 2013 12) They concluded “the city would need to 
see at least a 10% average reduction in future jail time” (ibid). 
The DOC calculated that over 3,700 adolescents (between 16 and 18 years) “were 
admitted into DOC custody on Rikers” (MDRC: 13), with a readmission rate of 47%, 
who on average “will spend more than 200 days in jail over the next six years (in addition 
to his or her current stay), an average of 34 days in jail each year.” (MDRC 2013: 13). It 
calculated that “it can save approximately $4,600 per jail bed” but much larger savings 
per unit if reductions were achieved on a larger scale, “approximately $28,000 per jail 
bed for reductions of 100 beds or more” (MDRC Financing: 15). At this scale, they could 
slash fixed labour costs MDRC writes: “If it could eliminate 100 beds or more DOC 
would be able to close a housing area, which in turn would allow the agency to lower its 
staffing needs (in this case, by reducing spending on overtime for uniformed 
staff)” (MDRC Financing: 15).  
Whereas the Peterborough SIB focused on reducing “reconviction events”, the New York 
City project’s “primary outcome of concern” was the “number of days young people 
spend in jail”, sometimes called “future jail days”, “future bed days” (MDRC 2013: 17), 
or “readmission bed-days (RBDs)”, which are defined as “a jail bed occupied by a young 
person on a second or subsequent stay on Rikers” (MDRC 2013: 19). 
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A target of 10% less RBDs, it was calculated, would require that minimally 9,240 
people must participate in the ABLE programme during the first four years (MDRC 2013: 
15), a time-frame decided upon by the main stakeholders. This figure was based on data 
about the historical effectiveness of the cognitive behavioural programme ABLE (ibid), 
the “average weighted impact” being 11.4% (MDRC 2013: 24). 
Because of the time-lapse required for reductions of incarcerated youth to effectively 
impact the DOC budget, the agreement was set for a four-year time frame. "It takes time 
to serve enough people to produce a broad enough effect for DOC to need 100 fewer 
beds", MDRC wrote (MDRC, 2013a, p. 15). Specifically, the calculations saw actual 
budgetary savings not occurring within the first three years, even if the first three cohorts 
achieved the 10% targeted reduction. MDRC writes that “a 10% reduction in jail bed use 
results in nearly invisible cost differences for Year 1 through Year 3; substantial savings 
do not appear until after Year 3” (MDRC 2013: 15). Yet, Goldman Sachs' contribution 
was guaranteed for the first three years, the fourth was conditional, depending upon 
evaluation results from Vera on the effectiveness of the ABLE programme to reduce 
RBDs: “[t]he SIB guarantees financing for the first three years, but investors must make 
a decision to continue financing the program for the fourth year” (MDRC 2013: 17). 
Impact targets and ‘shared savings’ 
With a 10% reduction in RBDs, the city was to repay the original investment. The DOC 
would return $9.6 million to Goldman Sachs and the City would keep up to $1 million in 
net savings (Bloomberg, Michael & Gibbs, Linda, n.d.; MDRC, 2013a, p. 19; The City 
of New York Office of the Mayor et al., 2012). The DOC “pays MDRC based on reduced 
re-admissions and the associated cost savings and MDRC then pays the private investor” 
(Bloomberg, Michael & Gibbs, Linda, n.d.). It “will be obligated to pay for these services 
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only if the ABLE program achieves predetermined reincarceration reduction targets that 
produce cost savings for the City” (ibid). Because the investor in the NYC project was a 
“traditional investor” (MDRC 2013: ES-9), rather than a “social investor” as in the 
Peterborough case, the Rikers Island SIB sought to mitigate the risk for the investor. 
Instead of a “sharp distinctions between repayment and total loss”, the NYC project 
offered the investor a partial pay-off in the case the project missed its recidivism target, 
promising to return half of the original investment if the project only reduced recidivism 
by 8.5% (ibid). (In this case, the City could expect to achieve up to $1 million in net 
savings.) Yet if on the contrary, the ABLE programme achieved reductions above 10%, 
the investor and the city could both expect larger financial benefits, with a total possible 
“success payment” at 20% recidivism reduction at $11,712,000 for Goldman Sachs and 
a "net projected taxpayer savings" of over $20 million (Bloomberg, Michael & Gibbs, 
Linda, n.d.; MDRC, 2013a, p. 19; The City of New York Office of the Mayor et al., 2012). 
6.3.3. Producing ‘leverage’ 
While the above description explains the ‘leverage’ arrangement for assessing and 
organising ‘shared savings’, this arrangement could only be finalised after the investor 
secured additional measures to further reduce its risk capital. The first additional measure 
involved a third-party loan guarantee in the case the project failed to hit its ‘impact’ target. 
This loan guarantee was offered by the mayor’s organisation, Bloomberg Philanthropies, 
in the amount of $7.2 million (GBP 5 million). This grant reduced the potential loss of 
the financial giant’s investment from $9.6 to $2.4 million (GBP 1.67 million), if ABLE 
failed to meet its target (The City of New York Office of the Mayor, 2013). (See 
also  MDRC 2016b, 4; Center for American Progress 2012, 14).  
MDRC writes: 
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“In most loans, the bank uses the likelihood of repayment to calculate its level of 
risk. In the New York City deal, the profit Goldman Sachs could receive was not 
high enough to justify the high level of risk it perceived regarding repayment of 
the $9.6 million loan. The city was willing to agree to a maximum profit of $2.1 
million. In an effort to balance the risk/reward trade-off, Bloomberg 
Philanthropies provided a $7.2 million grant to MDRC to act as a loan guarantee 
and reduce Goldman Sachs’ risk. This loan guarantee ensures that Goldman 
Sachs will only experience a partial loss if the program fails to produce the 
required impacts. The loan guarantee does not eliminate Goldman Sachs’ risk; it 
only reduces it.” (MDRC 2013: 24-25). 
Bloomberg Philanthropies committed to a £5.1 million [$7.2 million] loan guarantee for 
Goldman’s £6.8 million [$9.6 million] investment. This reduced Goldman's actual risk 
capital from £6.8 to 1.7 million. In the case of programme success, the loan from 
Bloomberg Philanthropies to MDRC will be used by held by the latter organisation and 
earmarked for future pay-for-success programmes (MDRC 2013: 25). 
The second measure was also taken by Bloomberg Philanthropies, and involved a grant 
to MDRC for its costs incurred for its ‘intermediary’ work. These often overlooked costs 
removed a direct expense by the City government, but meant that the SIB was being 
subsidised by a third party and not fully funded by the SIB financing mechanism, as 
claimed. 
As “evaluator” Vera would assess RBDs in a “quasi-experimental evaluation” comparing 
the outcomes of the ABLE programme cohorts to a historical comparison group (MDRC 
2013: 20). The selection of the control group will use the same method as used in the 
Peterborough programme, namely, Propensity Score Matching (MDRC 2013: 20). The 
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cohorts will be evaluated at 12 and 24 month intervals, and the investor – rather than city 
government – will have the opportunity to decide whether it would like to continue the 
project for a fourth year (MDRC 2013: 25). 
6.4. Governing the economic crisis: the strategy of producing ‘shared value’  
This section describes the third dimension of the New York City case, namely the 
‘economic dimension’. As described in Chapter 2, this concerns the way the NYC SIB 
responds to economic problems and seeks to restore profitability and accumulation, while 
simultaneously addressing issues of capital concentration and material polarisation. Here, 
it is situated within the processes of economic restructuring since the beginning of the 
‘multiple crisis’ in 2008. 
My account builds upon the theoretical work done by Dowling and Harvie (2014), 
wherein SIBs represent a ‘promise’ to resolve the ‘capitalist accumulation crisis.’ In the 
context of slow growth, opening the “potential” of social policy “to provide new 
investment opportunities for capital”, it is assumed that this may help “drive economic 
growth and restore profitability” (Dowling & Harvie, 2014, pp. 5–7). But I expand the 
focus to show how this first aspect of economic management is connected to an equally 
important second aspect, namely to reduce economic polarisation. The critical political 
economy literature understands the accumulation crisis as one of over-accumulation, 
identifying its cause in the structural socio-spatial unevenness and instability inhering in 
the capital relation. As Harvey (2010, p. 45) explains, the breakdown of capital circulation 
in the global financial crisis was the result of an incapacity to productively link surplus 
capital with surplus labour, which sat idly side by side. But the economic strategy of SIBs, 
as I show here, involves not just growth, but the effort to create ‘inclusive growth’. As an 
economic strategy then, I focus not only on the effort to restore economic growth, but the 
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idea of ‘producing shared [economic] value’, which aims to ‘blend fiscal and social 
returns.’ 
As in the previous sections, this one is organised into three parts, with the first analysing 
the economic discourse of ‘shared value’. The second section describes how these are 
translated into knowledging and governing practices for measurement purposes. The third 
and final section describes the social practices used towards delivering the shared value 
objectives.  
As in the previous sections, I focus on the ambiguity of these efforts, the presence of 
multiple narratives and strategies, including both an orthodox neoliberal strategy of 
market-based profitability schemes, as well as its alternative, focusing rather on use value 
instead of exchange value. I describe the encounter between these competing strategies, 
and the production of a consensus between them, a provisional compromise that 
nevertheless contains yet subdues persistent tensions, and eventually displaces unresolved 
problems. 
6.4.1. Narrating the economic strategy: ‘creating shared value’ 
The NYC SIB’s discursive intervention into the economic crisis has two parts, namely 
economic growth and shared prosperity. The production of ‘shared value’ is meant to 
create ‘blended returns’ with ‘financial and societal benefits’. 
Value Creation 
A critical component of the SIB’s economic narrative is the creation of value, expansion, 
and growth. The NYC SIB offered private investors the possibility of increasing their 
wealth. As described below, Goldman Sachs could expect a profit of £356,000 [$500,000] 
on its original £6.8 million [$9.6] investment if recidivism was reduced by more than 10% 
at Rikers Island, and a return of up to £1.5 million [$2.1 million] if reduced by 20% (Von 
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Glahn & Whistler, 2013, p. 60). The message of profitability was expressly articulated in 
the media with The Atlantic (2015) titling its article on the project, “A New Investment 
Opportunity: Helping Ex-Convicts”, the Washington Post (2013) asking “Can Investors 
Make Money in Social Services?”, Reuters (2013) writing that “Wall Street Sees Social-
Impact Bonds as Way to Do Good and Do Well”, and a New York Times (2013a) opinion 
article describing the SIB as “An Investment Strategy in the Human Interest”. 
The idea of expanding investor values in the SIB arrangement, was based on a well-
established practice within neoliberal governance regimes through the transfer of public 
assets into private hands (Harvey, 2005, p. 161). As investor in the New York City SIB, 
Goldman Sachs had the opportunity of increasing its capital by ‘capturing’ a portion of 
government savings that could accrue from cost-cutting efficiency reforms in social 
policy. 
As the McKinley think tank explains: governments are “capturing [financial] benefits” of 
SIB programmes and “ [r]epaying investors from realized cash savings” (McKinsey & 
Company, 2012, p. 37). In the words of the city, profits come 
from “capturing government savings that result from successful preventative programs 
and other initiatives” (The City of New York Office of the Mayor, 2013). These profits 
are paid by the government which “capture[s] savings when a less expensive preventive 
program replaces a more expensive remedial program” (McKinsey & Company, 2012, p. 
37). In this arrangement, “a dollar value can be attached to the [social policy] outcome” 
(MDRC, 2016b, p. 10) to be shared with investors. To do so, the government 
must “quantify likely savings” in order to calculate the pay-out of “public dollars” 
(MDRC 2016: 12) to private investors. McKinsey writes: “Social impact bonds (SIBs) 
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monetize social outcomes by capturing the value between the cost of prevention now and 
the price of remediation in the future” (McKinsey & Company, 2012, p. 66).  
The transfer of public assets into private hands is promoted through the commodification 
of social policy performance. This involves the construction of a ‘new asset class’ (Center 
for American Progress, 2012, p. 29; JP Morgan Global Research, Rockefeller Foundation, 
& Global Impact Investing Network, 2010) whose value is based on the risk versus returns 
assessments of the ‘outcomes’ of a specific social policy intervention. This new product 
is a financial instrument providing investors ‘exposure’ to the performance of particular 
social policy projects. 
Yet, as I now go on to explain, the narrative of value creation is not limited to the financial 
rewards that would accrue to investors alone, but under the term ‘shared value’, implies 
mutual benefit for both private investors and public authorities, so that the latter complete 
the deal with a net fiscal savings after having made ‘outcome payments’ to investors. 
Value sharing 
Though I’ve presented value creation and value sharing in separate sections, the idea of 
value sharing is not secondary to value creation, but conceptualised and situated within 
the project as an intrinsic component of value creation. 
Against the background of a ‘negative compromise’, where increasing financial returns 
were achieved for a decreasing minority of people through the reduction of living 
standards for a growing majority (in the lead up to the 2008 crisis), the SIB claims to go 
beyond such a destructive zero-sum game, presenting an ‘imaginary solution based on the 
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idea of ‘shared value’. This ‘positive compromise’ presents the idea of a financial 
instrument that brings mutual benefit for investors, government, and the investees.38 
Framed as a ‘public-private partnership’ (Olson & Phillips, 2013, p. 97), the SIB was said 
to bring mutual advantages for the private investors, government, and society. In an 
interview, Alicia Glen of Goldman Sachs frames the company’s social investment 
projects in terms of mutual benefit for the firm and society, saying:  
“Smart, progressive banks do not need to be an oxymoron. (…) We’re trying to 
use our capital to do important and interesting things. On our projects, if they don't 
make money, then nobody’s going to do more of them. If we make solid returns 
and have made a significant contribution, we’re going to get more money” 
(Goldman Sachs, 2013). 
Responding specifically to the poor public image of Goldman Sachs since the 
government’s rescue of the firm, she says: “We’re not all evil squids. We’re nice little 
calamari” (ibid).39 
Glen seeks to frame the firm in direct contrast, as being mutually beneficial to both its 
investors and society, involved in projects that create ‘shared value’. Yet the economic 
strategy of the SIB is not solely driven by investors, but also by a certain regulatory 
approach advanced by government, which is trying to guide private investment into SIBs 
and similar impact investment markets as forms of ‘responsible’ or ‘inclusive’ economic 
strategies. This is an important aspect of the New York City SIB, as Goldman participated 
                                                          
38 Erik Olin Wright discusses the difference between "negative" (i.e. “zero-sum”) and "positive" (i.e. 
“mutually beneficial”) compromises (Wright, 2012). 
39  Glen is responding to a specific remark by Matt Taibbi, which received wide coverage and was deeply 
situated in public consciousness, namely: "The world's most powerful investment bank is a great 
vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything 
that smells like money” (Taibbi, 2010). 
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in the project through its Urban Investment Group (Olson & Phillips, 2013), which invests 
funds exclusively in state-sanctioned ‘community reinvestment’ activities. As a recipient 
of government stimulus funds following the financial meltdown of 2008, Goldman was 
required to invest a portion of its capital into such CRA-defined projects. Hence, the SIB 
was not built solely on the profit-motives of the individual investor alone – in this case 
Goldman Sachs – but through state efforts to build “shared value” projects, market-centric 
initiatives that are supposed to bring social and financial rewards for society as well as 
investors. 
“Shared value” is a central element of the economic argument of the NYC SIB, for it 
promises not only social benefits to society, e.g. through reduced reincarceration levels, 
but also net fiscal savings to government and private financial rewards for the investor. 
This monetary benefit results from the fact that the investor absorbs only a portion of the 
gross government savings expected from the ABLE programme, leaving a share to 
government as net savings. The Center for American Progress writes, for example, that 
only “[a] portion of any financial savings that result from an outcome being successfully 
achieved will be used to pay back investors for sharing the risk and providing the upfront 
capital to get the initiative off  the ground” (Center for American Progress, 2012, p. 15). 
New York City government articulated the same argument writing that just “[a] portion 
of these cost savings will be returned to MRDC [sic] to both repay the upfront investment 
and provide a potential return on investment” (The City of New York Office of the Mayor, 
2013). And Third Sector Capital Partners wrote that “investors receive a pre-determined 
payment representing a share of the cost savings for the government” (Von Glahn & 
Whistler, 2013, p. 60). 
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6.4.2. Measuring ‘shared value’ 
The discourse of ‘shared value production’ presented above, was transformed into 
knowledging practices and technologies to conceptualise, organise, and structure data and 
social practices related to it in the NYC SIB by developing an internal relation between 
private profitability and social improvement, by pinning investor outcome payments to 
social policy performance (Dowling and Harvie 2014: 13). This contrasts to the traditional 
charitable operation or even corporate social responsibility, where profitability and 
contributions to social improvement were activities external to each another. With SIBs, 
we can take this argument one step further. Not only is the profitability of private investors 
dependent upon the achievement of ‘social impact’. It is also dependent upon the SIB’s 
creation of financial rewards for public authorities, ‘shared’ between government and 
non-governmental investors. This goal involves measuring technologies to quantify total 
savings in relation to different levels of ‘social impact’, to proportion the division of sums 
between public authorities and private investors, and to determine time-frames for 
potential pay-outs. 
The financial instrument bringing these elements together in NYC was the social policy 
derivative, as it provided investors with ‘exposure’ to the performance of a particular 
social policy project. As Bryan and Rafferty (2014, p. 892) explain, “with derivatives, 
one trades in the performance (shift in the quantum) of an attribute of a thing, but without 
necessarily trading in the ‘thing’ itself”. This ‘thing’ is ‘social impact’, designed in the 
NYC case to be the reduction in recidivism, measured according to the ability of ABLE 
to reduce “readmission bed-days”. 
Sources of value and profit 
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As in the Peterborough case, the sources of private profit in the NYC case were to come 
from savings from reduced recidivism. Whereas the Ministry of Justice was to pay 
investor return from cross-departmental savings expected to result from fewer 
“reconviction events”, the New York City Department of Correction was to pay outcome 
payments generated from a more narrowly focused budget, namely from the operational 
savings at Rikers Island resulting from reduced “future bed stays”. As MDRC 
wrote: “Gross taxpayer savings are purely operational savings within the jail 
system” (MDRC 2013: ES-8, 19), and it is a portion of these that would be returned to 
the Goldman Sachs in the case of a positive social outcome. 
Yet, in both cases we see the subsidisation of investor returns. Whereas the BIG Lottery 
Fund subsidised the Ministry of Justice's outcome payments in the case of a positive 
social outcome, Bloomberg Philanthropies acted as a third party in the NYC case to 
provide outcome payments in the case of a negative social outcome. That is, while the 
Department of Correction held full responsibility for paying investor returns in the case 
of “social impact”, the mayor’s personal (purportedly charitable) organisation drastically 
minimised the investor’s loss in the case of ABLE’s failure. 
6.4.3. Producing ‘shared value’  
The intended plan for shared value production was published by the Mayor’s Office, 
MDRC, and Goldman Sachs (Bloomberg, Michael & Gibbs, Linda, n.d.; MDRC, 2013b; 
Olson & Phillips, 2013; The City of New York Office of the Mayor et al., 2012). In a 
table published in documents published by all of these actors, they listed the different 
payoff levels and corresponding government net savings for eight potential levels of 
recidivism reductions. MDRC and the NYC Mayor’s Office generated the figures in the 
table “Summary of Payment Terms by Impact”. The table lists in three columns the 
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“recidivism reduction rate”, and the corresponding “Department of Correction Success 
Payment” and “Net Projected Taxpayer Savings”.40 
This table (MDRC, 2013a, p. 19) provides the following figures: Investors would break 
even if they reduce recidivism by 10% and the city would achieve up to £700,000 [$1 
million] in net savings (after making outcome payments). Between 8.5 and up to 10% 
investors receive 50% of their investment back, and the city would receive a net savings 
up to £700,000 [$1 million]. This was meant to present a gradual, rather than sharp, drop 
off in repayments in order to mitigate investor risk. At 10% reductions Goldman would 
retrieve its full investment. Between 11 and 20% reductions, it would receive an 
increasing share of the expected savings, between £7.1 and £7.9 million [$10 and $11.7 
million] as a maximum possible pay-out: at 11% reduction, they receive £7.1 million [$10 
million] back on their original £6.8 million [$9.6 million] investment, with the city 
retaining £1.2 million [$1.7 million] in savings. At 20% reductions the investor would 
receive £8.3 [$11.7 million] and the city £14.6 million [$20.5 million]. In figure 4 
(below), we see the figures of investor returns and government savings for different levels 
of reductions. 
                                                          
40  According to the table, this net savings "accounts for the DOC success payment and continued program 
operation for two additional years (Year 5 and Year 6)". 




Figure 4 - NYC SIB Pay-out and savings (MDRC 2013: 19). 
6.5. Contradictory outcomes of the New York City SIB 
In this chapter, I described the strategy of the New York City SIB in the crisis conjuncture 
of neoliberal hegemony. As described in chapter two, I was concerned about the iterative 
process of political economic development and changes in hegemony as seen through the 
policy development of the ‘social investment market’ and the effort to advance new 
approaches through the idea of an ‘ethical capitalism’. I analysed the policy as an 
intervention into three ‘objects’, namely the social, fiscal, and economic crisis, as 
described in the methodology chapter (chapter three). This involved efforts to reshape 
these objects through three modes of steering. I explained this discursive and material 
structuration process by focusing on discourse, knowledging technologies, and social 
practices. But, following the theory of hegemony presented in chapter two, I discovered 
within the policy process a set of conflicts between competing ideas about how to reshape 
these objects, challenging the notion that policies follow a singular logic. Drawing on 
HMPA, I presented the case as an encounter between competing ‘hegemony projects’ 
with diverging ideas about preferred forms of social, fiscal, and economic restructuring. 
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As described in detail in the following chapter, this was an encounter between market-
centric conceptions of policy on the one side, advancing individualist solutions to social 
crises, austerity approaches to fiscal challenges, and private investment schemes to 
address economic problems. But drawing on HMPA, I also showed the SIB to be a 
‘strategic terrain’, perceived by advocates of market-constraint, for the pursuit of goals in 
the opposite direction. Though these were more diffuse, they nonetheless were present, 
for example, in discursive fragments representing incarceration as a socio-economic 
problems. Progressive perspectives were also seen in the way fiscal problems were 
conceptualised as a problem of resource distribution, rather than according to an austerity 
scarcity logic. And these were also seen in narrative of ‘shared value’ which points in the 
direction of an economy based on human need, rather than centred on the accumulation 
of exchange value.  
In the present chapter I also showed, however, the way ‘structural selectivities’ shape the 
terrain upon which strategic action takes place and limit the possibilities for change. 
Actors supporting the different ideas represented above did not encounter one another on 
symmetrical grounds but instead had different resources for the operationalisation of their 
goals. But this did not occur through the exclusion of the opponent (alone), but also 
through their selective incorporation and reworking in order to correspond with a market-
centric structure of politics, and particular interests. Hence, the process of ‘complexity 
reduction’ created a passive consensus and provisional compromises favouring neoliberal 
governing practices, just as it was based on a material substratum allotting certain 
(limited) concessions to the junior partners in such alliances. The incorporation of 
progressive actors into such arrangements is a reflection of their weak status in the overall 
balance of social forces and the specific political context, and their weak steering 
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capacities due to their fragmentation. Progressives are able to achieve certain immediate 
material concessions, but their capacity, through the use of strategic action, to achieve 
larger goals and shift the political trajectory was shown in this case study to be strictly 
limited. This concluding section describes these dynamics in detail. 
6.5.1. Social outcomes: no impact on reincarceration levels 
As in the Peterborough case, the New York City Social Impact Bond was prematurely 
terminated. However, rather than external factors, the NYC SIB collapsed because of 
internal factors, namely its failure to achieve the slightest reduction in reincarceration. In 
its evaluation of the project, Vera (2015b) described the Rikers Island programme as 
having no effect upon recidivism: “The change in recidivism for the eligible 16- to 18-
year-olds, adjusted for external factors, was not statistically significant when compared 
to the matched historical comparison group,” the group wrote. The SIB “did not reduce 
recidivism and therefore did not meet the pre-defined threshold of success of a 10 percent 
reduction in recidivism bed days” (ibid). The organization found no difference between 
“the number of days that members of the study group were held in the jail during the 12 
months following their release from Rikers” compared to a group which did not 
participate in the ABLE programme (Vera Institute of Justice, 2015b, 2016b). Neither 
was the missed target due to low participation rates (which was 87%), nor poor 
performance as 44% of participants reached at least one ‘milestone’ (Vera Institute of 
Justice, 2015b, 2016b). Vera did not discuss reasons for programme failure in this report. 
The failure to create ‘social impact’ led Goldman to decide against a final year of 
behavioural therapy, and terminated the SIB on August 31, 2015 (Vera Institute of Justice, 
2016b, p. 21). As described in the next section, no outcome payment was made by the 
city to the investor, limiting the public’ fiscal liability to a minimum. However, the 
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investor had its risk capital steeply reduced through a loan guarantee issued by the 
Mayor’s personal foundation, Bloomberg Philanthropies (see below). 
As described above, the NYC SIB failed to reduce recidivism through the use of 
behavioural modification therapy at Rikers Island. Similar to Peterborough, it focused on 
personal behaviour, but it was even more narrow in it removal of material factors from 
consideration in any regard. Yet, as the project was completed, competing assessments of 
its failure led to new tensions in the policy coalition and the breaking up of the passive 
consensus underlying it. The Osbourne Association (2015) placed blame for the failed 
project on its narrow focus, emphasising the need for “comprehensive services and 
support”, and identifying the socioeconomic issues as a central problem, such as the 
inability of “many [persons] to afford bail”. The youth needed more services, including 
“mental health care, drug treatment and housing assistance” to ensure their resettlement 
in communities (WNYC, 2015). It was “irresponsible to provide one service to children 
in jail, and not to provide any kind of discharge planning or support upon release”, an 
interviewee at the organisation told me (personal communication, The Osborne 
Association, 2016). 
The project’s individualist focus was also criticised by some media voices: The local news 
website, City Limits (2015), also questioned “whether the experiment framed the policy 
issue properly”. It criticised the focus on social skills, the city’s “mass arrest policy” and 
called for an approach to the social crisis based on “public investment in schools, jobs, 
social programs and innovative criminal justice” (ibid). The labour union AFSCME 
(2015) criticised the SIB in a similar way, writing it “limited the conversation about 
solutions”, privileged “interventions” that “do not address the root causes” such as 
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“structural inequalities” which instead “require investments and policy changes on 
multiple levels”.  
But these social critiques were marginalised by an individualist framework advanced by 
the Mayor’s Office, Bloomberg Philanthropies, Goldman Sachs, and other actors of the 
‘social finance industry’ (Rosenman, 2017) who dominated the SIB discourse. 
MDRC defended “cognitive behavioural therapy” and placed the blame on Rikers’ 
“challenging environment” (MDRC, 2015b). Discontinuities and disruptions due to 
security issues and the conflicting social pressures (such as gangs) make it difficult for 
persons to internalize and practice “personal responsibility and sound decision making” 
(MDRC, 2016b, p. 6). One interviewee with MDRC emphasised the difficult for people 
with “weak social capital” (personal communication, MDRC, 2016a). Goldman Sachs 
and Bloomberg Philanthropies (2015) framed the conversation on the popular liberal 
website The Huffington Post in a similar way, arguing the problem was the difficult social 
“environment” of the prison facility. The organisations defended behavioural approaches 
and praised the “unique financing model” which “stands ready to help public sector 
leaders finance more efforts to better serve people who need support and better results” 
(ibid). Another Huffington Post (2015) article defends the behavioural approach and 
criticises its “implementation”, calling the SIB a “good failure” which is “a step on the 
path to progress”. 
If SIBs are supposed to test the effectiveness of different possible social programmes, the 
market mechanism selecting for the most competitive programme, and project 
management and measurement techniques placed under a mechanism to select for the 
most effective ones, one may conclude that the behaviourist programme may come under 
criticism, and that alternative programmes might be considered. But the discursive 
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boundaries were defined by advocates of individualist rather than structural approaches, 
which constrained the learning process and potential for change, leading to techno-
managerial tinkering with the narrow model. 
6.5.2. Fiscal outcomes: hidden costs 
As a fiscal strategy, the NYC SIB was framed as a way to address contradictions within 
a narrow fiscal policy corridor where “tight fiscal constraints” collided with intensifying 
social crises. In this context, city government sought to address reincarceration rates and 
refused to accept the narrative of capital scarcity. The SIB allowed it instead to 
acknowledge the problem as one of resource maldistribution, in which public fiscal 
deficits stand alongside private capital surpluses. However, the City refused to generate 
revenue for these interventions by taxing the “new pools of capital”, and instead sought 
to address the unmet needs of “underserved communities” by “leverag[ing] private capital 
for public good” through a private incentivisation scheme. 
Because of the financial mechanism the negative social outcomes were intended to protect 
the public from financial risks. MDRC (2015b) wrote: “[T]he program did not lead to 
reductions in recidivism for program participants and the program did not meet the target 
required for the City to pay the investors”. According to Vera (2016b, p. 21) then, “the 
social impact bond funding mechanism operated as intended”. MDRC (MDRC, 2015b) 
wrote similarly, that “the City is not paying for a program that did not produce results — 
a positive outcome for the City and taxpayers”. Goldman Sachs and Bloomberg 
Philanthropies also wrote that in the case of missed social targets, “the investor loses their 
money with no burden on taxpayers” (Bloomberg Philanthropies & Goldman Sachs, 
2015).  
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These statements are strongly misleading. While it is true that no outcome payments were 
made by the Department of Correction, there were other financial flows that were not 
accounted for in the total costs of the programme, but are saddled by other parties, 
including public authorities or philanthropies. First, neither MDRC’s expenses for project 
management nor those of Vera for project evaluation were covered by Goldman (MDRC, 
2013a, p. 53). MDRC’s operating expenses were covered by grants from Bloomberg 
Philanthropies, as one MDRC interviewee (2015a) told me. This raised the overall cost 
of the project which was not covered by the investment. Nor were Vera’s expenses 
covered by the investment but were instead quietly absorbed by city government. I found 
no documentary sources of this transaction, which was revealed to me only by an 
interview partner at Vera (personal communication, Vera Institute of Justice, 2016a). 
These hidden administrative costs convey an inconsistency in the fiscal strategy where 
programme costs are not saddled by investors but absorbed in unknown sums by public 
authorities and third party actors. But this problem is not addressed by post-project 
evaluations, and is likely to persist in future SIB projects.41 
6.5.3. Economic outcome: private absorption of philanthropic resources 
In this third dimension of the NYC SIB, I look at the outcome of the economic strategy 
of creating ‘shared value’. As explained above, the Department of Correction was not 
responsible to pay Goldman outcome payments on the failed social project. However, if 
public authorities were not to mitigate investor risk, Goldman secured a significant loan 
guarantee from Bloomberg Philanthropies to drastically lower its financial losses. As 
discussed above, the investor had its losses reduced to 17% of its principal  (Bloomberg 
                                                          
41 Hidden administrative expenses, not accounted for by investors, has only been discussed at the margins 
of the literature of the ‘social finance industry’ (McKinsey & Company, 2012) and by critics (see 
McKay, 2013, 2014). 
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Philanthropies & Goldman Sachs, 2015). The exact financial outcome for the firm could 
not be exactly determined, due to tax breaks discussed above, and require further 
investigation. The main conclusion in regards to the economic strategy is however that 
the investors were able to limit their risk exposure by absorbing philanthropic resources.42 
Hence, as in the Peterborough case, the economic practice of the NYC SIB did not 
produce ‘shared value’, but instead shifted resource to investors to limit their financial 
damage from a failed investment. 
6.6. Conclusion  
This chapter analysed the first Social Impact Bond in the U.S., developed in the aftermath 
of the financial meltdown of 2008 and the persistent crisis of neoliberal hegemony, and 
which was implemented between 2012 and 2015 at Rikers Island jail in New York City. 
The SIB has been conceived at the intersection of three developments concerning social, 
fiscal, and economic policy. The first regards social regulation, and the expansion of 
“preventative” services to address the social crisis of mass incarceration, caused by 
economic recession and welfare retrenchment. I’ve framed this as a form of poverty 
management rather than alleviation, which provides intentionally narrow, psychological 
and behavioural modification, to prevent people in precarious socioeconomic and 
repressive situations from returning to jail. While this decarceration goal appears as a 
corrective to established pattern of ‘prisonfare’, and the limited roll-back of the 
penalisation of poverty, it involves the roll-out of invasive control mechanisms, seeking 
to minimise the risk of re-offending by making personal coping strategies more effective, 
                                                          
42 Unfortunately, this issue could not be further investigated as Goldman Sachs did not respond to 
repeated interview requests. 
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rather than alleviating the negative pressures causing the cycle of incarceration in the first 
place.  
The failure of the ABLE programme to reduce reoffending in New York City has 
provided the opportunity for a critical assessment of individualised poverty management 
approaches, yet the assessments produced by the dominant policy actors limit the bounds 
within which lessons might be learned, that could take policy makers to assess the socio-
economic and criminal justice policies causing high rates of reincarceration among low-
income young men of colour. 
The project’s fiscal strategy also reflects a broader political effort to address public sector 
funding gaps caused by austerity, and the increasing need for public assistance. This 
involves the effort to incentivise private investment to fill public funding gaps, aimed at 
financing necessary services, thought to create “shared savings” for public authorities, 
which can be shared with private investors as return. While this strategy appears as a 
corrective to a strict policy of fiscal consolidation and welfare retrenchment, the narrow 
ABLE programme failed to produce the hoped for savings. Contrary to claims that 
financial risk would be shifted onto the private sector, Goldman had its losses sharply 
reduced by public and third-party actors who absorbed partial losses for the ineffective 
program, through development grants, and a substantial loan guarantee. 
The economic policy outcomes constitute the third and interlinked dimension of the 
project. Here, the SIB was framed as a way of “creating shared value” in a situation of 
low and uneven growth benefitting top earners at the expense of the vast majority of the 
population. Here the SIB expresses the idea of the social investment market in creating 
“blended social and fiscal returns”, of aligning investor and societal interests, and 
achieving a harmony between these in place of a zero-sum game. This discourse also 
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resonates because it appears to be a needed corrective to both the economic slump and 
the destructiveness of many aspects of neoliberal accumulation, particularly in the 
aftermath of the foreclosure wave, the financial meltdown, and the loss of jobs, personal 
savings, and pensions. However, I have shown the third party risk mitigating measure and 
public absorption of programme costs did not materialise the idea of “shared value”. 
Goldman’s losses were largely absorbed through the shifting of public and third party 
assets into the investor’s hands, as a form of what Harvey calls “accumulation by 
dispossession.” 
Yet, despite the NYC project widely missing its social impact target, SIBs appear to “fail 
forward” (Peck, 2012b, p. 6), allowing “manifest inadequacies [to] animate further rounds 
of neoliberal innovation”, rather than reflection and a change of policy direction. This 
point is discussed in the following chapter. 
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7. Chapter 7 – Analysis: SIBs and the contradictions of ‘progressive 
neoliberalism’ 
This chapter presents my main research findings about SIBs as part of the struggle over 
hegemony in the context of neoliberal crisis. It advances the thesis that SIBs may be 
understood as a ‘progressive neoliberal’ compromise. 
My research investigation is concerned with the changes and challenges to neoliberal 
hegemony during the post-2008 crisis conjuncture, as described in chapter 1. As I stated 
there, my aim was to elucidate the efforts to advance an ‘ethical capitalism’ in the face of 
the deep disruptions of market governance and the blocked transition of a post-neoliberal 
development. I selected the ‘social investment market’ as my object of research and 
conducted two case studies of social impact bonds, in Peterborough U.K. and New York 
City. These described efforts to link market modes of governance with new notions of 
public responsibility. I investigated these concrete policy experiments as an encounter 
between competing ideas and visions of societal restructuring, and at the intersection of 
social, fiscal, and economic policy. I described as SIBs contingent assemblages between 
market-centric ideas on the one hand, and efforts to re-embed the economy in forms of 
public accountability. The analysis focused on the negotiation between different 
approaches, in setting the discourses, knowledging technologies, and social practices that 
determined how social, fiscal, and economic objects of intervention were to be governed. 
I showed how the achieved provisional settlements rested upon power imbalances in the 
situation, and how uneven outcomes were produced. Finally, I discussed the way these 
compromises tended, in many ways, to displace rather than resolve the problems they set 
out to address. 
This section takes this analysis further by proposing that SIBs, the ‘social investment 
market, and the idea of ‘ethical capitalism’ be understood as a ‘progressive neoliberal’ 
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compromise, based on asymmetrical power relations, producing uneven outcomes, and 
whose status is instable. This thesis counters two dominant positions in the literature on 
SIBs and wider research on ‘ethical capitalism’. Namely, it challenges on the one side, 
the popular conception of SIBs as a harmony between government, market, and society 
(presented especially in the literature of the ‘social finance industry’ (Rosenman, 2017)), 
as well as their conception in one-side terms as the ‘colonisation of society by finance’ 
(Chiapello, 2015) (see also Dowling & Harvie, 2014; Schram, 2015; Whitfield, 2012b)). 
Instead, I argue that SIBs are an encounter, negotiation, and contingent assemblage of a 
provisional and asymmetrical compromise (with uneven outcomes) between multiple 
‘hegemony projects’, each seeking to use the policy as their ‘strategic terrain’, for the 
achievement of their opposing political visions of restructuring. They favour market-
centric forms of restructuring while simultaneously offering advocates of progressive 
alternatives some material concessions in the pursuit of their goals of re-embedding the 
economy in political and ethical considerations. 
The chapter advances this thesis in the following way. First, I discuss how I used my 
theoretical and methodological approach to analyse my research object. This discusses 
the use of CPE to conceive of the dynamic process of development, the production of 
hegemony, the role of discourse and structuration, and the idea of provisional 
compromises. These are enhanced, as described in chapter two, by historical materialist 
policy analysis, both by its concept of ‘hegemony projects’ and in its understanding of 
policy as a ‘politico-strategic terrain’ to advance them. 
Afterwards, I provide a case comparison to depict the contours of the ‘progressive 
neoliberal’ compromise, as an asymmetrical and unstable settlement between an 
‘orthodox neoliberal’ hegemony project on the one side and a ‘progressive post-
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neoliberal’ one on the other. In the final section I discuss the future of SIBs, between 
‘failing forward’ and breaking apart. 
7.1. Theoretical and methodological reflections: Cultural political economy and 
historical materialist policy analysis 
This section describes my operationalisation of the cultural political economy approach 
and historical materialist policy analysis, as described in chapter two. It explains how I 
arrived at my unique research findings through CPE’s dynamic theory of hegemony 
production as an iterative and contradictory process of development, and HMPA’s 
concern with competing ‘hegemony projects’ and the notion of policy as a ‘politico-
strategic terrain’ for their advancement. This section sets the ground for the main part of 
this chapter, where I present SIBs as an asymmetrical and unstable ‘progressive 
neoliberal’ compromise advancing the orthodox neoliberal hegemony project through the 
incorporation of selected elements of its ‘progressive post-neoliberal’ alternative (Peck et 
al., 2010, p. 112). 
In my analysis, I described Social Impact Bonds as part of the iterative process of post-
2008 political development and the renegotiation and reproduction of hegemony. This 
drew on CPE and HMPA’s common theoretical bases in Marx’s critique of political 
economy and Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, and their mutual borrowing from 
Foucault’s understanding of knowledge and power, as described in chapter 2. SIB’s were 
contextualised as a response to the manifold crisis of neoliberalism, and as a response to 
three aspects of it. 
The theory of cultural political economy was critical for the investigation of SIBs as it 
allowed me to locate this policy as part of the conflictual reproduction and reconstruction 
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of hegemony following the financial meltdown of 2008. Its theory of change and stability 
allowed me to analyse SIBs as part of the contestation between competing crisis 
discourses and efforts to re-shape the forms of future political economic development. 
CPE’s concept of hegemony was critical for the investigation because of its attention to 
the way consent was produced out of the multiple perspectives and among competing 
social forces. Its focus on both the discursive and material moments of these processes 
helped me to reconstruct the policy as a dynamic process. I was able not only to identify 
competing narratives within the policy process, but also show how this variation was 
reduced, and how these ideas were transformed through knowledging technologies and 
supported specific kinds of social practice and forms of collective action. In doing so, I 
was able to provide thick descriptions of how a coalition of actors in government, the 
private sector, and society came together to respond to multiple problems by linking 
market modes of governance with new notions of ‘public responsibility’. 
My analysis followed a central idea of CPE, namely, that hegemony struggles are fought 
around ‘objects of intervention’, which competing actors seek to discursively and 
materially remake through different modes of steering. I identified three central objects 
of steering through an iterative process combining deductive and inductive reasoning, 
drawn from theory, literature reviews, and from my own data analysis, as described in 
chapter three. These objects included the ‘social’, ‘fiscal’, and ‘economic’ crises. My 
analysis described not the selection of these objects for discursive and material reshaping, 
but the struggle between diverging positions as to how these should be reshaped, in two 
case studies in Peterborough and New York City. 
I analysed such processes in the case studies with reference to three modes of steering, 
namely discourse, knowledging technologies, and social practices. This allowed me to 
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reconstruct the process of ‘complexity reduction’ whereby consensus was formed out of 
a multiplicity of perspectives, and social compromises were achieved between multiple 
actors, including their material substratum.  
But this framework of analysing the encounter, negotiation, and compromise between 
competing views was made more specific by the enhancement of CPE by HMPA. The 
latter allowed me to identity the political character of the diverse positions advanced by 
the different actors and to present their compromises as provisional settlements between 
competing political visions. This was possible through the latter’s concept of ‘hegemony 
projects’, and its understanding of policy as the ‘politico-strategic terrain’ upon which 
such projects are advanced by competing actors. 
In particular, I revealed SIBs to be a political encounter between an orthodox neoliberal 
hegemony project seeking restoration through expansion, a progressive post-neoliberal 
project seeking, in various ways, to re-embed the economy in notions of public 
responsibility and forms of public accountability. This research finding was achieved by 
reliance on HMPA’s heuristic theorizing (Beauregard, 2012), which is concerned with 
the categorisation of complexity according to political content. As described in chapter 
two, this involves identifying elements of the analysed processes and relating them to the 
competing political forces involved in the dynamic restructuring of the political economy.  
This allowed me not only to identify the central policy object around which the 
restructuring was occurring in the case studies, but the competing visions of this 
restructuring, and the concessions each ‘hegemony project’ accepted in the achievement 
of compromise. This is elaborated in the sections below. As we see there, I focus on the 
‘social’ object of intervention (incarceration) as a contest between competing ideas of 
‘social impact’, namely, between social fragmentation belonging to orthodox 
   
240 
 
neoliberalism, and social protection belonging to progressive post-neoliberalism. I argue 
similarly that the struggle over the fiscal object of intervention is a competition between 
progressive ideas of public-private rebalancing on the one side, and ideas of neoliberal 
austerity on the other. Finally, I argue that the concept of ‘creating shared value’ equally 
is a contest around an economic object of intervention, and the negotiation between 
progressive ideas of need-based economy, and those of private accumulation of a market-
centric project. 
Furthermore, I drew on both CPE and HMPA’s understanding that this encounter and 
negotiation occurs on an uneven terrain of a biased context with ‘structural selectivities’ 
favouring certain strategies over others (see chapter two). This provides certain 
advantages to some strategic over others but it does not determine outcomes. This allowed 
me to both identify the often overlooked ‘progressive’ elements in these projects, while 
simultaneously identifying their constraints. I described SIBs as a provisional and 
unstable compromise between social forces in aftermath of the financial meltdown, the 
persistent crisis of neoliberal hegemony, and the continued blockage towards a 
progressive post-neoliberal transition. In the concluding chapter, I argue that this 
asymmetrical compromise is a contingent assemblage of the immediate post-2008 
political conjuncture, and may be understood as a form of ‘passive revolution’, whereby 
elements of neoliberalism’s opposition are selectively integrated into it as an attempt to 
achieve its restoration. At the same time, I argue that advocates of a progressive post-
neoliberal hegemony project may have found circumscribed advantages in such 
provisional alliances. Yet, ten years since the financial crisis, such assemblages may be 
coming to an end, as the political context appears to be changing. 
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7.2. Competing hegemony projects in the case studies 
The previous section presented the main thesis of this chapter, namely that SIBs are a 
provisional and unstable ‘progressive neoliberal’ compromise in the context of the crisis 
of neoliberal hegemony. Before demonstrating this thesis through the case comparison, it 
is helpful here to frame the following discussion. As discussed above, I analyse SIBs in 
relational terms. In the case comparison I explain efforts to link market governance with 
notions of ‘public responsibility’ as a relationship between competing hegemony projects. 
Conceived as ‘politico-strategic terrain’, I argue that SIBs are perceived by different 
actors as holding potential advantages for them, as well as limitations, in which they 
become involved in, with the aim of operationalising immediate, mid-term, or long-term 
objectives. I describe SIBs in the following case comparison as an encounter and 
negotiation between policy actors of different hegemony projects, competing over the 
“[f]orms of restructuring” and “the future trajectory of the state” in its integral sense (Hay, 
1999, pp. 330–331). This allows me to present an alternative explanation to a static 
conception of SIBs as a policy ‘instrument’ in terms of a singular, closed, and harmonious 
arrangement of ‘aligned interests’. Instead, I emphasise the contingent assemblage of 
diverging ideas, drawing attention to difference, conflicts and contradictions within this 
policy. I present SIBs as a social relationship between two opposite hegemony projects, 
and their provisional compromise. The SIB is an encounter and struggle between 
advocates of market expansion on the one hand, who work together on a provisional basis 
with actors seeking to ‘re-embed’ the economy (Polanyi) in structures of public 
accountability, on the other. These competing initiatives are described as belonging to an 
‘orthodox neoliberal’ hegemony project on the one side and a ‘progressive post-
neoliberal’ (Peck et al., 2010, p. 112) hegemony project on the other.  
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The orthodox neoliberal hegemony project is understood as an effort to increasingly 
expand market modes of governance into evermore areas of social life (Gill, 1995; 
Harvey, 2005; Jessop, 2002b). Brenner, Peck, and Theodore (2010b) define neoliberalism 
as “market-disciplinary regulatory restructuring”. This project advances deregulation, 
privatisation, the roll-back of social protections, commodification of public goods, 
financialisation, de-unionisation and the internationalisation of production and policy-
making. It involves the centring of market ideas in politics and the de-centring of ethical 
concerns, or as Davies (2017, p. 6) writes, the “disenchantment of politics by economics”. 
Since 2008, neoliberal hegemony has been advanced through fiscal austerity and welfare 
retrenchment, which have socialised losses and privatised gains. 
The second hegemony project which I identify in the case studies is the ‘progressive post-
neoliberal’ hegemony project. (Peck et al., 2010, p. 112) spanning from market-
restraining to market-transcending initiatives (N. Brenner, Peck, & Theodore, 2010a, p. 
341). These include neo-Keynesian economic proposals to ideas about a Green New Deal 
(Jessop, 2012), efforts to expand social protections, de-commodify social goods, debt 
cancellation, progressive taxation, investments in public works, democratisation of policy 
making, and social and ecological transformation (Brie, 2009; Institut für 
Gesellschaftsanalyse, 2011; Kannankulam & Georgi, 2014, p. 66; Solty, 2011). It 
includes “social democratic, solidaristic, and/or eco-socialist model[s] of regulation” (N. 
Brenner et al., 2010a, p. 342). Such ideas are present in social, labour, and environmental 
movements, as well as being diffused throughout society’s governing and civil society 
organisations. Since 2016, they have influenced political parties as well, with the U.K. 
Labour Party’s leftward shift under Corbyn’s leadership (Seymour, 2016), and the U.S. 
Democratic Party due to the pressure of Sanders’ grassroots movement (Rehmann, 2016). 
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The case comparison below describes how elements of each of these hegemony projects 
are present within the cases. It does so by showing how each of them seeks to discursively 
and materially reshape the social, fiscal, and economic objects of intervention. In doing 
so, I describe not only the encounter between competing perspectives, but also the 
compromise between them. 
This compromise constitutes the third hegemony project analysed in the cases. It 
represents what Fraser (2017a, 2017b, 2017c) calls ‘progressive neoliberalism’, meaning 
an asymmetrical ‘alliance’ between parts of each of the two hegemony projects discussed 
above. This refers here to the ‘third way’ politics of the 1990s, described in chapter 4, 
which emerged during ‘second wave neoliberalism’ (see chapter 4), and which sought to 
combine markets with ideas of public responsibility. It calls for a ‘responsible capitalism’ 
(Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 430), and includes a range of initiatives and ideas: corporate 
social responsibility, social economy, social capital, the ‘post-Washington Consensus’ 
(Jenson, 2010), and a specific conception of social inclusion through the labour market. 
The concept of ‘alliance’ or ‘compromise’ conceives such projects as the linking of 
competing ideas, rather than as homogenous singularities. In the case comparison, I 
explain how a progressive neoliberal strategy is pursued by linking opposites, and 
reworking ideas through this process. In doing so, I am also concerned with the 
contradictions, tensions, and displacement of problems as the outcome of these contingent 
assemblages. 
In table 1 I present these three hegemony projects and their salient features while table 2 
presents their particular approach towards the three central objects of steering which the 
case studies analyse, namely the social, fiscal, and economic crises. These provide 
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reference points for the following case comparison and description of a progressive-
neoliberal compromise. 
Table 1 - Hegemony projects and their salient features 








public sector privatisation, 
welfare roll-back, 
‘workfare’ and 
‘prisonfare’, scalar shift 
from state to society, value 
shift from social security 
to individualisation and 
‘moral behaviouralism’; 
de-unionisation and 
downward wage pressure; 
labour market 
flexibilisation, regressive 






redistribution of societal 
wealth; strong labour 
protections, economic 




capital, social economy, 
neo-corporatist 
‘partnership’ between 






Green economy, etc. 
 
 
Table 2 - How hegemony projects approach three aspects of the crisis 
How hegemony projects approach three aspects of the crisis 
Hegemony 
Project 
Interventions into the: 






containment of the 
poor 
Fiscal austerity, public 
sector cuts, welfare roll-
back, hollowing out 











public and private 
wealth, through public 
capture of private 
surpluses through 
revenue generation via 
Moral, democratic 
economy of mutual 
benefit concerned 
with addressing 
needs, rather than 
value production and 
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7.3. Progressive ideas and market methods – SIBs as unstable ‘progressive 
neoliberal’ compromise 
In this main section of the chapter, I present the thesis that SIBs represent an unstable 
‘progressive neoliberal’ compromise, linking progressive ideas with market methods of 
restructuring. This is achieved through a case comparison. I describe this compromise 
with reference to the three policy objects – the social, fiscal, and economic crises – and 
show how progressive ideas are linked to market modes of governance. In doing so, I 
identify both the achievements and setbacks of each hegemony project to operationalise 
its goals and objectives, and the ways problems are displaced when these are not resolved. 
At a higher level, this analysis describes the presence of alternatives to neoliberalism 
within the project of ‘ethical capitalism’, as well as illuminating their constraints. In doing 
so, I describe ‘progressive neoliberalism’ as deeply contradictory and unstable.  
Social crisis, decarceration, individualisation 
In both case studies, the SIBs targeted deepening social crises since the onset of the 
economic recession in 2008 and the introduction of harsh austerity measures in 2010. The 
particular policy object was each country’s high levels of incarceration. In both cases, the 
effort to reduce prison populations diverges strongly from repressive forms of social 
regulation established by neoliberal governments in both countries since the 1990s. These 
established modes of ‘prisonfare’, which Wacquant (1999, 2009, 2010, 2011) described 
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as the “punitive containment of the poor”, involved the enormous expansion of carceral 
institutions in the U.S. and U.K. (and elsewhere) to deal with growing economic 
marginalisation and shrinking social protections. Deepening social crises since 2007/8 
also triggered the renewal of political alternatives to these repressive practices, focusing 
instead on ensuring economic security through redistributive mechanisms, expanding 
social protections, and achieving social rights. The failure of ameliorative or 
revolutionary alternatives to supplant the instituted practices of repressive social control, 
I showed, were also partially taken up by ideas linked to the  ‘third way’ supporting  
preventative services and social capital, leading  to the idea of ‘social impact’ and policy 
experimentation with Social Impact Bonds.  
The first observation in the case analysis of the social dimension in the New York City 
and Peterborough SIBs, is the expression of a progressive post-neoliberal desire for an 
alternative to repressive social control and punitive containment. Both projects 
problematize mass incarceration, select high recidivism as their ‘objects of intervention’, 
seek to reduce re-incarceration, particularly in the area of blue-collar crime, and in NYC 
in particular, among the disproportionately high level of young men of colour in 
detention. This reversal of ‘tough on crime’ rhetoric was articulated by the U.K. Ministry 
of Justice in its questioning of endless prison expansion and the popular notion that it 
ensures public safety (Ministry of Justice & Social Finance, 2010). This critical attitude 
towards established repressive practices was linked to positive alternatives focusing on 
prevention, broadening the organisation’s view beyond the narrow confines of 
remediation (Ministry of Justice & Social Finance, 2010). 
In doing so, each SIB problematized established modes of repressive social regulation or 
“prisonfare” where city governments manage poverty through “punitive containment” 
   
247 
 
(Wacquant, 2010, 204). This challenge to the political style of ‘law and order’ was echoed 
in the media, with the previously cited entreaty by The Economist to “Let ‘em out, and 
throw away the key” (2010). The shift towards a decarceration policy goal signalled a 
deviation from repressive modes of social regulation developed by city governments 
across the U.K. and U.S. over the past four decades, with policy actors now pushing for 
community re-settlement rather than punitive containment.  
Furthermore, it was possible in both cases for SIB actors to partially challenge 
individualization, as a common narrative and practice of market-centric governance, to 
de-link interdependencies of the social context, and shift responsibility for incarceration 
onto individual persons. Policy documents went so far as to identify structural causes of 
incarceration, repeating in the Peterborough case, the oft-cited socio-economic statistic 
about blue-collar infractions. The Social Finance organization nearly described such 
crimes as crimes of necessity when describing people released from detention having only 
“£46 in their pocket, often with nowhere to live, no job to go to and no family waiting for 
them” (Social Finance, 2011, 6). Structural factors were also identified in NYC, although 
here, SIB ‘stakeholders’ pointed towards the additional political causes behind 
reincarceration. As project manager, MDRC pointed to the role racial profiling practices 
by the police have had on detention numbers, criticising harsh sentencing laws for 
detaining low-level infractions, and high bail costs for keeping low-income population 
groups in corrections custody (MDRC, 2014). Similar statements were made by the 
program’s evaluator Vera (2015a), who said that harsh sentencing laws and money bail 
keeps people locked up ‘because they’re poor’. Service providers made similar comments 
(Friends of Island Academy, 2016; The Osborne Association, 2016). 
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These critical statements may be understood as symbolic interventions against prisonfare. 
But they also legitimate policy decisions over the form of state action, and in this case, 
those kinds focusing on prevention rather than those on punitive containment. In 
supporting preventative services in the context of welfare contraction, the analysis reveals 
not only a discursive renegotiation, but also the ‘material substratum’ underlying this 
social compromise, as service providers receive funds for anti-recidivism programmes. 
However, these compromises involve a mixture of progressive advances and constraints 
upon a decarceration turn in criminal justice policy and more broadly, approaches to the 
social crisis. While such critical ideas co-shaped the SIBs, and secured resources for 
service expansion in a context of contraction, each effort was limited by the continuity of 
the institutional power of neoliberal governance structures, which bracketed out the 
structural causes of incarceration and singled-out personal behaviour. This is seen in the 
way the new goal of decarceration was to be linked to the methods of individualization, 
not through increased social security, but more effective personal coping strategies. In the 
NYC case, power inequalities were revealed inside the ‘cross sector collaboration’, as the 
service intervention was decided by the Mayor’s Office and MDRC, and contracted out 
to the service providers, rather than the latter contributing to the decision-making process 
around goals and policy design. The result was the narrowly behaviourist model instead 
of comprehensive (and more costly) re-entry support including housing and employment, 
for example. 
Criminal justice reformers could not connect their decarceration goal to the redistributive 
methods progressives they favoured to resettle former detainees. That is, decarceration 
was not to be ensured by increasing economic security nor expanding social protections 
from the vagaries of the market, by reallocating resources “from corrections budgets 
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to[wards] education, housing, healthcare, and jobs” (Brown et al. 2012, 96). Instead, 
decarceration was to be achieved by lowering reincarceration risk (Social Finance, 2011, 
19) by improving personal coping strategies, reallocating budgets from remedial towards 
‘preventative services’ (Whitfield, 2015) to ‘re-able’ people. The use of behavioural 
therapy in NYC to persuade detainees to change their attitudes in a context of poverty and 
repression, and the minimal personal support provided to people in Peterborough to 
navigate the benefit system and insert themselves into the low-wage economy, sought to 
compensate for the social conditions of recidivism, despite acknowledging these 
structural causes. Here, the symbolic power of progressive civil society to define 
decarceration goals, met the stiff resistance of stronger actors determining methods of 
individual responsibility (Silver & Clarke, 2014), and social fragmentation conducive to 
market-centric governance. 
Multiple service providers in Peterborough sought to reduce the ‘risk’ of re-offending by 
accompanying ex-offenders through the gauntlet of post-release issues (Nicholls & 
Tomkinson, 2015), including filing for benefit support, offering small housing rental 
loans, providing limited job training (Social Finance, 2011), and by preventing ‘idleness’ 
through trash collecting and other activities (Sova, personal communication, September 
30, 2014). NYC’s approach was even more narrow, which Osbourne and Friends 
contracted to “restructure distorted thinking” through behavioural modification therapy 
to detainees (MDRC, 2013, 29).  
In both cases, the focus on ‘social impact’ reflected common shortcomings of 
‘performance-based policy’, namely a narrow ‘tunnel vision’ and the performativity of 
symbolic practices (Eagleton-Pierce, 2016, pp. 139–140).43 This played out in the NYC 
                                                          
43 A third shortcoming identified by the author is the high administrative costs of design ‘impact’ metrics, 
   
250 
 
case with the fundamental bracketing out of socio-economic and political causes of 
incarceration, including economic recession, racial-profiling police practices, harsh 
sentencing laws and high bails, which contributed greatly to the ‘cycle of re-offending’. 
But the problem went further, with the “antirecidivism programme” (Wall Street Journal, 
2012) stripping the context completely, seeking to reduce offending among people who 
had not been convicted of a crime. As MDRC (2013a, p. 32) explained, 90% of the 
persons in the ABLE programme were “pre-trial detainees”, meaning, “un-sentenced 
young people who remain in New York City Department of Correction [DOC] custody 
while their cases are pending in court”. The tunnel vision of ‘social impact’ produced a 
contradiction wherein an anti-recidivism programme sought to reduce re-offending 
among people who had not been convicted of a crime. This contradiction could only be 
resolved or displaced by reference to technical, juridical language defining ‘offender’ as 
a person who has been detained by the police (Vera Institute of Justice, 2015a) 
(independent of their actual act of committing a crime). 
Whereas the Peterborough case was less extreme in context-stripping, seeking to address 
some immediate material needs, at least in a limited way, it too was afflicted by tunnel 
vision, focusing on a binary measurement of convictions in a quantitative assessment 
based on conviction statistics. This narrow focus tells us little about a persons’ qualitative, 
and socially sustainable re-settlement, or, whether they remain in a situation of economic 
insecurity, and their potential for personal crisis and relapse. 
Table 3 illustrates how the SIBs intervenes in the social crisis as an object of steering. It 
depicts the different elements from the competing hegemony projects, and how they are 
                                                          
monitoring, and evaluating policy, which, as we see in the fiscal and economic dimensions, are often 
paid by the public. 
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incorporated and combined to assemble a ‘progressive neoliberal’ compromise. Read 
from top to bottom, it depicts the process of selecting the different elements (from 
‘approach’ to ‘objective’ to ‘method’). The grey cells identify the incorporated elements 
from the different HPs, while the white cells identify those elements from each hegemony 
project which are excluded or backgrounded.  
Table 3 - SIBs as 'progressive neoliberal' response to the social crisis 
SIBs as ‘progressive neoliberal’ response to the social crisis 
  Hegemony Projects (HPs) 
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Public fiscal crisis, private capital surplus, and ‘impact’ investment 
This section describes SIBs as a ‘progressive neoliberal’ compromise by depicting the 
case studies as an intervention into a second object of governance, namely the fiscal crisis. 
This intervention involves a partial step away from the politics of austerity, by countering 
the argument of resources scarcity with one focused on the maldistribution of resources 
between the public and private sectors. SIBs drew on the progressive argument that public 
fiscal deficits were the flipside of private capital surpluses. However, as I argue here, the 
progressive idea of fiscal rebalancing is constrained by a logic of entrepreneurial 
government focused on private investment schemes. Rather than raising revenue through 
taxation, governments sought to attract private capital by offering investors the 
opportunity profitable returns through the absorption of public assets.  
Following Dowling and Harvie (2014), SIBs were analysed in their fiscal dimension. This 
takes as a background condition for SIB policy emergence, the fiscal crisis of the state, 
caused by the public’s recapitalization of the financial sector following its meltdown in 
2008 (Blyth, 2013), and the state’s revenue fallout due to the economic recession. This 
‘fiscal crisis of the state’ created an ‘urgence’ towards which policy makers and other 
societal actors turned, producing a variety of ideas as to the source of the crisis, ‘imagined 
solutions’, and the correct methods to tackle it. 
The post-scarcity argument was expressed in both the NYC and Peterborough cases. The 
New York City Mayor’s Office (2012) stressed that “in these times of constrained 
government spending” a “new pool of funding – commercial investment” might be 
“unlocked”. Similarly, the U.K.’s Social Finance organization (2011, p. 33) wrote that 
SIBs “can tap into new sources of funding [a]t a time of tight public finances.” In both 
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cases, the argument was made that public fiscal deficits should not be a constraint upon 
social policy – there is an alternative. 
This alternative frame had more than symbolic value. It possessed material implications, 
allowing local governments to adhere to fiscal targets while simultaneously supporting 
services (in a limited manner), thereby absorbing some of the shock effects of drastic 
welfare retraction, for example, with the closure of homeless support and women’s 
shelters in the city (Sova, 2014a). But if this fiscal discourse of unevenly distributed 
abundance pivots around an austerity narrative of scarce resources, and thereby articulates 
elements of a postneoliberal perspective, the means by which this fiscal strategy was to 
be operationalized deeply constrained its potential. This is because, as a fiscal strategy, 
the SIB remained largely within the repertoire of the entrepreneurial governance (Peck & 
Whiteside, 2016), essentially “financializing urban governance” (Lake, 2015), by 
attracting private investment through the possibility of profitable returns, rather than 
generating revenue through taxation. That is to say, instead of reversing measures of 
regressive taxation upon large capital holders, the problem was framed as a ‘liquidity 
squeeze’, and market mechanisms were adapted to incentivize – ‘leverage’, ‘mobilize’, 
or ‘harness’, but not ‘redistribute’ – ‘private capital for public goods’ (Social Finance, 
2009, 2010a). 
However, such a method placed certain fiscal pressures upon the public, because, loans 
from private investors were to be paid with interest if the social impact target is achieved. 
This affected the ability of service values, design, and implementation, focusing on short-
term savings to repay investors. Both the NYC Department of Correction (2012) and the 
UK Ministry of Justice expected their programs to ‘pay for themselves’ with “no cost to 
taxpayers”, the MoJ (2014) expecting enormous savings (see above) “through reduced 
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administrative costs associated with any crime, plus reduced prison costs associated with 
housing an inmate”, and “reductions in court, police and prison costs as a result of reduced 
re-offending”. The NYC Mayor’s Office similarly expected that prison downsizing would 
push down fixed costs associated with inmate housing and labour costs and create 
budgetary savings for the Department of Correction (MDRC, personal communication, 
March 11, 2015). 
In NYC, these short-term fiscal goals shaped the service design, decided, despite the 
project’s ‘collaborative’ frame, without the inclusion of the experienced service providers 
who emphasised long-term and sustainable re-entry requiring housing, employment, and 
other more costly social support (Friends of Island Academy, 2016; The Osborne 
Association, 2016). In Peterborough as well, service expenditures were economised so 
that they would trigger savings in larger amounts, hence contributing to the downward 
pressures on long-term and sustainable re-entry in service design. 
Table 4 illustrates how the SIBs intervenes in the second object of governance, namely 
the fiscal crisis. It depicts the different elements from the competing hegemony projects, 
and how they are incorporated and combined to assemble a ‘progressive neoliberal’ 
compromise. Read from top to bottom, it depicts the process of selecting the different 
elements (from ‘approach’ to ‘objective’ to ‘method’). The grey cells identify the 
incorporated elements from the different HPs, while the white cells identify those 
elements from each hegemony project which are excluded or backgrounded.  
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Table 4 - SIBs as 'progressive neoliberal' response to the fiscal crisis 
SIBs as ‘progressive neoliberal’ response to the fiscal crisis 
  Hegemony Projects (HPs) 
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Economic crisis, responsible market, and social extraction 
The third aspect of the ‘progressive neoliberal’ compromise regards the SIBs’ 
intervention into the economic crisis of capital over-accumulation, as an object of 
discursive and material reshaping. Here, it intervenes into the crisis of slow and uneven 
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growth, providing a ‘progressive neoliberal’ compromise. On the one hand, these projects 
advance the progressive goal of making the economy responsible to society, while on the 
other hand, they adopt and adapt investment practices which rely on the extraction of 
public assets, and result in a mode of accumulation by dispossession. 
Following Dowling and Harvie (2014), SIBs were analysed in economic terms as a 
response to the crisis of capital accumulation and profitability following the financial 
meltdown of 2008. This breakdown in capital circulation related directly to uneven 
economic development where gross imbalances between surpluses on the one side and 
economic scarcity on the other led to disruptions in accumulation processes (Harvey, 
2010).   
The specific economic strategy of SIBs could be reconstructed by referring to existing 
hegemony projects discussed above, and showing how struggles to redefine and 
potentially reshape economic strategies advanced. In analysing the economic dimension 
of the SIBs, we see efforts to construe and construct a compromise between these 
positions, resembling the kind of ‘progressive neoliberal’ formations and initiatives since 
the 1990s. 
This section describes this process of renegotiation of the lines between competing 
projects and reconfiguration of discourses and collective action in New York City and 
Peterborough cases, showing too their power asymmetries and resulting uneven 
outcomes. I first show how the cases advance a (partial) critique of neoclassical 
economics, before showing how these elements of a progressive post-neoliberal critique 
are constrained through their particular reconfiguration of, and experimentation with, 
efforts to ‘create shared value’. 
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The first observation in this struggle over the renegotiation of economic imaginaries and 
practices is the negative moment, of a critique of ‘business as usual’ in SIB literature and 
utterances by their advocates. This involves a partial push back against the idea of the 
self-regulating market, the ‘invisible hand’, homo oeconomicus, and the narrow idea that 
for firms ‘the business of business is business’ (Friedman, 1970). Here, the focus lay on 
the financial sector’s risky overreach, and its negative impact upon society. Finance “got 
a bad rep in the financial crisis”, one Atlantic article writes, but “[t]he Occupy movement 
has tarred Wall Street with a broad brush” (Bank, 2012). As an alternative, SIBs show 
“[h]ow financial innovation can save the world”, the author writes, by “tweaking risk and 
reward” to direct “private capital markets for positive, measurable social impact” (ibid). 
The Economist editor Matthew Bishop articulates a similar position, framing SIBs are “a 
promising opportunity to guide the invisible hand by creating new markets for impact” 
(Bishop, 2014). Directly addressing the uneven rewards of contemporary capitalism, 
economist Andrew Palmer argues that the impact investments in Peterborough and New 
York show how “Creative Finance Helps Everyone—Not Just the Rich” (2015). 
The aim is to expand the market’s societal use value, framing the financial sector as a 
‘service’ industry providing resources to an underfinanced society. A similar frame is 
used by Goldman Sachs, which limits the critique of the financial sector, and harnesses 
the critique to support its ‘urban investment group’. They say: “Smart, progressive banks 
do not need to be an oxymoron. (…) We’re trying to use our capital to do important and 
interesting things. On our projects, if they don’t make money, then nobody’s going to do 
more of them. If we make solid returns and have made a significant contribution, we’re 
going to get more money” (Goldman Sachs, 2013). 
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According to Porter and Kramer (2011, p. 16), concepts and structures of ‘shared value’ 
hold the possibility of transcending “zero-sum competition” by “reconfiguring the value 
chain”. The SIB is one “opportunity to create economic value through creating societal 
value” and such projects, the authors anticipate, “will be one of the most powerful forces 
driving growth in the global economy” in the years ahead (Porter & Kramer, 2011, p. 15). 
The media also participated in redefining financial firms and their potentially positive 
social contribution in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Admitting an initial unease at 
the idea of “inviting venture capitalists into the state human services system”, one article 
in The Seattle Times (2014), frames Goldman’s involvement in a SIB in Massachusetts 
to reduce prisoner recidivism, as an innovative way to re-embed the market, or in his 
words, to “get bankers to pay to reduce prison recidivism”, advocating state governments 
to accept a state bill for SIBs in Washington state. 
Table 5 depicts the way the cases intervened in the third object of governance, namely 
the economic crisis of capital over-accumulation. It depicts how the SIB assembles 
different elements from the competing hegemony projects in order to respond to the crisis 
of slow and uneven growth. It shows how these are incorporated and combined to 
assemble a ‘progressive neoliberal’ compromise. Read from top to bottom, it depicts the 
process of selecting the different elements (from ‘approach’ to ‘objective’ to ‘method’). 
The grey cells identify the incorporated elements from the different HPs, while the white 
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Table 5 - SIBs as 'progressive neoliberal' response to the economic crisis 
SIBs as ‘progressive neoliberal’ response to the economic crisis 
  Hegemony Projects (HPs) 
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7.5. The future of SIBs: Failing forward or coming apart? 
The above description present SIBs, and by extension, ‘ethical capitalism’, as a contingent 
assemblage of countervailing forces advancing on the one side, market-centric ideas of 
neoliberal governance, and on the other hand, market-constraining efforts to embed the 
economy in forms of public accountability. It describes their compromise as provisional 
and asymmetrical. This section discusses their uneven outcomes and whether SIBs 
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experience a future contradictory roll-out in the form of ‘failing forward’, or whether the 
provisional coalition that underpins it is headed for a breakup. 
In the case comparison above, I described the linkage between the progressive idea of 
decarceration and the neoliberal method of social fragmentation and individual 
responsibilisation. I argued too that the intervention into the fiscal crisis challenged the 
austerity notion of scarce resources by pointing out that public fiscal deficits were a 
product of private capital surpluses. However, I showed that progressives could not 
achieve revenue generation through taxation and instead were limited by modes of 
entrepreneurial government which sought to incentivise private investment by offering 
investors public assets as financial rewards. I too argued that SIBs can be understood as 
an intervention into the economic crisis, and that this coupled progressive notions of 
needs-based economy with market-centric practices of extracting public resources 
independently of their social contributions. 
This section discusses the outcomes of these experiments, describing the process of 
‘failing forward’ (Peck, 2012b, p. 6). In both the Peterborough and New York City cases, 
the achievement of social impact was mixed. The extremely narrow service design in 
New York City, based solely on behavioural therapy, failed to achieve any change in re-
entries relative to a control group, and Goldman Sachs discontinued the programme’s 
final year. In contrast, Peterborough reduced ‘reconviction events’ by 9%. However, the 
narrow focus of the project says little about its long-term outcomes. The concerted effort 
to limit levels and kinds of support to minimum for former offenders meant that these 
persons remained in situations of economic insecurity, or were dependent upon public 
benefits and low-wage and precarious employment opportunities. ‘Impact’ is based on a 
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quantitative figure of reconviction figures, not a qualitative assessment of social stability 
or re-settlement, leaving many people’s long-term needs unmet. 
Fiscal outcomes were even less successful than the social ones, in this fusion between 
progressive narrative and a market-centric practice. The attempt to address the 
maldistribution of abundant resources and to make private capital publically beneficial 
was limited by efforts to remain within a market-centric framing which adopted a private 
investment scheme to incentivise profit seeking investors. As a result, both governments 
transferred sizable amounts of public assets to investors despite the failure of either SIB 
to create public savings. 
Whereas investor returns were supposed to be paid from efficiency gains, an evaluation 
of the Peterborough project by Rand Europe described it as “not likely to result in 
substantial cashable savings to the Ministry of Justice or other governmental 
departments” (Rand Europe, 2011, p. 8, emphasis in original). Lower re-entries would 
relieve prison overcrowding but not shrink the facility nor lower expenditures (Rand 
Europe, 2016). Yet, according to the contract, public authorities were responsible to pay 
investor outcomes if the social impact targets were hit. In the absence of cashable savings, 
these payments will expand the MoJ budget rather than shrink it, and increase the public’s 
contribution to investors through Big Lottery Fund, directly contradicting the project’s 
goal of creating ‘shared savings’ (Ogman, 2016). 
This shortcoming was anticipated by the project, with the Ministry of Justice’s outcome 
payments being subsidized by a third-party, the BIG Lottery Fund, which would “top up” 
the MoJ’s £3 million payment with £5 million of its own (Centre for Social Impact Bonds, 
personal communication, December 1, 2015). Insofar as the SIB expands public 
expenditures, it deepens rather than relieves the conditions of fiscal crisis that gave rise 
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to it. This outcome directly contradicts the SIB’s intended fiscal strategy, where, instead 
of shared savings, we see investors accruing capital in a zero-sum game through the 
absorption of public assets, without taxpayers achieving gains for themselves. Instead of 
the SIB allowing the public to ‘harness private capital’ to offset its funding gaps, the 
relationship was inverted, with the public subsidizing investor returns (Huckfield, 2014). 
This problem resulted in the institutional development of governmental “top up funds” to 
transfer public assets to private investors to subsidize future outcome payments (Ogman, 
2016). 
In the New York City case, we witness similar public-to-private sector asset transfers, 
contradicting the SIB’s fiscal objective. Instead of ‘transferring risk from the public to 
the private sector’, investors had their financial loss drastically reduced by third-party 
subsidies, despite failing to achieve social objectives. A substantial loan guarantee from 
Bloomberg Philanthropies covered two-thirds of Goldman Sachs’ principal, reducing its 
risk capital by more than 80% (Bloomberg Philanthropies & Goldman Sachs, 2015). 
Further transfers were made through subsidies from Bloomberg Philanthropies to MDRC 
for project management (MDRC, 2013a), and from the city to the evaluator, Vera, through 
an external grant (Vera Institute of Justice, 2016a). Such underwriting lowered the 
investor’s actual financial contribution to the project, and raised the financial burden on 
public and third-party actors. These concealed transactions show how fiscal assets flow 
from the public towards private sector, directly contravening the objectives of the SIB 
project. 
In the end, the partial discursive shift in fiscal narrative from scarcity-necessitated-
constraint to unevenly-distributed-societal-abundance did not effect a similar institutional 
shift for indebted government strategies to secure private surpluses, which instead 
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continued to repay private investors through public asset sales at an often zero-sum loss 
to the public (see more below). For this reason, the compromise is construed as 
asymmetrical, and the outcomes as uneven. 
For the projects’ economic outcomes, neither one achieved its goals of creating ‘shared 
value’. The progressive idea of linking economic activities to socially beneficial practices 
did modify financial flows, with investors supplying up-front funding for public 
interventions, with returns pinned to performance upon recidivism levels. However, in 
neither case, did investors truly take on risk. In both cases, risk mitigation schemes 
prevented it from being shifted from the public to the private sector. This lowered the 
investors’ actual risk and protected its principal in the case of failure. 
In NYC, where the project failed to create ‘social impact’, investors did not lose their 
investment but instead had their loss strongly reduced by the large loan guarantee from 
Bloomberg Philanthropies and city government grants. In Peterborough, where ‘social 
impact’ was achieved, though no savings were achieved, investor returns were secured 
by public subsidies from the Big Lottery Fund and the MoJ. In both cases, the SIBs failed 
to create a mutually-beneficial outcome of ‘shared value’ and transcend the zero-sum 
game. Neither project ‘aligned the interests’ of public and private actors, and instead, 
extended the practice of uneven accumulation strategies associated with neoliberal 
accumulation. 
In summary, these case studies show that the Social Impact Bonds did not replace a 
‘negative’ compromise of a zero-sum game with a mutually-beneficial, ‘positive’ one 
(Wright, 2000) among all partners. Within the context and timespan of these projects, and 
given the existing relation of forces shaping their parameters of action, the progressive 
drivers of innovation, while pointing to potential new goals of market governance, are 
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deeply constrained by other local, regional, and national actors, with established power 
holders seeking to only narrowly modify existing modes of entrepreneurial governance 
arrangements. 
Hence, these findings suggest that SIBs represent neither a clear unidirectional expansion 
of market rule or the “colonization by finance” (Chiapello, 2015) into the social, nor the 
re-embedding of the economy in public accountability structures, but instead an 
asymmetrical ‘progressive neoliberal’ compromise. Drawing on Fraser (2017b, 2017c), 
this implies that efforts by the social forces behind the neoliberal hegemonic project are 
under pressure to find new forms of legitimacy, to seek alternative modes of social 
cohesion, to explore ‘ethical’ investment opportunities, and ways to offset some of the 
damage caused by the austerity approach to the fiscal crisis. These forces, mostly situated 
in higher-level state apparatuses and private firms form, in SIB projects, coalitions 
together with advocates of a progressive post-neoliberal hegemony project situated at 
lower levels of governmental and societal power, such as service providers and think 
tanks, who seek to open new pathways in a constrained environment, for more social 
intervention, funded through increased resources, and which link economic actors with 
societally beneficial activities.  
Yet, as described above, these policy experiments failed to achieve their goals within the 
time frames set out for them, and did so in such a way that conform more to the central 
demands of neoliberal governance strategies than they do to those pointing towards a 
progressive post-neoliberal trajectory. Only minor concessions to progressive advocates 
were achieved within the time-space envelope of the New York City and Peterborough 
cases. 
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But what do these outcomes say about the future of this contingent assemblage of 
‘progressive neoliberalism’ in the ongoing and mutating crisis conjuncture? Do they ‘fail 
forward’, allowing for their “manifest inadequacies [to] animate further rounds of 
[progressive] neoliberal invention” (Peck, 2012b, p. 6)? Or do these problems instead 
place more hurdles on the path to an encounter between the diverging hegemony projects 
of orthodox neoliberalism and progressive post-neoliberalism, and hence making the 
grounds more difficult for the negotiation of new provisional compromises?  
Strangely, both developments can be seen. On the one hand, SIBs have grown 
exponentially since their first appearance, numbering 100 projects around the globe in 
late 2017 totalling more than £285 million [$400 million] (Pioneers Post, 2018), with the 
U.K. leading this development. Despite the failure of the NYC project, Bloomberg and 
Goldman (2015) wrote of the country’s “growing appetite” for SIBs. In 2015, Goldman 
had already invested in an additional three SIBs, “with [n]umerous other financial 
institutions and private investors hav[ing] followed suit” (Bloomberg Philanthropies & 
Goldman Sachs, 2015).  
In summary, SIBs continued to expand, with innovative measures being developed to 
cope with and displace contradictions. Public authorities assuming no alternative accept 
the negative long-term fiscal costs. Investors find ways to reduce their losses or secure 
their profits through public subsidies. And social service organisations hope that the 
projects will expand the opportunities for directly funded services in the future, or resign 
themselves to the limited resources they receive in such projects. 
Yet just as SIBs continue to ‘fail forward’, it is not clear whether they can secure lasting 
progressive neoliberal alliances. At least in the two cases analysed here, their forward 
motion occurs only through geographical dispersion, as they fail to establish local roots 
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in either of the places they were located. Hence, SIBs appear to ‘fail forward’ just as the 
‘progressive neoliberal’ alliances underlying them break up. This is especially clear in the 
NYC case, as I explain below. 
Since the completion of the Peterborough and New York City projects, neither of these 
locations have seen the development of new SIBs. There has been however, new policy 
developments with the goal of decarceration. These are pursued in both locations in non-
SIB frameworks, without the participation of private investors. 
As described in chapter 5, the Peterborough SIB has been replaced by the country-wide 
probation programme ‘Transforming Rehabilitation’, while New York City is developing 
decarceration policies in entirely new political directions. 
Hence, there is an expansion of SIBs on the one hand, and the break-up of the local 
coalitions that underpinned the analysed cases on the other hand. How do we explain this? 
Is it possible for the policy to expand despite the failures which accumulate? What 
explains its ability to be repeated elsewhere? And why are these coalitions breaking up? 
And what does it tell us about the future of the struggle between competing hegemony 
projects? Are they re-grouping in new forms? 
Contradictory expansion of SIBs 
The expansion of SIBs has meant the intensification of its own fiscal contradictions. In a 
full inversion of the effort to address public funding gaps through SIBs, now governments 
are “fill[ing] the funding gap for UK social impact bonds”, as the Pioneers Post (2012) 
put it, essentially subsidising investor returns from public money. This is occurring on 
the national level in the U.K., while U.S. examples are more dispersed. Even before the 
Peterborough project was completed “outcome funds” were being created out of public 
money to “top up” outcome payments when savings were not achieved. The Cabinet 
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Office created a £20 million “Social Outcomes Fund” and the Big Lottery Fund forming 
a £40 million “Commissioning Better Outcomes” Fund for this purpose (Centre for Social 
Impact Bonds, 2013). Since 2017, more than £1 billion in subsidies have been committed 
by the U.K. government to supporting the ‘social investment market’, with the majority 
of these funds concentrated in the period since the financial crash (Floyd, 2017). Hence, 
SIBs are being promoted up front as a way of addressing a public deficit crisis, but 
ultimately spend public money on outcome payments to private investors. Because 
funding gaps are not reduced in such arrangements, these problems remain a source of 
new SIB initiatives, which intensifying public deficit problems, create new grounds for 
their promotion. 
The expansion of SIBs as economic strategy in the crisis conjuncture also means 
increasing uneven outcomes. As in the case studies, ‘shared value’ schemes appear rather 
to distribute wealth upwards. In order to make outcome payments, subsidies are drawing 
from public money. One way this is being done is through the Big Society Capital, a 
‘social investment bank’ established by the cabinet office, and through the 2008 Dormant 
Bank and Building Society Accounts Act (HM Treasury, 2014). The Act allows banks to 
transfer of assets from personal deposits accounts that are inactive for at least 15 years. 
With a portion of these funds retained in a “reclaim fund” to cover possible future claims, 
the rest is shuffled to the government’s impact investment bank, Big Society Capital, 
which uses the funds for a variety of social investment market financing activities, 
including SIBs (Big Society Capital, 2013). These investments build the SIB 
infrastructure that lowers investors’ contribution levels and raises outcome payments. 
For the government, the Dormant Accounts Act is part of an economic growth strategy, 
which seeks to break the credit freeze, by funnelling resources into the social investment 
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market with the goal of growing the social sector. Looking at the sources of these funds, 
we observe a consistent class dimension. This is based on calculations I’ve made from 
figures provided by The Guardian, who writes of an “estimated 500,000 dormant 
accounts in the UK worth around £500m” (The Guardian, 2010b). Dividing the total 
monetary amount by the total number of accounts leaves us with an average amount per 
personal deposit of £1,000.44 Following this money leads to the conclusion that the SIB 
infrastructure and outcome payments involve the enclosure of small savings, its transfer 
into public assets, and eventually shifted into private investor hands. This upward 
distribution of wealth is in striking contradiction to the stated goals of SIBs as an 
economic model for creating ‘shared value’. 
Such trends are echoed in the U.S. The U.S. National Advisory Board on Impact Investing 
(2014, p. 28) seeks to lower investor risks and raise their returns, among other means, 
through tax credits for philanthropic investors, and similarly to the U.K., by enlisting 
“unclaimed assets of dormant bank accounts” for project development and outcome 
payments. It calls for public subsidies for investors by “lower[ing] corporate tax rates for 
qualified impact businesses, lower capital gains rates for investors supporting qualified 
impact businesses, allow impact investors to write off losses as a charitable tax deduction, 
or allow individuals to deduct contributions to US impact initiatives” (US National 
Advisory Board on Impact Investing, 2014, p. 35). Other ways of creating profits through 
‘impact investing’ would be allowing tax loopholes for repatriated capital from overseas 
(US National Advisory Board on Impact Investing, 2014, p. 35). But such measures will 
essentially mean that investors will absorb public money, or “cannibalize philanthropic 
                                                          
44  Larger contributions would lower the average account sum, leading us to conclude that the money is 
mostly from middle- and lower-income persons. 
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and public funding and fail to increase the capital available to fund the needed  
interventions” (Godeke, 2013, p. 73). What results is, as Harvey (2005) states, an 
investment model built on the shifting of public assets into private hands, what he calls 
“accumulation by dispossession”.  
On the one hand, these examples show that SIBs tend increasing to replicate established 
modes of neoliberal governance. While it is questionable as to whether such forward 
failures may accumulate indefinitely, there are currently no signs of their development 
slowing down. This is to say, they continue to succeed in framing an answer to three 
intersection problems of the current crisis of neoliberalism, and providing some 
concessions to progressive actors, to continue moving forward despite their constraints. 
Coming apart? 
While SIBs are advancing, they are doing so by geographical dispersion and are not 
solidifying coalitions in a sustainable way within specific geographical settings. Since the 
completion of the case studies, neither Peterborough nor New York City have tested new 
SIBs. In each case, the completion of the projects meant the re-emergence of tensions 
which had been provisionally neutralised or subdued during the course of the projects. 
Following their completions, tensions re-emerged, and policy actors have pursued 
different kinds of restructuring. This can be seen most clearly in the way decarceration 
efforts have outlived the SIB projects and have in both locations been followed up in 
different policy frameworks.  
Since the conclusion of the NYC SIB, the succeeding progressive mayor of New York 
City, Bill DeBlasio, promised to close the Rikers Island facility, reducing the local jail 
population by half, to soften sentencing laws, and to end class-discriminatory bails (New 
York Times, 2017). This initiative is borne out of changing make-up of policy coalitions 
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in the city, with progressive post-neoliberal hegemony project appearing to apply more 
pressure than was seen in the case study. Neither Bloomberg nor Goldman Sachs are 
involved in these new arrangements. It arises from the pressure of progressive criminal 
justice reform groups in the city. Unlike the SIB, the progressive goal of decarceration is 
linked to progressive methods targeting structural causes of incarceration, rather than 
being linked to market governance frameworks of individualisation and behaviourist 
methods. Also, it does not include private investors, and instead, the city may benefit 
from any fiscal savings it achieves through facility closures, which it is not required to 
‘share’ (i.e. redistribute) with market actors. This indicates how progressive ideas and 
being linked to progressive methods in the reconfiguration of policy coalitions in the 
pursuit of decarceration goals, which aim to create public fiscal benefits without 
responsibilities to private investors. 
Peterborough has also seen new decarceration policies since the completion of the SIB. 
Yet, just as with the SIB, local actors continue to play a minor role in the policy formation. 
In the U.K. example, ‘Transforming Rehabilitation’ was decided by central government 
and expands probationary services to all short-term offenders in a country-wide program 
(Social Finance, 2013b). While this project is not a SIB, it uses similar performance-based 
contracts, but does not involve private investors. However, as described in the case 
chapter, the services offered by TR do not amount to social protections, but rather, are 
focused on labour market integration. In this case, the retreat of punitive prisonfare 
coincides with the expansion of disciplinary workfare. Likely due to the top-down 
implementation of the Peterborough SIB and TR, there are no clear signs of a stabilisation 
of a progressive neoliberal coalition in that city, nor the strengthening of progressive post-
neoliberal forces as we see in New York City. 




This chapter presented the accumulated research findings and my theoretical and 
methodological contribution to knowledge. I have described SIBs as a form of 
‘progressive neoliberal’ compromise linking progressive discourses with market-centric 
modes of governance. Also, I identified the achievements of progressive actors in these 
arrangements, and the constraints. My analysis focused on the asymmetries of power and 
the resulting uneven outcomes. I have argued that following the contradictory outcomes 
of the cases, there is both the further expansion of SIBs in a process of ‘failing forward’, 
as well as signs of tension and break up in the coalitions underpinning them. In the 
concluding chapter, I connect these research findings to broader questions regarding 
‘ethical capitalism’ as part of the struggle over hegemony in the U.K. and U.S. since the 
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8. Chapter 8 – Conclusion 
This thesis contributes to contemporary research on neoliberalism by analysing ‘ethical 
capitalism’ initiatives in the aftermath of the financial meltdown of 2008. It focuses on 
efforts to renew neoliberal hegemony in the case of the ‘social investment market’, as a 
way of linking market modes of governance with new notions of ‘public responsibility’. 
I argue that such efforts express an asymmetrical compromise of a ‘progressive 
neoliberal’ hegemony project. This concluding chapter presents and summarizes the main 
findings of my investigation and offers future research ideas. 
8.1. The ‘social investment market’ and the struggle over hegemony 
This dissertation argues that the ‘social investment market’ is part of the renegotiation of 
hegemony, and that the strivings towards ‘ethical capitalism’ should be understood as a 
‘progressive neoliberal’ hegemony project in the crisis conjuncture. It analyses efforts to 
link market modes of governance with new notions of public responsibility, and thereby 
create a harmony between market, state, and society, as an attempt to correct for the 
polarizing effects of neoliberalism and to renew capitalism by partially incorporating 
progressive alternatives. I show how Social Impact Bonds are part of the ‘iterative 
reconstitution’ of a crisis-ridden political economy (N. Brenner et al., 2010b, p. 16) 
responding to both ‘internal’ structural contradictions as well as ‘external’ political 
challenges favouring post-neoliberal exit strategies. This involves a ‘passive revolution’-
type process (Gramsci, 1971) to address structural problems through modernization by 
partially incorporating progressive alternatives, but doing so in such a way which extends 
rather than constrains market rule into the future. In doing so, I transform a common 
notion of ‘moral capitalism’, described by Clarke (2010a, p. 388), as a ‘muted echo of 
popular scepticism and outrage about the crisis of the present’, into a relational encounter 
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between competing ‘hegemony projects’. I thereby analyse the presence of alternatives 
within ‘responsible’ market governance initiatives, their discursive and material effect 
upon them, as well as their constraints. I conclude that the social investment market is a 
provisional fix in the form of a ‘progressive-neoliberal alliance’ (N. Fraser, 2017a), 
linking market expanding initiatives in an asymmetrical compromise with agents of a 
progressive post-neoliberal hegemony project, with uneven outcomes. 
The analysis challenges both the dominant narrative of ‘ethical capitalism’ presented in 
the literature of the ‘social finance industry’ (Rosenman, 2017), and the critical narrative 
found in much of the secondary literature. First I reveal the failure of concrete SIB 
projects to achieve the ‘paradigm shift’ and ‘revolution’, and the ‘aligned interests’ 
proclaimed in the dominant narrative. Such visions were impeded by failure to 
compromise market interests, resulting in the displacement rather than solution to 
problems, and the asymmetrical power relations tilted towards market actors. I showed 
how the projects produced uneven outcomes rather than ‘shared value’. (See chapter 7). 
My analysis also challenged important limitations in the secondary literature. If the social 
finance industry presented an overly optimistic neo-corporatist image, the secondary 
literature often over-emphasised the continuities of the social investment market with pre-
crisis forms of market governance and overlooked important discontinuities. I challenged 
the often undifferentiated conception of social impact bonds, for example, as the “the next 
neoliberal thing” (Schram, 2015), as the “mutation of privatisation” (Whitfield, 2012b), 
or the ‘colonization of society by finance’ (Chiapello, 2015). While this literature 
highlighted important continuities between the SIM and dominant modes of market 
governance, it often overlooked equally significant discontinuities or challenges. 
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My empirical case studies confirm three central critiques of the social investment market 
advanced in the secondary literature. First, I show that, counter to the dominant narratives 
(A. Fraser et al., 2016), SIBs do not necessarily shift fiscal risk away from the public and 
onto the private sector. Instead, there are persistent public fiscal risks due to risk 
mitigation mechanisms deployed by public and third party actors, which lower investor 
risk by raising public liabilities (McKay, 2013, 2014; Warner, 2013). The case studies 
strongly challenged a second dominant narrative of SIBs, namely the idea that they ‘solve 
society’s most intractable problems at their roots’. I revealed that ‘social impact’ is 
narrowly construed in ‘individualist’ frameworks supporting methods of personal 
behavioural change and individual self-reliance, which insulate social conditions or 
structural causes from consideration (Joy & Shields, 2013, p. 43; McHugh et al., 2013, p. 
249), and which effectively limited the project’s outcomes. My research confirmed also 
a third concern in the literature (Dowling, 2016, p. 9), namely that the economic practices 
would not ‘produce shared value’, but instead reward investors through a zero-sum game 
by shifting public assets into private hands without public benefits, in a process described 
by Harvey (2005) as ‘accumulation by dispossession’. 
Yet, while I identified these clear continuities between the dominant modes of market 
governance and emerging strategy of ‘ethical capitalism’ in my case studies, I also 
brought to light relevant discontinuities. These were equally represented in three 
examples. First, I argued that the goal of reducing recidivism in both case studies marks 
a symbolic shift away from dominant modes of managing social crises based on punitive 
punishment and mass incarceration, which have developed as part of neoliberal 
governance practices in both national contexts. Against nearly three decades of 
‘prisonfare’ (Wacquant, 1999, 2009, 2010, 2011), and the ‘punitive punishment of the 
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poor’, each case articulated a goal of ‘decarceration’ and ‘community re-settlement’. 
Second, I argued that a discontinuity could be seen with regards to fiscal policy, and that 
SIBs represent a partial critique of austerity’s scarcity argument. In contrast to the 
‘necessity’ of fiscal consolidation, public service cuts, and welfare retrenchment, ‘impact 
investing’ schemes imply that the problem is not scarcity of resources but instead their 
maldistribution. The other side of public fiscal deficits is private capital surpluses. 
Government ‘mobilisation’ of private resources is aimed at achieving net public savings 
even after making outcome payments. The third way SIBs are differentiated from 
dominant modes of market governance is with their idea of ‘producing shared value’. This 
vision of creating benefits for all ‘stakeholders’, both for society and investors, contrasts 
to a dominant market discourse of self-interest and shareholder value. Furthermore, this 
is not simply a contradiction between words and deeds, rhetoric and action. I explained 
that discursive shifts opened practical opportunities which were previously unavailable, 
even if these were limited (e.g. additional resources for new services).45 
In view of these contradictions, my original contribution to knowledge is to conceptualise 
the ‘social investment market’, and the broader ‘ethical capitalism’ project of which it is 
part, as a compromise formation. This enabled me to describe the research object not as 
a policy instrument but as a social relationship, traversing the institutions of society, the 
economy, and the state. Instead of a single, unitary object, SIBs are understood as an 
encounter between multiple competing projects each articulating different visions for 
societal restructuring. I analysed the negotiation between these competing visions, as well 
as the provisional settlements they achieved. This included a discursive struggle over 
                                                          
45  Tse and Warner (2018) argue that such discursive shifts have created support for progressive policy 
approaches following the completion of SIBs projects in some cases. 
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competing social imaginaries, and depicted the winners and losers in the struggles to 
advance certain kinds of collective action geared towards specific policy goals and 
political ends. 
This strategic-relational approach succeeded in operationalising Clarke’s (2010a, p. 388) 
simple definition of ‘moral capitalism’ as a ‘muted echo of popular scepticism and 
outrage about the crisis of the present’, by describing a dynamic social relationship 
between competing hegemony projects, and the lines of conflict between them. I showed 
both the presence of ‘critique’ within the SIBs, while simultaneously accounting for its 
constraints (i.e. how it is ‘muted’). In doing so, I identified both the advances and setbacks 
of the different strategic actors, and the constraints upon their desired actions and goals. 
In conceptualising SIBs as a ‘progressive neoliberal’ compromise, I show how the 
incorporation of elements of a diffuse counter-neoliberal sentiment into a modified form 
of market governance by linking it with notions of public responsibility. I build on Nancy 
Fraser’s (2017a) concept, which conceives of the ‘third way’ projects beginning with 
Blair and Clinton, as an alliance between “mainstream liberal currents of the new social 
movements” with sections of finance capitalism. SIBs represent, like other ‘third way’ 
projects, a provisional compromise between an orthodox neoliberal hegemony projects 
on the one side, and a progressive post-neoliberal one on the other. In the analysed 
projects, progressives achieve certain, albeit limited, concessions in the management of 
contemporary capitalist crisis, but do not point to a breakthrough into a new paradigm, as 
proclaimed by some advocates of the ‘social finance industry’ (see G8 Social Impact 
Investment Taskforce, 2014). This compromise is detailed in the previous chapter, and 
builds upon Clifton and Warner’s (2013) conceptualisation of SIBs as a ‘third way’ 
strategy. 
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This conceptualisation echoes recent studies in the field of cultural and political economy 
research seeking differentiated concepts of neoliberalism, for example, those examining 
neoliberalism’s potential ‘communitarian’ turn (Bieling, 2006; W. Davies, 2012). The 
albeit limited critiques of neoliberal governance articulated within social investment 
market projects, as discussed above, are neither overcome through the neo-corporatist 
arrangements, nor completely nullified through their contradiction with actual practices. 
This argument coheres with similar perspectives found in the critical literature on post-
crisis dynamics. As Davies (2012, pp. 440–441) writes in his analysis of 
‘neocommunitarianism’, such elements can neither “be simply explained away as 
neoliberalism in disguise” nor are these “necessarily emancipatory or normatively 
desirable”. They might however constitute “elements of a post-neoliberal paradigm.” This 
all depends upon context and conduct, or structural selectivities and strategic action. 
Bieling (2006, p. 218) also stresses the need to “elaborate an even more differentiated 
analytical concept, in order to avoid the trap of terming all and everything that happens 
nowadays as ‘neoliberal’.” This might help identify “potential source of counter-
hegemonic transformation, even if they are – unintentionally – in favour of certain 
elements of neoliberal restructuring” (ibid).  
But this encounter between multiple projects within a single policy was described, with 
reference to Gramsci (1971, pp. 219–220), in terms of a ‘passive revolution’. It is 
insufficient to represent a plurality between competing projects within a single ‘ethical 
capitalism’ project, without discussing the relation between these competing drives. Just 
as critical discourse theory is concerned with the ‘order of discourse’, that is, with the 
structuring or arrangement between multiple discourses (Fairclough, 2012, p. 456), I am 
concerned not only with the fusion character of SIBs, but with the relationship between 
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dominant and marginal projects within it. In doing so, I applied Gramsci’s (1971, pp. 
219–220) concept of ‘passive revolution’ to describe “the dialectic of 
‘revolution/restoration’” within these projects, and concluded that the predominating 
tendency was towards the ‘restoration’ of market rule rather than those tending towards 
‘revolutionary’ ones. 
I argue that ‘ethical capitalism’ can be understood as a process whereby a crisis-ridden 
hegemony partially and selectively incorporates its opposition, using innovation rather 
than repression to overcome hurdles. But oppositional actors make strategic choices to 
join such projects because of the perceived concessions for these junior partners. Their 
power is limited to altering the general contours of such projects, helping stabilise the 
overall order, and effectively prevent a shift towards a significantly different 
developmental trajectory.  
But, incorporation of alternatives, as I argued above, does not mean their wholesale 
negation. Passive revolutions do not ‘turn back history’ as “restorations in toto do not 
exist” (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 219–220). On the one hand, ‘ethical capitalism’ presents a new 
horizon of thought towards the idea of an ethical economy beyond capitalism, but it 
simultaneously involves the economization of ethics through further rounds of 
commodification. The ‘social investment market’ may push against some of the limits of 
a neoliberal order of an increasingly uneven development, but it’s refusal to depart from 
a valorisation paradigm also closes off the possibility of such a transition. It represents, 
in the conjuncture of hegemonic crisis, a ‘passive dialectic’ (Haug, 2008, p. 24), 
integrating and fragmenting a critique of neoliberalism and simultaneously subordinating 
such negations, creating a forward motion which carries protagonists of a post-neoliberal 
project along backwards. 
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But I believe this critical investigation of the social investment market also provides 
grounds for challenging the notion of a ‘crisis of critique’ (Hickel & Khan, 2012). 
Whereas critics are correct to point out how capitalism recuperates, fragments, and 
aestheticizes alternatives through the development of a ‘new spirit of capitalism’ 
(Boltanski & Chiapello, 2006), the problem may be framed, in Gramscian terms, as a 
crisis of practice. The case studies showed not the absence of critique, but its structural 
limitations. A ‘passive’ rather than ‘active’ consensus could be detected, as some actors 
within the policy processes sought to use the SIBs towards their advantage, and expressed 
scepticism towards its dominant narrative. What I identify is the ubiquity of critical 
perspectives, the mere contingency of their link to market modes of governance in this 
case, and the ongoing struggle between competing actors, as Zizek (2011) argues, to 
“appropriate” this “overload” of critique, and to reassemble it as part of a project with 
post-neoliberal potential.  
Lest this point be misunderstood, the case analysis revealed little reason to expect 
substantive changes in a post-neoliberal direction within the framework of the ‘social 
investment market’. Rather the opposite was true. We see the development towards 
accumulation by dispossession through public and third party subsidies, less fiscal 
protection for the public, and narrowing parameters for social impact. Hence, while we 
can identify “progressive elements” within these projects, it does not appear that the 
‘social investment market’ will achieve an incrementalist progressive politics. As Bieling 
(2006, p. 221) writes, they will not succeed on their own, but “only realize their potential 
if the material dimensions of the social and cultural crisis – i.e. socioeconomic 
inequalities, hierarchies and power relations – are not ignored but forcefully addressed in 
order to overcome the neoliberal configuration.” This is very unlikely to occur within the 
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current framework of the ‘social investment market’, but we could imagine similar 
progressive ideas and actors reassembled around different projects and in different 
contexts. They might find better compromises, which more substantively embed 
economies in structures of democratic accountability, subordinate them to ethical 
concerns and use values, and achieve equitable redistribution. As I discuss below, the 
changing political context, ten years after the rapid growth of the social investment 
market, might provide a shifting strategically selective context within which strategic 
action could make the difference. But this, as discussed below, cannot be concluded from 
the current research project, and only be investigated through future research. 
8.2. Contribution to research on neoliberalism, crisis, and hegemony 
My thesis contributes to contemporary research on neoliberalism and hegemony in 
multiple ways. First, it offers a more nuanced explanation of the ‘strange non-death of 
neoliberalism’ (Crouch, 2011) since the crash of 2008. It does so by complementing the 
dominant narrative focusing on ‘post-democracy’ and authoritarian restoration (Bruff, 
2014; Crouch, 2016; Habermas, 2011; Jessop, 2013; Offe, 2013), by illuminating efforts 
to create a new consensus around the idea of ‘ethical capitalism’. Alongside a ‘punitive 
neoliberalism’ which attacks its fragmented and marginalised political opposition (W. 
Davies, 2016, p. 132), is an effort to selectively integrate alternatives, in a piecemeal 
fashion, into a project of modernisation, reform, and compromise. I show that 
neoliberalism is restored through both coercive and consensual modes of power thereby 
reshaping hegemony. Here, post-neoliberal alternatives are not merely excluded and 
repressed, but also, through a passive revolutionary process, partially incorporated and 
reshaped in the development of the ‘social investment market’ with the effort to link 
market modes of governance with notions of ‘public responsibility’. 
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Hence, absent a Polanyian-style ‘pendulum swing’ involving a new ‘great 
transformation’ and the ‘re-embedding’ of the economy (Dale, 2012; Peck et al., 2012), 
and the blockage towards a post-neoliberal transformation, we experience multiple 
‘double movements’ within neoliberalism, ‘ricocheting’ effects at different sites and 
scales, and contributing to the iterative reconstitution of the political economy (N. 
Brenner et al., 2010b, p. 16). I showed how then, market governance responds to the dual 
challenge of internal structural crisis and external subjective challenge in multiple ways, 
and described efforts to address these challenges through innovation, seeking to 
recuperate alternatives, in a way that provided certain concessions, but allow for a flexible 
mode of ‘correspondence’ (Brand, 2014, p. 434) with capitalism’s drive towards 
expansion and its requirements of stability. 
While my analysis reconstructs a ‘progressive neoliberal’ hegemony project, it is 
concerned with representing a strategy, and not assessing whether hegemony problems 
have been solved. The qualitative case study method allowed for a level of analysis 
operating at a lower scale, which was able to describe strategies and processes with 
limited generalizability. While it may be possible to generalize about the kinds of 
conflicts and settlements between the analysed cases and a larger population, the study is 
not designed to resolve the question of whether an appropriate ‘fix’ has been achieved. 
What the case studies do show is a process of ‘failing forward’, that is, the contradictory 
expansion of a hegemony project despite its at least partial failure to achieve its goals 
locally. Since the world’s first SIB in Peterborough in 2010, over 100 SIBs have now 
been implemented across the globe (Pioneers Post, 2018), and the ‘social investment 
market’ has steadily grown. 
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However, ten years after the crisis of 2008, it is unclear whether this quantitative growth 
will continue to coincide with their qualitative status as a corrective to a polarizing market 
economy. It is quite possible that their failing forwards may not disrupt their geographical 
dispersion, but that it could jeopardize their standing as an innovative hegemony project. 
Just as my analysis frames the social investment market as a progressive neoliberal 
hegemony project in the direct aftermath of the economic crisis of 2008, we might reflect 
on the current political context, which has shifted in important ways, and therefore 
changed the calculations among actors for their political opportunities. 
If progressive ideas and actors were able to be linked to market governance structures 
following 2008, this was, as I argued, due to the weakness and fragmentation of a 
progressive post-neoliberal forces at that time. But political events of 2016 may have 
changed this context again, and with it, complicated the future of ‘ethical capitalism’. 
This is due to the defeat of ‘third way’ politics in the U.S. and U.K. contexts, with the 
loss by Hillary Clinton in the presidential election, and the U.K. referendum to leave the 
E.U. These defeats of the centre at the hands of the conservative nationalist right were 
coupled by the renewal of the Left in both countries, with the insurgent leadership battle 
of self-described democratic socialist Bernie Sanders and the victory of the left-wing 
Jeremy Corbyn to lead the Labour Party (Rehmann, 2016). These changes in the party 
landscape reflect similar changes in society, possibly increasing the opportunities for 
progressive policy-making. What this changing context means for my research topic, is a 
shift in the structural selectivities affecting the possibilities of ‘ethical’ or ‘responsible 
economy’ initiatives. Advocates of the post-neoliberal persuasion might find themselves 
better positioned in the ongoing battle and negotiation over policy, and more broadly, 
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over the ideas and proposed practices of our common future, and move from a situation 
of ‘passive’ to ‘active dialectics’ (Haug, 2008). 
8.3. Future research 
 
Following from this perspective, I propose three possibilities for future research. 
First, it would be interesting to test the thesis developed here in a larger population group. 
Are the conflicts described here representative for other SIBs? That is, do we see in other 
cases, a conflict over the meaning of ‘social impact’ between narrow behaviourist 
approaches and those targeting structural causes of social polarisation? How are fiscal 
issues addressed? Is there a similar struggle over fiscal risk and the liabilities of publics 
versus private actors? And how do the efforts to ‘produce shared value’ play out? Do they 
achieve economic growth in extractivist form, or do they overcome the zero-sum game 
typical of neoliberal accumulation strategies? 
If policies are the ‘strategic terrain’ of larger hegemony projects, we might also take a 
longitudinal approach, investigating the medium or long-term effects upon policy or 
political context beyond the lifespan of SIB projects, as Tse and Warner (2018) have 
done. This suggestion is not hypothetical but instead based on historical developments 
since the completion of each project. As described in chapter 6, following the completion 
of the NYC SIB, there have been important developments in the direction of a 
decarceration policy, with the new (progressive) mayor DeBlasio promising to close 
Rikers prison, sharply reduce the prison population, and liberalise sentencing laws. These 
promises push the decarceration goal, yet do so in a progressive way, by addressing 
structural and political causes of incarceration, rather than through personal behaviour 
change. Yet it is a matter of concrete research to determine whether this is a matter of 
correspondence or causality between the SIB and the proposed changes. As described in 
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chapter 5, the Peterborough SIB was followed by the rolling out of country-wide 
probationary services for all short-term offenders. Some commentators argue that the SIB 
contributed to this expansion of social services, while others counter that the SIB reflected 
a changing political mood that had already been set in motion. Here one could investigate 
whether there is a correspondence or causal relationship. But there is an additional aspect 
to consider. If the Transforming Rehabilitation programme replicates the Peterborough 
services, then punitive prisonfare might only retreat through the expansion of disciplinary 
workfare. As described in chapter 5, this would reflect the tendency within performance-
based policy towards performativity, as a quantitative concept of ‘social impact’ strips 
away qualitative considerations of life quality. Additionally, other examples of the ‘social 
investment market’ could be investigated, other than Social Impact Bonds. 
The second idea for future research projects would be to expand the focus beyond SIBs, 
onto other ‘social investment market’ products, or even further, to include ‘participatory 
budgeting’ projects, ‘universal basic income’, and ‘shared economy’ initiatives in both 
the global North and South. Bringing together a cultural political economy approach and 
the historical materialist policy analysis, as developed here, may provide new insights 
into the encounter, conflicts, negotiations, and compromises in these projects between 
competing hegemony projects, and identify openings for progressive alternatives, as well 
as their blockages. 
The final research idea takes a step further away from the ‘social investment market’ in 
particular to explore the question of ‘progressive neoliberalism’ more broadly. Reflecting 
on the changes since 2016 (discussed above), namely the erosion of the centre and 
strengthening of Left-wing forces, we might investigate how such ‘ethical capitalism’ 
projects resonate in the near future. Can the ‘progressive neoliberal alliance’ persist in 
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this changed context? Or do the new polarisations to the left and the right in the USA and 
the UK make such contingent assemblages more difficult to sustain, and new 
opportunities emerge for other courses of action? Is Fraser (2017a) correct to view 
‘progressive neoliberalism’ as a vulnerable alliance in this new context? Are we seeing, 
as Fraser (ibid) argues, a division in the ‘progressive neoliberal’ alliance through the 
regrouping of some of these political forces behind a new ‘progressive populism’? In 
other words, do we see the disaggregation of the links between market governance and 
notions of public responsibility? And if so, are public responsibility initiatives regrouping 
behind ‘ethical economy’ initiatives that transcend market frameworks, or at least seek to 
restrain them? And do these initiatives gain strength from the growing support for 
progressive perspectives in society and contribute to a “new counterhegemonic bloc” 
(ibid)? 
8.4. Conclusion 
This thesis concludes by returning to the prefatory quotes at the beginning of this text. 
Following the analysis laid out in this research project, I now argue that the ‘revolution’ 
which the G8’s Social Impact Investment Taskforce (2014) both professed and promised 
to bring about, does, as Clarke (2010a, p. 388) writes, represents, a ‘muted echo of popular 
scepticism and outrage about the crisis of the present.” It reflects the forces of progress 
but also their blockage by countervailing forces of neoliberal restoration, and hence a 
‘passive revolution’. This research project observed ‘ethical capitalism’ to tend towards 
‘restoration’ rather than ‘revolution’, in Gramsci’s (2007, p. 252) terms. But, as there are 
no restorations “in toto” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 220), my contribution disclosed the contours 
of contemporary struggles over hegemony even inside the very forms of market 
governance themselves, to identify processes of becoming, and the political economy’s 
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iterative reconstitution, and with it, the emerging new terrain upon which the battles over 
hegemony in the near future will be fought. Discovering how these new processes play 
out is the work of future research. I hope my research has contributed to these efforts. 
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